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Artificial intelligence and work organisation

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Artificial intelligence and work organisation

Using the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), this paper examines the relationship between occupational exposure to Artificial Intelligence (AI) and changes in work organisation between roughly 2011 and 2024, a period that encompasses the early diffusion of generative AI. Work organisation has evolved over this period, with manual tasks declining, problem solving and information-processing tasks becoming more prevalent, and teamwork becoming increasingly common. AI may have played some role in these changes: occupations more exposed to AI have seen a smaller increase in monotonous tasks, while the frequency of some information-processing tasks has increased faster. That being said, rising educational attainment appears to have played a more significant role in some of these changes in work organisation, underscoring the continued importance of investments in education and training.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Employment, Work Organisation.

JEL codes: J2, J5, J8, L2, M1, M5.

Résumé

En s'appuyant sur l'Évaluation des compétences des adultes (PIAAC) et l'Enquête européenne sur les conditions de travail (EWCS), ce document examine les liens entre l'exposition des professions à l'intelligence artificielle (IA) et l'évolution de l'organisation du travail entre 2011 et 2024 environ, une période qui englobe les débuts de la diffusion de l'IA générative. L'organisation du travail a changé pendant cette période : les tâches manuelles ont reculé, les tâches liées à la résolution de problèmes et au traitement de l'information ont gagné en importance, et le travail en équipe est devenu de plus en plus courant. L'IA pourrait avoir contribué à ces changements : dans les professions plus exposées à l'IA, les tâches monotones ont moins augmenté tandis que la fréquence de certaines tâches de traitement de l'information a augmenté plus rapidement. Néanmoins, certains changements dans l'organisation du travail semblent tenir davantage à l'élévation du niveau d'instruction, ce qui souligne combien il importe de poursuivre les investissements dans l'enseignement et la formation.

Abstract

Im vorliegenden Arbeitspapier wird auf Basis der Erhebung über die Kompetenzen Erwachsener (PIAAC) und der Europäischen Erhebung über Arbeitsbedingungen (EWCS) der Zusammenhang zwischen der beruflichen Exposition gegenüber künstlicher Intelligenz (KI) und Veränderungen der Arbeitsorganisation im Zeitraum von etwa 2011 bis 2024 untersucht – einem Zeitraum, in den auch die beginnende Verbreitung generativer KI fällt. In diesem Zeitraum hat sich die Arbeitsorganisation verändert: Manuelle Tätigkeiten sind zurückgegangen, Aufgaben zur Problemlösung und Informationsverarbeitung haben an Bedeutung gewonnen, und Teamarbeit ist zunehmend üblich geworden. KI könnte zu diesen Veränderungen beigetragen haben: In Berufen mit höherer KI-Exposition haben monotone Tätigkeiten weniger stark zugenommen, während die Häufigkeit bestimmter Aufgaben der Informationsverarbeitung rascher gestiegen ist. Allerdings scheint der Anstieg des Bildungsstands bei bestimmten Veränderungen der Arbeitsorganisation eine größere Rolle gespielt zu haben. Dies unterstreicht, dass Investitionen in Allgemeinbildung und berufliche Bildung nach wie vor wichtig sind.

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This paper contributes to the OECD's Artificial Intelligence in Work, Innovation, Productivity and Skills (AI-WIPS) programme, which provides policymakers with new evidence and analysis to keep abreast of the fast-evolving changes in AI capabilities and diffusion, and their implications for the world of work. The programme aims to help ensure that adoption of AI in the world of work is effective, beneficial to all, people-centred and accepted by the population at large. AI-WIPS is supported by the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) and will complement the work of the German AI Observatory in the ministry's Policy Lab Digital, Work & Society. For more information, visit https://oecd.ai/en/work-innovation-productivity-skills and https://denkfabrik-bmas.de/.

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Executive summary

Work organisation refers to how work is structured and managed within a workplace to achieve an organisation's goals. It is about how tasks are divided, allocated and performed, who takes decisions, as well as the interdependencies between workers.

Work organisation matters because it impacts both worker and firm outcomes. For firms, aspects of work organisation are linked to productivity and innovation. Work organisation can also affect worker engagement and well-being, as well as their health.

Historically, work organisation has been shaped by successive waves of technological innovation. Each industrial revolution – from mechanisation and electricity to digitalisation – has brought about shifts in how work is performed and managed.

Already, there is some evidence that AI is changing the tasks that workers do, how they perform these tasks, and the skills they require to do so. There is also evidence that AI helps with decision making and is changing the way workers are managed, including the relationships they have with their managers. To date, however, little is known about how significant and widespread these changes are.

This working paper digs deeper into the link between AI and work organisation, by reviewing the recent literature and presenting new evidence from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). More specifically, the paper documents links between AI exposure and changes in work organisation at the occupational level, over a period of approximately ten years which just captures the introduction of generative AI (2011-2012 to 2022-2023 for PIAAC, and 2015 to 2024 for EWCS).

Work organisation has changed over this period. There has been a decline in physical and manual work, while monotonous and administrative tasks have been on the rise, and workers also spend more time solving problems at work. Perhaps one of the most significant changes is the rise in information-processing tasks. Some aspects of worker discretion, autonomy and decision making appear to have improved, and teamwork and communication have become more common.

AI may have played some role in these changes. Perhaps as expected, changes in physical and manual tasks are uncorrelated with exposure to current AI technologies. However, AI exposure seems to be associated with a greater increase in certain information-processing tasks, like writing and reading memos, e-mails, and directions. While AI exposure appears associated with the frequency of solving simple problems, there is no relationship with the frequency of doing complex tasks or solving complex problems. At the same time, the evidence does not support concerns that AI is ushering in a new era of Taylorism. In fact, there is little evidence that, as of 2025, AI exposure is associated with significant changes in worker discretion and autonomy, either positive or negative. If anything, in fact, AI exposure appears to be associated with a lower increase in monotonous tasks and an increase in job satisfaction.

One limitation of the study is that it looks at AI exposure rather than actual adoption, good measures of which are unfortunately lacking at the occupational level for the time period studied. In addition, the period covered by the analysis spans the early years where generative AI was introduced. More significant

impacts on work organisation may therefore be detected in years to come as both the technology continues to progress and adoption increases. It is also possible that in certain sectors and occupations, AI has already had a more significant impact on work organisation that does not show up at the aggregate level.

However, the findings of the study may help explain why, to date at least, the impact of AI has not yet been clearly visible in aggregate productivity statistics. For that to occur, companies using AI may need to redesign work processes and workflows in a more substantial way so that it results in a more effective integration of the technology in the operations of firms. Indeed, the evidence to date suggests that while AI's breadth of application is wide – i.e. it touches many occupations – its depth remains limited, with only a small share of tasks affected in most occupations.

Finally, it is worth noting that, for the period covered in this study at least, some changes, such as reductions in manual work, and increases in both problem solving and worker discretion, have been much more closely associated with changes in educational attainment of the workforce than with exposure to AI. While nothing can be said about the direction of causality of this finding, it does point to the continued importance of investing in education, training and skills.

Synthèse

L'organisation du travail désigne la manière dont le travail est structuré et encadré dans une entreprise pour atteindre des objectifs. Elle renvoie à la répartition, l'attribution et l'exécution des tâches, aux autorités décisionnelles, et aux interdépendances entre les travailleurs.

Si l'organisation du travail est importante, c'est parce qu'elle influe à la fois sur les résultats des travailleurs et sur ceux des entreprises. Dans les entreprises, l'organisation du travail influe sur l'efficience, la productivité et l'innovation. Elle peut aussi avoir une incidence sur l'implication et le bien-être des travailleurs, ainsi que sur leur santé.

Du point de vue historique, l'organisation du travail a été façonnée par des vagues successives d'innovation technologique. Chaque révolution industrielle (mécanisation, électricité et transformation numérique) a entraîné des changements dans l'exécution et la gestion du travail.

Certains éléments montrent déjà que l'IA transforme les tâches effectuées par les travailleurs, mais aussi la façon dont ils les exécutent et les compétences dont ils ont besoin pour le faire. On observe aussi que l'IA est un appui à la prise de décision et qu'elle modifie les modalités de gestion des travailleurs, y compris les relations qu'ils entretiennent avec leurs managers. Pour autant, on sait encore peu de choses sur l'importance et l'ampleur de ces changements.

Ce document de travail examine plus en profondeur les liens entre l'IA et l'organisation du travail, en passant en revue les publications récentes et en présentant de nouvelles données issues de l'Évaluation des compétences des adultes (PIAAC) et de l'Enquête européenne sur les conditions de travail (EWCS). Plus précisément, il recense les liens entre l'exposition à l'IA et les changements dans l'organisation du travail au niveau des professions, sur une période de 10 ans environ, qui tient compte des débuts de la diffusion de l'IA générative (2011-2012 à 2022-2023 pour le PIAAC, et 2015 à 2024 pour l'EWCS).

Cette période a été marquée par un changement dans l'organisation du travail. Le travail physique et manuel a diminué, tandis que les tâches monotones et administratives augmentent et que les travailleurs passent plus de temps à résoudre des problèmes au travail. L'un des changements les plus importants peut-être est la progression des tâches relatives au traitement de l'information. Certaines dimensions de la latitude et de l'autonomie dont bénéficient les travailleurs, mais aussi de leur pouvoir de décision, semblent s'être améliorées, et le travail en équipe et la communication se généralisent.

Ces changements pourraient avoir été influencés par l'IA. Comme on pouvait peut-être s'y attendre, les changements dans les tâches physiques et manuelles ne sont pas corrélés à l'exposition aux technologies d'IA actuelles. Néanmoins, l'exposition à l'IA semble être associée à une progression plus importante de certaines tâches liées au traitement de l'information, comme la lecture de mémos, d'e-mails et d'instructions. Néanmoins, s'il semble y avoir un lien entre l'exposition à l'IA et la fréquence des tâches consistant à résoudre des problèmes simples, il n'y a pas de corrélation avec la fréquence des tâches complexes ou la résolution de problèmes complexes. Parallèlement, les données disponibles ne permettent pas d'affirmer que l'IA ouvre la voie à une nouvelle ère de taylorisme. En fait, peu d'éléments attestent qu'en 2025, l'exposition à l'IA est associée à des changements significatifs dans la latitude et l'autonomie dont bénéficient les travailleurs, qu'ils soient positifs ou négatifs. L'exposition à l'IA semble

même associée à une moindre hausse des tâches monotones et à une augmentation de la satisfaction professionnelle.

L'une des limites de cet examen est qu'il porte sur l'exposition à l'IA plutôt que sur son adoption effective, pour laquelle on manque malheureusement de mesures fiables au niveau des professions pour la période considérée. Par ailleurs, la période couverte par l'analyse n'aborde que les premières années de l'introduction de l'IA générative. Son influence grandissante sur l'organisation du travail pourrait ainsi être mise en lumière dans les années à venir, à mesure que la technologie et son adoption continueront de progresser. Dans certains secteurs et certaines professions, l'IA pourrait d'ores et déjà avoir eu une incidence plus importante sur l'organisation du travail, qui ne ressort pas des données agrégées.

Toutefois, les conclusions de l'étude pourraient contribuer à expliquer pourquoi, à ce jour du moins, l'incidence de l'IA n'est pas encore nettement visible dans les statistiques agrégées sur la productivité. Pour qu'elle ressorte, les entreprises qui utilisent l'IA devront peut-être repenser plus en profondeur leurs processus et flux de travail afin de favoriser une intégration plus efficace de cette technologie dans leurs activités. En effet, les données disponibles à ce jour suggèrent qu'en dépit du large champ d'application de l'IA, qui touche de nombreuses professions, sa mise en œuvre effective reste limitée et elle ne concerne qu'une petite partie seulement des tâches dans la plupart des professions.

Il convient enfin de noter que, pour la période considérée dans l'étude du moins, certaines évolutions, ainsi que la réduction de travail manuel, l'augmentation du temps que les travailleurs passent à résoudre des problèmes au travail, et l'amélioration de l'autonomie, sont bien plus étroitement liée à l'évolution du niveau de formation de la main-d'œuvre qu'à l'exposition à l'IA. Si rien ne permet de déterminer le sens de ce lien de causalité, il montre en tout cas à quel point il reste important d'investir dans l'éducation, la formation et les compétences.

Zusammenfassung

Arbeitsorganisation bezieht sich auf die Art und Weise, wie Arbeit in einem Unternehmen strukturiert und verwaltet wird, um dessen Ziele zu erreichen. Dabei geht es darum, wie Aufgaben aufgeteilt, zugewiesen und ausgeführt werden, wer Entscheidungen trifft und welche Interdependenzen zwischen Beschäftigten bestehen.

Die Arbeitsorganisation ist deshalb wichtig, weil sie sowohl die Ergebnisse der Beschäftigten als auch die der Unternehmen beeinflusst. Bestimmte Aspekte der Arbeitsorganisation werden auf Unternehmensebene mit Produktivität und Innovation in Verbindung gebracht. Darüber hinaus kann sich die Arbeitsorganisation auf das Engagement und das Wohlbefinden der Beschäftigten sowie auf ihre Gesundheit auswirken.

Im historischen Rückblick wurde die Arbeitsorganisation durch aufeinanderfolgende Wellen technologischer Innovation geprägt. Jede industrielle Revolution – von der Mechanisierung über die Elektrifizierung bis hin zur Digitalisierung – hat die Art und Weise verändert, wie Arbeit ausgeführt und verwaltet wird.

Es gibt bereits Anzeichen dafür, dass KI die Aufgaben, die Beschäftigte zu erledigen haben, die Art und Weise, wie sie diese Aufgaben ausführen, und die Kompetenzanforderungen, denen sie gerecht werden müssen, verändert. Zudem gibt es Belege dafür, dass KI die Entscheidungsfindung erleichtert und die Mitarbeiterführung verändert, einschließlich der Beziehungen zwischen Beschäftigten und Führungskräften. Bislang ist allerdings nur wenig über die Bedeutung und das Ausmaß dieser Veränderungen bekannt.

In diesem Arbeitspapier wird der Zusammenhang zwischen KI und Arbeitsorganisation eingehender untersucht, indem die jüngste Fachliteratur analysiert und neue Erkenntnisse aus der Erhebung über die Kompetenzen Erwachsener (PIAAC) und der Europäischen Erhebung über die Arbeitsbedingungen (EWCS) präsentiert werden. Konkret werden über einen Zeitraum von ungefähr zehn Jahren, der gerade noch die Einführung generativer KI erfasst (2011-2012 bis 2022-2023 bei PIAAC und 2015 bis 2024 bei EWCS), Zusammenhänge zwischen der KI-Exposition und Veränderungen der Arbeitsorganisation auf Berufsebene dokumentiert.

In diesem Zeitraum hat sich die Arbeitsorganisation verändert. Körperliche und manuelle Arbeit ist zurückgegangen, während monotone und administrative Aufgaben zugenommen haben und Beschäftigte am Arbeitsplatz mehr Zeit damit verbringen, Probleme zu lösen. Eine der wohl bedeutendsten Veränderungen ist die Zunahme informationsverarbeitender Tätigkeiten. Der Handlungsspielraum, die Autonomie und die Entscheidungsfindung von Arbeitskräften scheinen sich in einigen Aspekten verbessert zu haben, und Teamarbeit und Kommunikation haben zunehmend an Bedeutung gewonnen.

KI könnte dabei eine gewisse Rolle gespielt haben. Wie vielleicht zu erwarten war, besteht keine Korrelation zwischen Veränderungen bei körperlichen und manuellen Tätigkeiten und der Exposition gegenüber aktuellen KI-Technologien. Allerdings scheint die KI-Exposition mit einem stärkeren Anstieg bestimmter informationsverarbeitender Tätigkeiten in Zusammenhang zu stehen, etwa dem Verfassen und Lesen von Mitteilungen, E-Mails und Anweisungen. Die KI-Exposition scheint mit der Häufigkeit assoziiert

zu sein, mit der einfache Probleme gelöst werden, nicht jedoch damit, wie häufig komplexe Aufgaben erledigt oder komplexe Probleme gelöst werden. Gleichzeitig bestätigt das vorliegende Datenmaterial nicht die Befürchtung, dass KI eine neue Ära des Taylorismus einläutet. Tatsächlich gibt es kaum Anzeichen dafür, dass die KI-Exposition bis 2025 mit nennenswerten positiven oder negativen Veränderungen des Handlungsspielraums und der Autonomie von Beschäftigten verbunden ist. Wenn überhaupt, scheint die KI-Exposition mit einer geringeren Zunahme monotoner Tätigkeiten und einer höheren Arbeitszufriedenheit einherzugehen.

Eine Einschränkung der Studie besteht darin, dass sie die KI-Exposition und nicht deren tatsächliche Einführung untersucht, für die es für den betrachteten Zeitraum leider an aussagekräftigen Messgrößen auf Berufsebene mangelt. Zudem umfasst der Analysezeitraum lediglich die ersten Jahre nach der Einführung generativer KI. Deutlichere Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsorganisation könnten sich deshalb erst in den kommenden Jahren zeigen, wenn die Technologie weiter voranschreitet und KI stärker genutzt wird. Es ist auch möglich, dass KI in bestimmten Sektoren und Berufen bereits signifikantere Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsorganisation gehabt hat, als dies auf gesamtwirtschaftlicher Ebene erkennbar ist.

Die Ergebnisse der Studie könnten jedoch teilweise erklären, warum sich die Auswirkungen von KI zumindest bislang noch nicht deutlich in den gesamtwirtschaftlichen Produktivitätsstatistiken niedergeschlagen haben. Dazu müssten Unternehmen, die KI nutzen, ihre Arbeitsprozesse und abläufe möglicherweise grundlegend umgestalten, damit die Technologie effektiver in die betrieblichen Vorgänge der Unternehmen eingebunden werden kann. Tatsächlich legen alle bislang verfügbaren Erkenntnisse nahe, dass die Anwendungsbreite von KI zwar groß ist – d. h., dass sich KI auf viele Berufe auswirkt –, ihre Anwendungstiefe jedoch begrenzt bleibt, da in den meisten Berufen nur ein kleiner Teil der Aufgaben betroffen ist.

Schließlich ist festzuhalten, dass einige Veränderungen zumindest im Betrachtungszeitraum dieser Studie viel stärker mit Veränderungen des Bildungsniveaus der Erwerbsbevölkerung als mit der KI-Exposition zusammenhingen. Dazu zählen der Rückgang manueller Tätigkeiten sowie die Tatsache, dass Beschäftigte häufiger Probleme lösen und über größere Handlungsspielräume verfügen. Auch wenn sich daraus keine Aussagen über die Kausalitätsrichtung ableiten lassen, unterstreicht der Befund doch, dass Investitionen in Allgemeinbildung, berufliche Bildung und Kompetenzen nach wie vor wichtig sind.

1 Introduction

1.1. What is work organisation and why does it matter?

At its core, work organisation refers to how work is structured and managed within a workplace to achieve an organisation's goals. It is about how tasks are divided, allocated and performed (e.g. pace and sequence), who takes decisions (including the extent of worker discretion and autonomy), and the interdependencies between workers (e.g. reporting relationships, communication and teamwork, including the rules and procedures that govern them) (Eurofound, n.d.[1]; Börnfelt, 2023[2]; Eurofound, 2026[3]).

Work organisation matters because it impacts both worker and firm outcomes. For firms, aspects of work organisation are linked to productivity (Askenazy, Vincent Marcus and Caroli, 2002[4]; Börnfelt, 2023[5]) and performance (Eurofound, n.d.[1]; Eurofound and Cedefop, 2020[6]). For example, a greater emphasis on employee development (Den Hartog and Verburg, 2004[7]); collaborative working (Cross, Davenport and Gray, 2019[8]); working-time autonomy (University of Basel, 2015[9]) and employee involvement (Jones and Kato, 2003[10]) are all related to better firm performance. The way work is organised to promote learning and problem solving has been linked to greater innovation (Arundel et al., 2006[11]).

Work organisation can also affect worker engagement and well-being (Eurofound, n.d.[1]; Eurofound and Cedefop, 2020[6]) as well as their health (Eurofound, 2001[12]) and learning (Börnfelt, 2023[5]). For example, the extent to which management decisions are centralised and the degree to which management concerns itself in its organisational decisions with workers, both have an impact on working conditions and workers' health (Eurofound, 2001[12]). Greater scope for decision making and control at work lead to higher work engagement (Eurofound, n.d.[1]) and boost worker subjective well-being (Dhondt, Delano Pot and O. Kraan, 2014[13]; Lindström, 1994[14]). Even in workplaces with high job demands, well-designed jobs that offer sufficient autonomy and opportunities for skill utilisation can help mitigate psychosocial risks and support employee well-being (OECD, 2017[15]). Changing workforce configuration and flexibility at work also impact on worker health (Kompier, 2006[16]) and how work is organised can have negative consequences for workers, such as a higher risk of injury and greater mental strain (Askenazy, Vincent Marcus and Caroli, 2002[4]).

1.2. Why AI may have an impact on work organisation

Historically, work organisation has been shaped by successive waves of technological innovation. Each industrial revolution – from mechanisation and electricity to digitalisation – has brought about shifts in how work is performed and managed. For example, during the First Industrial Revolution, the introduction of the steam engine and machines led to a shift from manual, home-based production to factory-based, machine-operated division of labour, greatly increasing efficiency and output, but also raising new issues around employee health and well-being (Haradhan, 2019[17]). These shifts have increased productivity, but have also raised concerns around worker autonomy, well-being, and skill obsolescence (Kuznetsov, Zakharov and Perfiljeva, 2021[18]; Musso, 2013[19]).

Today, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is widely touted as the next General-Purpose Technology (Calvino, Haerle and Liu, 2025[20]) and the key driving force behind the next industrial revolution. AI is expected to fundamentally change the nature of work by automating not only routine and non-cognitive tasks, but also non-routine, cognitive ones (Tyson and Zysman, 2022[21]), and by augmenting human capabilities and promoting skill development. Combined with its enhanced potential for autonomy and self-improvement, it has been argued that AI could foster creativity, accelerate research and development, boost innovation and entrepreneurship (Calvino, Reijerink and Samek, 2025[22]), eventually leading to higher aggregate productivity growth (Filippucci, Gal and Schief, 2024[23]) and greater societal well-being.

Already, there is some evidence that AI is changing the tasks that workers do at work (by automating some and creating new ones), how they perform these tasks (including the pace and the control they have over the sequence of those tasks), and the skills they require to perform them (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). There is also evidence that AI helps with decision making and is changing the way workers are managed (including the giving of instructions, and the monitoring and evaluation of work), and the relationships workers have with their managers (Milanez, Lemmens and Ruggiu, 2025[25]).

However, while the macroeconomic productivity gains from AI are expected to be substantial (a contribution of 0.25-0.6 percentage points (p.p.) to annual aggregate total-factor productivity growth) (Filippucci, Gal and Schief, 2024[23]) and there is some experimental (Calvino, Reijerink and Samek, 2025[22]) as well as survey (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]; OECD, 2025[26]) evidence that AI is contributing to increased worker performance, there is so far little evidence at the macroeconomic level that AI has resulted in improvements in productivity (International Labour Organization, 2026[27]). In addition, while AI can contribute to higher job quality, e.g. by automating routine tasks and improving occupational safety and health, there are also concerns that AI can, under certain circumstances, worsen working conditions (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]; Milanez, Lemmens and Ruggiu, 2025[25]).

Much of the optimism around AI's potential to boost productivity and economic growth rests on the assumption that the technology will become more widely adopted and more deeply integrated into the way work is organised. This underscores an important message: there is nothing deterministic about how AI will impact the workplace. As in past transformations, worker outcomes depend not solely on the technology and its intrinsic features, but also on decisions made around work organisation – decisions which are taken by employers, and preferably jointly with workers as this has been proven to improve outcomes for both (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]; Milanez, Lemmens and Ruggiu, 2025[25]; Cedefop and Eurofound, 2023[28]). Without careful design, AI risks reducing autonomy, fragmenting communication, and deepening disparities instead.

This working paper digs deeper into the link between AI and work organisation, reviewing the recent literature and presenting new evidence from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). The working paper covers the following aspects of work organisation: how tasks have changed in occupations more exposed to AI compared to occupations that are less exposed; whether AI exposure is associated with changes in worker discretion and autonomy in how and when tasks are performed, as well as in collaboration, teamwork and communication. Finally, the working paper investigates how changes in work organisation related to AI may have impacted the quality of jobs.

2 Data

The analysis behind this paper relies on two data sources: the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), both of which were matched at the occupational level to the OECD AI Exposure Measure.

2.1. The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)

The main aim of the Survey of Adult Skills, a product of the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), is to measure adults' proficiency in key information-processing skills (literacy, numeracy and problem solving). The survey also asks about adults' skills use at work, the tasks they perform and how they perform them, as well as a range of employment outcomes. The survey covers a large number of OECD countries and allows comparisons over time: the 1st Cycle of the survey was conducted between 2011 and 2018 in 39 countries, while the 2nd Cycle was conducted between 2022 and 2023 in 31 countries and economies. Twenty-six countries participated in both cycles. The 2nd Cycle of the Survey of Adult Skills may have just caught the initial impact of generative AI on work: ChatGPT was released to the wider public in November 2022, while for most countries the data collection for the 2nd Cycle ended between April and June 2023. PIAAC therefore offers a unique opportunity to study changes in work organisation over time.[1] Sample sizes per cycle range from 3 513 individuals in the Netherlands to 11 697 in Canada, and from 2 587 in the United States to 8 846 in Canada when considering employed individuals only. Full sample sizes by country and cycle can be found in Annex A.

2.2. The European Working Conditions Survey

The European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) has been conducted by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) since 1991. The main aim of the EWCS is to measure the quality of work and employment across Europe, assessing job quality along seven dimensions: earnings, prospects, skills and discretion, working time, work intensity, the social environment and the physical environment. Beyond job quality, the survey provides detailed information on how work is organised, including the tasks that workers perform, the discretion they exercise over them, and the use of digital tools and practices at work. In addition, the survey covers a large number of European countries and allows comparisons over time. Therefore, the survey complements the information provided by PIAAC with detailed indicators on job quality and work organisation.

The present working paper draws on the sixth wave of EWCS (conducted in 2015) and the eighth wave (conducted in 2024) each covering 35 countries, comprising the EU Member States alongside a number of neighbouring and candidate countries. Thirty-three countries participated in both waves. For the purposes of this analysis, only the 27 EU Member States as of 2020 were included in the analysis. EWCS generally covers around 1 000 individuals per wave and per country, with some exceptions.[2,3] Full sample sizes by country and cycle can be found in Annex A.

2.3. The OECD AI Exposure Measure

Neither PIAAC nor the EWCS have measures of AI adoption that can be compared over time. The analysis in this paper therefore uses a measure of occupational exposure to AI, more specifically the OECD AI Exposure Measure. This measure maps the nine OECD AI Capability Indicators (OECD, 2025[29]) to occupational requirements in O*NET, resulting in an occupational AI Capability Gap Index that measures the gap between the capabilities demanded by each occupation and current AI capabilities, for each capability domain as well as for the occupation as a whole. The measure can be interpreted as a measure of potential exposure to the current AI frontier. While some parts of a job may offer scope for automation, others may still require human input or human AI collaboration. From this perspective, the OECD AI Exposure Measure can be understood as a potential job transformation index.

3 Recent trends in work organisation

The primary objective of this paper is to analyse the contribution of AI to changes in work organisation in OECD and non-OECD EU (OECD, 2026[30]) countries. Before doing so, it is important to understand the broader context in which AI is operating. This section therefore describes recent changes in work organisation in OECD and EU countries, using the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS).

The analysis shows that there have been some changes in work organisation over the time period studied. In particular, there has been a decline in physical and manual work, while monotonous and administrative tasks have been on the rise. Perhaps one of the most significant changes is the rise in information-processing tasks, and workers also spend more time solving problems at work. Some aspects of worker discretion, autonomy and decision making appear to have improved, and teamwork and communication have become more common. However, changes in job quality over this period have been mixed.

3.1. There has been a decline in physical and manual work

On the whole, there appears to have been some decline in physical and manual work across OECD and EU countries over the period studied. The share of workers working physically for a long period has declined by 5% between the two cycles of PIAAC. Meanwhile, similar declines emerge from EWCS: -4% in the share of EWCS respondents who are exposed to vibrations at least half of the time, -4% in the share lifting or moving people at least half of the time, and -8% in the share moving heavy loads at least half of the time (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Changes in manual and physical work

Share of workers



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 1st and 2nd Cycles and European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2015 and 2024.

3.2. Monotonous and administrative tasks are on the rise

The frequency of monotonous and administrative tasks has increased. According to PIAAC, the share of workers filling in forms at least once a week has increased (+6%) while, compared to ten years prior, more EWCS respondents report doing repetitive movements at least half of time (+7%), monotonous tasks at least half of the time (+14%), repetitive tasks of less than 1 minute (+38%), and repetitive tasks of less than 10 minutes (+30%) (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Changes in monotonous and administrative tasks

Share of workers



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.
Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 1st and 2nd Cycles and European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2015 and 2014.

3.3. Workers spend more time solving problems

The share of workers solving simple problems at least once a week (i.e. problems that take no more than 5 minutes to find a good solution) has increased slightly between the two cycles of PIAAC (+4%) while the share solving complex problems at least once a week (i.e. problems that take at least 30 minutes to find a good solution) has increased more substantially (+18%). Meanwhile, the share of EWCS respondents who solve unforeseen problems as part of their jobs has increased (+3%), as has the share doing complex tasks (+6%).

Figure 3. Changes in problem solving

Share of workers



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.
Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 1st and 2nd Cycles and European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2015 and 2024.

3.4. Information-processing tasks have become more common

PIAAC documents an almost across-the-board increase in the share of workers carrying out information-processing tasks at least once a week, including: writing letters, memos or e-mails (+17%), reading letters, memos or e-mails (+15%), reading directions or instructions (+14%), reading manuals or reference materials (+19%), and reading bills, invoices, bank statements or other financial statements (+7%). The only exception is reading articles in newspapers, magazines or newsletters (-10%) (Figure 4). These findings have been reported elsewhere, with tasks related to information-processing skills undertaken more frequently in most countries and occupations, driven in particular by low-qualified workers narrowing gaps with higher-qualified workers, reflecting a broad upgrading of tasks within jobs (Tuccio, 2026[31]).

Figure 4. Changes in information-processing tasks

Share of workers



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.
Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 1st and 2nd Cycles.

3.5. Some aspects of worker discretion, autonomy and decision making have improved

According to PIAAC, more workers can now influence to a high or very high extent: the sequence of tasks (+14%), the method of work (+10%), the speed of work (+12%), and working hours (+21%). In addition, the share of workers planning their own activities at least once a week has increased (+8%), but the share saying they can organise their own time at least once a week has changed less (+2%) (Figure 5).

EWCS paints a more mixed, although not inconsistent, picture on worker discretion, autonomy and decision making. For instance, the share of workers who say the pace at work is determined by numerical production or performance targets has fallen (-15%), as has the share who say it is determined by an automatic system or machine (-16%). Consistent with PIAAC, more individuals now report an ability to choose/adapt/determine their own working hours (+6%). On the other hand, there has been a decline over time in the share of workers who say they can apply their own ideas at work always or most of the time (-4%). Similarly, there has been a decline in the share of workers involved in improving work organisation or processes (-14%), and influencing decisions that are important for their work (-5%) (Figure 6).

That being said (and consistent with findings reported below about increases in teamwork), it has become more common for team members to decide on the division of tasks (+9%) as well as on the timetable (+14%) (Figure 6).

Figure 5. Changes in worker discretion and autonomy (Survey of Adult Skills)

Share of workers



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 1st and 2nd Cycles.

Figure 6. Changes in worker discretion and autonomy (ECWS)

Share of workers



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.
Source: European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2015 and 2024.

3.6. Collaboration, teamwork and communication have become more common

The share of EWCS respondents saying that they work in teams has increased over time (+14%). While according to PIAAC, there has been a decline in the share of workers who carry out collaboration tasks (-6%), more workers now share information more than half the time (+8%), and there has also been an increase in the share who say that, at least once a week, they: instruct (+19%), make speeches (+34%), influence (+16%) and negotiate (+15%) (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Changes in teamwork and communication

Share of workers



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.
Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 1st and 2nd Cycles and European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2015 and 2024.

3.7. Some aspects of job quality have improved, though not all

There has been a slight increase in the share of PIAAC respondents who say they are satisfied or very satisfied with their jobs (+4%). ECWS paints a more mixed picture on job quality. More workers agree that their organisation motivates them (+8%) while fewer experience stress always or most of the time (-13%). Fewer have long working hours (-28%) or report having worked for 10 hours or more on at least one day over the past month (-8%), and individuals have also become more positive about their prospects for career advancement (+20%) while feeling less worried about losing their job in the next 6 months (-32%).

That being said, there are also some negative evolutions in job quality according to EWCS, although most of these are minor. Fewer workers feel enthusiastic about their jobs (-2%) or that their work is either useful (-1%) or well done (-1%). Working at high speed (+8%) and to tight deadlines (+7%) has become more common, consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature on work intensification, although there has been no change in the share not having enough time to get the job done, nor in the share of those working in shifts. Work intensification might also explain why fewer workers feel full of energy (-5%) and significantly more are tired after work (+17%). Slightly more workers worry about work when not working (+1%) and there has been a small increase the share of workers saying their safety and health is at risk at work (+3%) (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Changes in job quality



Notes: 95% confidence intervals.
Source: European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2015 and 2024.

4 The impact of AI on work organisation: Literature review

This section summarises some of the emerging literature on AI and work organisation. It finds that AI is likely to affect work organisation differently from previous technologies because it can perform cognitive, non-routine tasks across a much broader range of occupations. However, while its breadth of application is extensive, its impact within individual jobs is often limited to specific tasks. Adoption and use also vary by firm size, with large firms more likely to deploy AI in core business activities, while smaller firms tend to use it for support functions. There is some indication that AI is more likely to automate than to create repetitive and dangerous tasks, while complex tasks are the most likely to be created, suggesting AI results in a mixture of automation and augmentation of human labour. There is some indication also that AI may increase the pace at which tasks are performed, although this has not necessarily translated into poorer working conditions so far. There is growing evidence that AI can enhance worker autonomy and improve decision making by providing information and recommendations, but its effects on teamwork, collaboration, and overall team performance remain mixed and are not yet well understood.

4.1. Tasks and task allocation

AI's ability to perform cognitive, non-routine tasks is what sets it apart from previous technologies, and it is the reason why it will affect a far larger share of occupations, including high-skilled ones. AI is currently assessed by experts to perform at Level 3 (out of 5) on language, creativity, vision, and knowledge, learning and memory – capabilities required in most occupations, but more so in high-skilled ones. By contrast, AI's current capabilities are more limited (Level 2) when it comes to manipulation (e.g. a robotic arm used in highly controlled manufacturing environments) and robotic intelligence (e.g. autonomous delivery robots in structured environments) (OECD, 2025[29]). The IMF estimates that almost 40% of global employment will be exposed to generative AI, rising to 60% in advanced economies due to the prevalence of cognitive-task-oriented jobs (Cazzaniga et al., 2024[32]).

While the breadth of AI's application may be wide, its depth seems more restricted (so far at least). In most occupations, the share of tasks affected by AI appears to be limited. For example, Eloundou et al. (2023[33]) estimate that 80% of the U.S. workforce could have at least 10% of their work tasks affected by LLMs, but only 19% could see at least 50% of their tasks impacted. Similarly, Handa et al. (2025[34]) estimate that over one-third of occupations would see AI use in at least a quarter of their associated tasks, while only 4% of occupations would use it across three-quarters of their associated tasks. These figures are consistent with those of Bonney et al. (2024[35]) who use the U.S. Business Trends and Outlook Survey (BTOS) and a broader definition of AI, and find that nearly 85% of businesses using AI to replace tasks use it to replace only a small number of tasks, while 2.4% use it to replace a large number of tasks. The estimates by the Brookings Institute are slightly higher, though still in line with the above: 85% of workers will have at least 10% of their work tasks impacted, and more than 30% of workers at least 50% of their tasks (Kinder et al., 2024[36]). Other research finds that the impact of AI on task changes is, so far at least, less significant than that of robots, and that this may be because robots tend to replace entire tasks, leading

to larger and more immediate occupational adjustments, while AI is often integrated as an augmentative tool, resulting in more gradual changes in tasks (Engberg et al., 2025[37]).

The impact of AI on work organisation will depend on the kind of tasks that are impacted. While some companies – and in particular larger ones – already use AI in their core activities (defined as those that produce revenue, or the main goods and services), not all do. In manufacturing, among companies (with at least 20 employees) that use AI, 60% do so in production (including in: quality control, robotics, worker assistance, digital twins and simulation, and autonomous vehicles), 40% use it for maintenance tasks, 36% for product design, and 35% for planning and scheduling (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). In finance, companies (with at least 20 employees) that use AI, primarily do so in data analytics (52%) and fraud detection (50%) (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). In both sectors, AI is less commonly used in human resources (17% and 21% in finance and manufacturing, respectively) and or other more "peripheral" activities (such as customer service & advice).[4] Official statistical surveys covering all sectors suggest even lower uses of AI in core activities (i.e. the production of goods and services) (Filippucci et al., 2025[38]).

SMEs (<250 employees), are less likely to use AI in their core activities: only 29% of those using (generative) AI do so (OECD, 2025[26]). The business support activities which SMEs are most likely to use (generative) AI for are: marketing and sales (50%) and IT (45%) (OECD, 2025[26]). SMEs further say that they are more likely to use GenAI in simple, one-off and trivial tasks (53%, 38% and 30% of SMEs, respectively).

The difference in AI usage by firm size could reflect differences in the type of AI being used. In the OECD study cited above, SMEs were asked about generative AI – a type of AI that is far more affordable and accessible than other forms of AI, but with a different set of capabilities. SME's reported use of generative AI is consistent with evidence from the companies developing these tools. For example, Anthropic finds that its large language models (LLMs) under its Claude series are mainly used in software engineering roles and technical writing tasks (Appel et al., 2026[39]). Similarly, Microsoft finds the most common uses of Copilot in "Sales and Related" occupations, "Computer and Mathematical" and "Office and Administrative Support" (Tomlinson et al., 2025[40]).[5]

The impact of AI on work organisation will not only depend on where and what AI is used for, but whether it automates tasks and/or creates new ones. The evidence so far indicates that AI is more likely to automate tasks than to create them: more than two-thirds of employers in manufacturing and finance say that AI has automated tasks, while just under half say it has created new tasks – similar to what workers report. Of course, this does not say anything about the time taken to complete those tasks: more time may be required to complete new tasks than is gained by automating old ones. However, these findings do go in the direction of what Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019[41]) warn against, i.e. that the current tendency is to develop AI in the direction of further automation, with insufficient focus on creating new tasks where labour can be productively employed.

Some studies, however, argue that AI could be complementing/augmenting human labour rather than replacing it (Wang and Lu, 2025[42]). The IMF estimates that about half of jobs exposed to AI may be negatively affected, while the rest could benefit from enhanced productivity through AI integration. According to the IMF, the jobs most likely to benefit from AI are those that require nuanced judgment, creative problem solving, or intricate data interpretation – traditionally the domain of highly educated professionals (Cazzaniga et al., 2024[32]). The companies behind the most commonly used LLMs also believe in their augmenting powers. In their analysis of tasks submitted to Claude, Anthropic finds that AI use leans more toward augmentation (57%), where AI collaborates with and enhances human capabilities, compared to automation (43%), where AI directly performs tasks. On Copilot, the most common work activities people seek AI assistance for (i.e. augmentation) involve gathering information and writing, while the most common activities that AI itself is performing (i.e. substitution) are providing information and assistance, writing, teaching, and advising (Tomlinson et al., 2025[40]).

The impact on work organisation will also depend on the kind of tasks that AI automates/creates. According to employers in manufacturing and finance, AI is twice as likely to automate as to create repetitive and dangerous tasks, and workers agree with this assessment (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). At the same time, employers in both sectors say complex tasks were the type of task most likely to be created by AI (34%/31% in finance/manufacturing) (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). However, some research has found that AI has reduced non-routine abstract tasks, like information gathering, and increased the demand for "high-level" routine tasks, like monitoring processes (Gathmann, Grimm and Winkler, 2024[43]).

Finally, AI will have an impact on how tasks are performed. Around three-quarters of workers who use AI say it increased the pace at which they perform their tasks (75% and 77% in finance and manufacturing, respectively) (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). These workers are more than 5 times more likely to report that AI increased pace than decreased it. The increased pace of work is not necessarily associated with worse working conditions. In fact, AI users who reported that pace had increased were more likely than the average AI user to report positive impacts of AI on both performance and working conditions. It is possible that AI allows these workers to concentrate on more complex tasks, which may intensify work-related stress but also provides a greater sense of satisfaction once accomplished.

4.2. Worker discretion, autonomy and decision making

In the context of work, autonomy generally refers to the degree to which employees can exercise discretion in how and when they perform their tasks (Hackman and Oldham, 1976[44]). In turn, autonomy has been shown to play a critical role in employee motivation (Gagné et al., 2022[45]).

The impact of AI on autonomy could be either positive or negative, depending on how it is used. For example, algorithmic management systems, because they prioritise efficiency and standardisation, can restrict workers' discretion (Gonzalez Vazquez et al., 2025[46]; Eurofound, 2026[47]). But AI could also enhance autonomy, for example by automating routine and repetitive tasks and allowing workers to focus on more complex, creative, and strategic activities that require more discretion (Lane and Saint-Martin, 2021[48]). The association between autonomy and AI use at work is complex and has been shown to depend on a range of other workplace factors, such as the use of other digital technologies and the education level required for the job (Giering and Kirchner, 2025[49]). Giving workers leeway to redefine and personalise their own roles in response to AI through job-crafting can also result in greater autonomy (Parker and Grote, 2020[50]; Li et al., 2024[51]).

Empirically, there is some evidence that AI may have a positive impact on autonomy at work. More than half of AI users say that AI increased the control they have over the sequence in which they perform their tasks (58%/59% in finance/manufacturing, respectively), compared to 20% and 21% of AI users who say AI decreased control (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). The same study also indicated that control over the sequence in which workers perform their tasks was positively associated with performance and working conditions, in that AI users who report diminished control are less likely than the average AI user to report positive impacts. Another study showed that 50% of mid-level managers say that AI increased the autonomy with which they make decisions (as opposed to just 5% who said it decreased it), resulting in higher quality decision making (Milanez, Lemmens and Ruggiu, 2025[25]).

AI systems can be used to support, inform, and, in some contexts, automate decision making by processing large amounts of data, identifying patterns, and generating classifications, predictions, or recommendations. What makes AI particularly powerful as a decision-making tool is its speed and scale. It can process far more information than a human could ever do. But AI also has its limitations. In particular, AI systems are only as good as the data they are trained on, and biased or incomplete data can lead to inaccurate or inappropriate outcomes. AI is also only as good as the design of the system itself. AI can lack context, judgment, and ethical reasoning. Because of this, human oversight, as well as accountability and evaluation, remain essential to interpret results, question assumptions, and ensure that decisions align

with broader goals and values. AI is best seen as a tool that can enhance human decision making rather than replace it.

In the OECD's AI survey of workers in manufacturing and finance, 70% and 56% of AI users in finance and manufacturing, respectively, reported that AI assisted them with decision making. 84% and 83% of workers in finance and manufacturing, respectively, agreed that they liked that AI assisted with decision making, compared to 4% and 3% who disagreed (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). The results were similarly positive when the same workers were asked whether AI helped them make better decisions and whether AI helped them make faster decisions. The positive result suggests that workers feel that AI is complementing their work when it assists with decision making.

Mid-level managers report that the use of algorithmic management software increases the quality of managerial decisions (60%). U.S. managers stand out for an even greater share of positive responses (88%). While fewer managers in European and Japanese firms report increased decision quality (52% and 50%, respectively), they are still far more likely to answer positively than negatively. Managers report increases in the information available to make decisions (70%), the speed of decisions (62%), and the autonomy with which to make decisions (50%).

4.3. Collaboration, teamwork and communication

The use of AI in the workplace could also impact on how employees interact and work with each other. At one extreme, AI agents have the potential to function as semi-autonomous virtual team members (O'Neill et al., 2023[52]). At a more basic level, AI can automate some communication and co-ordination tasks. Moreover, while not directly the subject of this report, AI is increasingly used to automate managerial tasks thereby changing the relationship between managers and supervisees at work (Box 1).

Box 1. Algorithmic management and its implications for work organisation

In 2024, the OECD ran a survey of mid-level managers in six countries (United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) on the prevalence of algorithmic management tools – i.e. tools to automate managerial tasks, such as giving instructions, monitoring, and evaluating them (Milanez, Lemmens and Ruggiu, 2025[25]). The study showed that such tools were already very commonly used: 90% of mid-level managers in the United States. said their companies used such tools and 79% across the European countries covered by the survey – although the intensity of use varied significantly (more than three-quarters of firms in the United States used ten or more types of tools, compared to three to five in Europe and just one in Japan).

The use of such tools not only alters the role of managers, but also their relationship with workers (Jarrahi et al., 2021[53]; Baiocco et al., 2022[54]). Algorithms that assist or implement management functions potentially have two main implications in terms of organisational tasks and roles: the shrinking of middle management and the atomisation of work across occupations (Baiocco et al., 2022[54]). This can contribute to flattened organisational structures (Baiocco et al., 2022[54]), but also to a centralisation of knowledge and therefore control and reinforcing managerial authority.

Under certain circumstances, AI has a positive impact on collaboration, teamwork and communication. For instance, if AI automates routine tasks (such as scheduling, task tracking, information sharing), it could reduce administrative overhead and allow teams to spend more time on higher-value tasks (Webber, 2025[55]). In addition, by providing data and information, AI sheds light on team dynamics and team performance, laying the basis for improving them (Webber, 2025[55]). AI can also enhance communication clarity, by helping in the drafting, summarising and refining of documents and messages – which is especially valuable in multi-cultural teams where language barriers may exist.

But AI could also pose a risk to teamwork and collaboration. For example, over-reliance on AI for generating summaries or recommendations results in team members engaging less deeply with the material, or with each other, weakening critical discussion and shared ownership of decisions, as well as communication between team members. In this respect, AI could disrupt the team environment in such a way as to impede the development of trust and psychological safety (Webber, 2025[55]; Ulfert et al., 2023[56]; Dell'Acqua, Kogut and Perkowski, 2025[57]). Evidence from an OECD survey of mid-level managers on the use of algorithmic management suggests that such tools could reduce human interaction: in all participating countries except Japan, mid-level managers were more likely to say that algorithmic management reduced the frequency of human interaction than increased it (Milanez, Lemmens and Ruggiu, 2025[25]). That being said, workers report more positive emotions and fewer negative emotions when engaging with AI compared to working alone, matching the emotional benefits traditionally associated with human teamwork (Dell'Acqua et al., 2025[58]).

Whether AI improves team performance remains a subject of debate. Some studies find that teams augmented with AI outperform those without (Dell'Acqua et al., 2025[58]), while others show that human – AI teams often underperform compared to the best human or AI alone in decision making tasks (Vaccaro, Almaatouq and Malone, 2024[59]) and that AI automation decreases team performance and increases co-ordination failures (Dell'Acqua, Kogut and Perkowski, 2025[57]).

5 The impact of AI on work organisation: New evidence from PIAAC and EWCS

This final section examines the extent to which the trends in work organisation described in Section 3 are associated with AI, adding also to the evidence base discussed in Section 4. In an ideal scenario, one would observe AI adoption by a company and then compare work organisation before and after. However, such data are not available. Instead, the analysis in this section relies on exposure to AI at the occupational level, and tests whether this is associated with changes in work organisation at the occupational level. If and when such associations are found, it is important to remember that they cannot necessarily be interpreted as causal relationships.

In addition, AI may not be the only factor affecting work organisation. While it is difficult to control for everything that affects work organisation, the analysis that follows controls for changes in the composition of the workforce at the occupational level (sex, age and education).[6] In addition, the analysis controls for country-specific factors that are fixed over time. More specifically, the regression analysis uses the following OLS specification:

$$\Delta Y_{oc} = b_0 + b_1 AI_o + b_2 \Delta M_{oc} + b_3 \Delta A_{oc} + b_4 \Delta HE_{oc} + \gamma_c + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where ΔY_{oc} is the average annual change in outcome *Y* in occupation *O* and country *C* (calculated as the level difference between the two waves of the survey, divided by the number of years), AI is the OECD measure of exposure to AI (which only varies by occupation O), M_{oc} is the average annual change in the share of men in occupation *O* and country *C*, ΔA_{oc} is the average annual change in the average age in occupation *O* and country *C*, and ΔHE_{oc} is the average annual change in the share of tertiary educated workers in occupation *O* and country *C*. Finally, γ_c represents country fixed effects and ε_{it} the error term.[7]

The data are constructed as a pseudo-panel at the occupation-country level: all outcomes and explanatory variables are computed as occupation-country employment weighted averages in each wave, and each outcome is expressed as its annualised change between waves (the level difference divided by the number of years between them). ISCO-2 is used as the level of occupational detail, and cells with fewer than 15 observations in either wave are dropped (with no material impact on the results). The AI exposure measure enters as a time-invariant occupational level variable, while the demographic controls (share male, mean age, share tertiary-educated) enter as annualised changes. All explanatory variables are standardised to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 over the estimation sample, so each coefficient gives the change in the outcome (in p.p. per year) associated with a one standard-deviation difference in that regressor, and coefficients are comparable across regressors. The regressions are estimated by weighted least squares, weighting each cell by the average of its occupation's share of within-country employment in the two waves, with robust standard errors.

Table 1 shows the coefficients on AI exposure obtained from running the above equation on the PIAAC data. Specification (i) is weighted, but otherwise represents a simple regression of the outcome variable on AI exposure only, with no control variables or fixed effects. Specification (ii) then adds fixed effects and

the three explanatory variables (education, sex, age) to control for the socio-demographic composition of occupations. The coefficients on these explanatory variables are also shown for comparative purposes. Table 2 then repeats the same for the EWCS data. Both tables also report the number of observations for each regression, the standard errors, as well as the adjusted R squared.

Taken together, the results indicate a very slight positive association between AI exposure and changes in work organisation, although the story is by no means clearcut. In particular, AI exposure appears correlated with a lower increase in monotonous tasks and a greater increase in some writing and reading tasks, but there is very little correlation with either worker discretion or teamwork. In comparison, changes in work organisation are much more clearly associated with improvements in the educational attainment of the workforce. That being said, AI exposure appears associated with more favourable changes in job satisfaction and quality.

As expected, exposure to current AI technologies is uncorrelated with changes in physical and manual tasks (areas where AI has made less progress in recent years), except for a decrease in tiring positions (EWCS, Table 2). This may be because AI makes existing tools and machinery safer (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]). Consistent with this, AI exposure is also associated with a smaller increase in the share of workers who report their safety or health to be at risk (EWCS, Table 2).

AI exposure does, however, seem to be associated with a lower increase in monotonous tasks (EWCS, Table 2) and filling in forms (PIAAC, Table 1). This is consistent with the finding that current AI capabilities are closest to occupations involving routine information processing, administrative work and codifiable tasks (OECD, 2026[30]).

It has sometimes been argued that AI will lead to upskilling in the workplace. For example, employers say that AI leads to an increase in demand for high-skilled workers (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]) and a greater need for high-level skills (OECD, 2025[26]). The results in Table 1 and Table 2 support that narrative to some extent. For instance, the PIAAC results in Table 1 suggest a positive correlation between AI exposure and writing and reading letters, memos or e-mails, reading directions or instructions, as well as a lower decrease in reading articles in newspapers, magazines or newsletters – although higher AI exposure is also associated with a slightly lower (and only marginally statistically significant) increase in reading bills, invoices, bank statements or other financial statements. While AI exposure appears associated with the frequency of solving simple problems, there is no relationship with the frequency of doing complex tasks or solving complex problems (PIAAC, Table 1). Similarly, EWCS indicates no correlation with solving unforeseen problems or doing complex tasks (Table 2).

In general, there is little indication that AI exposure is associated with either increased or decreased worker discretion, autonomy and decision making. Most results in Table 1 and Table 2 are not statistically significant, with the exception that AI exposure appears positively correlated with the freedom to plan one own's activities (PIAAC, Table 1). Also, there was a greater decline in the share of workers whose pace is determined by an automatic system or machine in occupations more exposed to AI. While, on average, pace has also become less determined by numerical production or performance targets over the period studied, this reduction was less marked in occupations more exposed to AI (EWCS, Table 2) – which is perhaps counter to expectations.

Similarly, there is no clear association between AI exposure and teamwork. EWCS indicates no statistically significant correlation with teamwork, although in PIAAC AI exposure is associated with more information sharing and instructing (Table 1).

Finally, the association between AI exposure and job quality is a little more marked, echoing other findings that AI can lead to greater enjoyment at work (Lane, Williams and Broecke, 2023[24]) – although this needs to be put in the context of a mixed evolution of job quality over the period studied, with some indicators improving and others worsening. In PIAAC (Table 1), AI exposure is associated with greater job satisfaction, while in EWCS, it is associated with a greater increase in feeling motivated by the organisation

and in receiving recognition at work. Feelings of work well done and being full of energy became less common on average, but this decrease was smaller in occupations more exposed to AI. Enthusiasm about the job also rose in occupations more exposed to AI, while remaining stable overall. Finally, the general increase in working to tight deadlines and in the perceived risk to occupational safety and health is less marked in occupations more exposed to AI, while the reduction in stress is more so.

All this indicates that, to date at least, AI may only have had a minor impact on work organisation, and that therefore significant impacts on productivity and innovation, or even on employment and skill needs, are unlikely to be visible in aggregate data during the sample period of the analysis (up to 2024). Of course, it is worth remembering that these correlations were measured in the early days of AI adoption and use, and that in the future work organisation may change more substantially if work processes and workflows are redesigned to take advantage of AI's capabilities, rather than simply incorporating AI into existing practices.

To close the discussion, it is worth comparing the effects of AI exposure to increases in educational attainment. The latter is more clearly correlated with reductions in manual work, and increases in both problem solving and worker discretion. The association with cognitive tasks is similar between AI exposure and education, although the coefficients tend to be larger in the case of education. By contrast, AI exposure appears to have a stronger association with job satisfaction and quality than education does. The direction of causality cannot be established with the research methods used in this paper – for instance, is it that a more educated workforce is more likely to change the organisation of work, or is it changes in work organisation that increasingly require more educated workers? However, it does point to the close connection between work organisation and education, and the importance of continued investments in the latter.

Table 1. Regression results, PIAAC

	(i) No Controls			(ii) Controls & FE					
	AI (s.e.)	Obs	R2	AI (s.e.)	Education (s.e.)	Male (s.e.)	Age (s.e.)	Obs	R2
Physical and manual tasks									
Physical work (at least once a week)	-0.0005	881	0.002	-0.0002	-0.0022***	-0.0002	-0.0003	881	0.102
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)		
Monotonous and administrative tasks									
Filling in forms (at least once a week)	-0.0012***	881	0.013	-0.0011***	-0.0004	-0.0000	-0.0003	881	0.221
	(0.0004)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Problem-solving									
Solving simple problems (at least once a week)	0.0009***	881	0.008	0.0010***	0.0007**	0.0005*	-0.0008**	881	0.415
	(0.0003)			(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Solving complex problems (at least once a week)	0.0000	881	-0.001	0.0001	0.0011***	0.0008**	0.0002	881	0.245
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Info-processing tasks									
Writing letters, memos or e-mails (at least once a week)	0.0006*	881	0.002	0.0005*	0.0017***	0.0005	0.0002	881	0.161
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Reading letters, memos or e-mails (at least once a week)	0.0013***	881	0.016	0.0011***	0.0017***	0.0003	0.0004	881	0.199
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)		
Reading directions or instructions (at least once a week)	0.0008**	881	0.005	0.0008***	0.0003	-0.0002	0.0002	881	0.301
	(0.0004)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)		
Reading articles in newspapers, magazines or newsletters (at least once a week)	0.0012***	881	0.015	0.0013***	0.0013***	-0.0002	0.0013***	881	0.217
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)		
Reading manuals or reference materials (at least once a week)	0.0007*	881	0.003	0.0008**	0.0010***	0.0000	0.0003	881	0.359
	(0.0004)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Reading bills, invoices, bank statements or other financial statements (at least once a week)	-0.0004	881	0.002	-0.0005*	-0.0001	0.0004	0.0008**	881	0.081
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Discretion, autonomy and decision-making									
Choose sequence of tasks (to a high or very high extent)	0.0001	881	-0.001	-0.0002	0.0010**	0.0004	0.0004	881	0.330
	(0.0004)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)		
Choose method of work (to a high or very high extent)	0.0005	881	0.001	0.0003	0.0011***	0.0006*	0.0004	881	0.338
	(0.0004)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)		
Choose speed of work (to a high or very high extent)	0.0003	881	-0.000	0.0001	0.0007*	0.0005	0.0003	881	0.366
	(0.0004)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)		
Choose working hours (to a high or very high extent)	-0.0004	881	0.001	-0.0005	0.0011***	0.0004	-0.0003	881	0.192
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)		
Plan own activities (at least once a week)	0.0012***	881	0.014	0.0007**	0.0012***	0.0005	0.0008**	881	0.456
	(0.0004)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Organise own time (at least once a week)	0.0002	881	-0.001	0.0002	0.0011***	0.0002	0.0005	881	0.388
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Collaboration, teamwork and communication									
Collaborating (more than half the time)	-0.0002	881	-0.001	0.0001	-0.0010**	-0.0003	-0.0002	881	0.230
	(0.0004)			(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)		
Sharing information (more than half the time)	0.0005*	881	0.003	0.0005**	0.0003	-0.0001	-0.0002	881	0.216
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Instructing (at least once a week)	0.0011***	881	0.011	0.0013***	0.0000	0.0004	0.0004	881	0.233
	(0.0004)			(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)		
Making speeches (at least once a week)	-0.0004	881	0.002	-0.0003	0.0004	0.0000	0.0002	881	0.143
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)		
Influencing (at least once a week)	0.0000	881	-0.001	-0.0001	0.0012***	0.0008**	-0.0002	881	0.189
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)		
Negotiating (at least once a week)	-0.0004	881	0.001	-0.0003	0.0005	0.0009***	0.0003	881	0.217
	(0.0004)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)		
Outcomes									
Job satisfaction	0.0014***	881	0.033	0.0012***	0.0004	-0.0002	-0.0000	881	0.170
	(0.0002)			(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) 1st and 2nd Cycles.

Table 2. Regression results, EWCS

	(i) No Controls			(ii) Controls & FE					
	AI (s.e.)	Obs	R2	AI (s.e.)	Education (s.e.)	Male (s.e.)	Age (s.e.)	Obs	R2
Physical and manual tasks									
Exposure to vibrations at least half of the time	0.0002	558	-0.001	0.0001	-0.0015***	0.0017***	-0.0000	558	0.052
	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)		
Tiring positions at least half of the time	-0.0011*	558	0.004	-0.0014**	-0.0007	-0.0000	0.0011*	558	0.136
	(0.0006)			(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)		
Lifting or moving people at least half of the time	-0.0003	558	0.000	-0.0002	-0.0009**	0.0001	-0.0001	558	0.049
	(0.0004)			(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)		
Moving heavy loads at least half of the time	-0.0007	558	0.001	-0.0006	-0.0020***	0.0021***	-0.0001	558	0.112
	(0.0005)			(0.0004)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)		
Monotonous and administrative tasks									
Doing repetitive movements at least half of the time	-0.0001	558	-0.002	-0.0001	-0.0013**	0.0008	0.0001	558	0.203
	(0.0007)			(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)		
Doing monotonous tasks	-0.0019***	558	0.012	-0.0017***	-0.0017**	0.0006	-0.0007	558	0.136
	(0.0007)			(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)		
Repetitive tasks of less than 1 minute	0.0007	558	0.000	0.0004	-0.0006	-0.0004	-0.0002	558	0.291
	(0.0007)			(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)		
Repetitive tasks of less than 10 minutes	-0.0003	558	-0.002	-0.0004	-0.0011	0.0002	-0.0003	558	0.218
	(0.0008)			(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)		
Problem-solving									
Solving unforeseen problems	0.0005	558	0.000	0.0005	0.0008*	0.0003	-0.0001	558	0.204
	(0.0005)			(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)		
Doing complex tasks	0.0002	558	-0.002	0.0005	0.0006	0.0005	0.0002	558	0.353
	(0.0008)			(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)		
Discretion, autonomy and decision-making									
Team members decide the division of tasks	0.0006	558	-0.001	-0.0000	-0.0009	-0.0001	-0.0010	558	0.066
	(0.0008)			(0.0008)	(0.0010)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)		
Team members decide on timetable	0.0009	558	0.000	0.0007	-0.0006	0.0003	-0.0007	558	0.104
	(0.0009)			(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)		
Can choose/adapt/determine own hours	-0.0005	558	-0.001	-0.0009	0.0016***	0.0020***	0.0010	558	0.170
	(0.0007)			(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)		
Influence decisions that are important for your work (always or most of the time)	0.0007	558	0.000	0.0003	0.0017**	0.0010	0.0028***	558	0.142
	(0.0006)			(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)		
Involved in improving work organisation or processes (always or most of the time)	0.0008	558	0.000	0.0008	0.0025***	-0.0005	0.0020**	558	0.218
	(0.0008)			(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)		
Apply own ideas in work (always or most of the time)	-0.0004	558	-0.001	-0.0008	0.0018***	0.0009	0.0023***	558	0.144
	(0.0007)			(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)		
Pace determined by numerical production or performance targets	0.0020***	558	0.013	0.0022***	0.0007	0.0006	-0.0009	558	0.293
	(0.0007)			(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)		
Pace determined by an automatic system or machine	-0.0010**	558	0.004	-0.0009*	-0.0012**	0.0017***	0.0007	558	0.154
	(0.0005)			(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)		
Collaboration, teamwork and communication									
Work in a group or team	-0.0000	558	-0.002	0.0001	0.0002	0.0007	-0.0002	558	0.173
	(0.0008)			(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)		
Outcomes									
Feeling you are doing useful work (always, most of the time)	-0.0001	558	-0.002	-0.0003	0.0001	-0.0002	0.0007	558	0.212
	(0.0005)			(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)		
Feeling of work well done (always, most of the time)	0.0009*	558	0.003	0.0008*	0.0004	-0.0007	0.0011**	558	0.203
	(0.0005)			(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)		
Have enough time to get the job done (always, most of the time)	0.0004	558	-0.001	0.0006	0.0003	-0.0013**	0.0008	558	0.183
	(0.0007)			(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)		
Working at high speed (all the time, almost all of the time)	-0.0010	558	0.002	-0.0009	-0.0009	0.0003	-0.0018**	558	0.234
	(0.0007)			(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)		
Working to tight deadlines (all of the time, almost all of the time)	-0.0012	558	0.003	-0.0016**	0.0002	0.0016**	-0.0010	558	0.250
	(0.0008)			(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)		
Organisation motivates me (tend to agree, strongly agree)	0.0010	558	0.002	0.0014**	0.0006	-0.0009	0.0008	558	0.208
	(0.0007)			(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)		
Receive recognition (tend to agree, strongly agree)	0.0012*	558	0.004	0.0012**	0.0005	-0.0006	0.0006	558	0.129
	(0.0007)			(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)		
Experience stress (always, most of the time)	-0.0010*	558	0.004	-0.0009*	-0.0003	0.0002	-0.0004	558	0.241
	(0.0006)			(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)		
Enthusiastic about job (always, most of the time)	0.0011*	558	0.004	0.0011*	0.0005	-0.0003	0.0006	558	0.121
	(0.0006)			(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)		
Feel full of energy (always, most of the time)	0.0012*	558	0.004	0.0015**	0.0005	-0.0008	-0.0002	558	0.134
	(0.0006)			(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)		
Is OSH at risk because of work	-0.0008	558	0.001	-0.0012**	-0.0013**	0.0010**	-0.0009	558	0.230
	(0.0006)			(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)		
Long working hours (>45 hours)	-0.0000	558	-0.002	0.0000	-0.0003	0.0021***	0.0004	558	0.113
	(0.0005)			(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)		
Work for 10 hours or more (any day over past month)	0.0003	558	-0.002	-0.0003	0.0001	0.0034***	-0.0001	558	0.231
	(0.0006)			(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)		
Work in shifts	0.0003	558	-0.001	0.0003	-0.0019***	-0.0001	-0.0016**	558	0.044
	(0.0005)			(0.0005)	(0.0007)	(0.0005)	(0.0007)		
Worry about work when not working (always, most of the time)	-0.0000	558	-0.002	-0.0001	0.0003	-0.0002	0.0005	558	0.205
	(0.0005)			(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)		
Tired after work (always, most of the time)	-0.0000	558	-0.002	-0.0003	-0.0013**	0.0004	0.0001	558	0.146
	(0.0006)			(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)		
Prospects for career advancement (tend to agree, strongly agree)	0.0008	558	0.000	0.0011*	0.0023***	0.0007	-0.0018***	558	0.169
	(0.0007)			(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)		
Might lose job in next 6 months (tend to agree, strongly agree)	-0.0011**	558	0.005	-0.0006	0.0002	-0.0003	-0.0006	558	0.224
	(0.0005)			(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)		

Note: Higher values of the work-intensity items denote greater intensity; for all other items a higher value denotes the more positive outcome.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Source: European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2015 and 2024.

6 Conclusion

Using the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), this paper examined the relationship between occupational exposure to Artificial Intelligence (AI) and changes in work organisation between roughly 2011 and 2024, a period that encompasses the early diffusion of generative AI.

Work organisation has changed over this period. There has been a decline in physical and manual work, while monotonous and administrative tasks have been on the rise, and workers also spend more time solving problems at work. Perhaps one of the most significant changes is the rise in information-processing tasks. Some aspects of worker discretion, autonomy and decision making appear to have improved, and teamwork and communication have become more common.

AI may have played some role in these changes. Perhaps as expected, changes in physical and manual tasks are uncorrelated with exposure to current AI technologies. However, AI exposure seems to be associated with a greater increase in certain information-processing tasks, like reading memos, e-mails, and directions. However, while AI exposure appears associated with the frequency of solving simple problems, there is no relationship with the frequency of doing complex tasks or solving complex problems. At the same time, the evidence does not support concerns that AI is ushering in a new era of Taylorism. In fact, there is little evidence that, as of 2025, AI exposure is associated with significant changes in worker discretion and autonomy, either positive or negative. If anything, in fact, AI exposure appears to be associated with a lower increase in monotonous tasks and an increase in job satisfaction.

One limitation of the study is that it looks at AI exposure rather than actual adoption, good measures of which are unfortunately lacking at the occupational level for the time period studied. In addition, the period covered by the analysis spans the early years where generative AI was introduced. More significant impacts on work organisation may therefore be detected in years to come as both the technology continues to progress and adoption increases. It is also possible that in certain sectors and occupations, AI has already had a more significant impact on work organisation that does not show up at the aggregate level. All of these should be the subject of future research.

The findings of the study may help explain why, to date at least, the impact of AI has not yet been clearly visible in aggregate productivity statistics. For that to occur, companies using AI may need to redesign work processes and workflows in a more substantial way so that it results in a more effective integration of the technology in the operations of firms. Indeed, the evidence to date suggests that while AI's breadth of application is wide – i.e. it touches many occupations – its depth remains limited, with only a small share of tasks affected in most occupations.

Finally, it is worth noting that, for the period covered in this study at least, changes in work organisation have been much more closely associated with changes in educational attainment of the workforce than with exposure to AI. While nothing can be said about the direction of causality of this finding, it does point to the continued importance of investing in education, training and skills.

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Annex A. Sample sizes

Table A A.1. Survey of Adult Skills sample sizes

Country	Year of interview		Number of observations			
			All individuals		Employed individuals	
	Cycle 1	Cycle 2	Cycle 1	Cycle 2	Cycle 1	Cycle 2
AUT	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,130	4,565	3,647	3,280
BEL	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,463	3,909	3,301	2,660
CAN	2011-2012	2022-2023	27,285	11,697	19,379	8,846
CHL	2014	2023	5,212	4,726	3,539	3,276
CZE	2011-2012	2022-2023	6,102	5,057	3,610	3,693
DEU	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,465	4,793	3,965	3,723
DNK	2011-2012	2022-2023	7,328	5,067	5,274	3,441
ESP	2011-2012	2022-2023	6,054	5,871	3,311	3,908
EST	2011-2012	2022-2023	7,632	6,663	5,313	5,093
FIN	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,464	4,061	3,846	3,053
FRA	2012	2023	6,993	6,432	4,438	4,370
GBR	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,131	4,941	3,441	3,724
HUN	2017-2018	2022	6,149	4,564	4,207	3,418
IRL	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,983	3,852	3,626	2,935
ISR	2014	2022-2023	5,538	6,092	3,451	4,036
ITA	2011-2012	2022-2023	4,621	4,847	2,786	2,765
JPN	2011	2022-2023	5,278	5,165	3,832	4,225
KOR	2011-2012	2022	6,667	6,198	4,342	4,398
LTU	2014	2022-2023	5,093	6,186	3,170	4,205
NLD	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,170	3,513	3,890	2,797
NOR	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,128	4,053	3,491	3,266
NZL	2014	2022-2023	6,177	5,359	4,467	3,682
POL	2011-2012	2022-2023	9,366	5,014	5,023	3,322
SVK	2011-2012	2022-2023	5,723	5,238	3,274	3,661
SWE	2011-2012	2022-2023	4,469	3,710	3,302	2,891
USA	2011-2012	2022-2023	7,921	3,765	4,705	2,587
All countries			176,542	135,338	116,630	97,255

Table A A.2. European Working Conditions Survey sample sizes

Country	Year of interview		All respondents		Employees	
	EWCS 2015	EWCS 2024	EWCS 2015	EWCS 2024	EWCS 2015	EWCS 2024
AUT	2015	2024	1,028	1,043	851	868
BEL	2015	2024	2,587	2,053	2,151	1,795
BGR	2015	2024	1,064	1,001	867	865
CYP	2015	2024	1,003	817	803	703
CZE	2015	2024	1,002	1,017	829	891
DEU	2015	2024	2,093	1,062	1,827	954
DNK	2015	2024	1,002	1,000	937	925
ESP	2015	2024	3,364	1,002	2,738	882
EST	2015	2024	1,015	1,007	886	841
FIN	2015	2024	1,001	1,001	786	876
FRA	2015	2024	1,527	1,052	1,384	934
GRC	2015	2024	1,007	1,138	630	715
HRV	2015	2024	1,012	1,070	814	865
HUN	2015	2024	1,023	1,059	832	895
IRL	2015	2024	1,057	1,107	825	934
ITA	2015	2024	1,402	1,023	930	725
LTU	2015	2024	1,004	1,038	857	886
LUX	2015	2024	1,003	512	893	466
LVA	2015	2024	1,004	1,090	832	949
MLT	2015	2024	1,004	849	870	679
NLD	2015	2024	1,028	1,110	863	939
POL	2015	2024	1,203	1,044	967	762
PRT	2015	2024	1,037	1,081	719	789
ROU	2015	2024	1,063	981	833	778
SVK	2015	2024	1,000	1,097	861	936
SVN	2015	2024	1,607	1,339	1,312	1,153
SWE	2015	2024	1,002	1,028	915	897
All countries			**34,142**	**28,621**	**28,012**	**23,902**

Notes

[1] Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic (Czechia), Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

[2] The countries included in the EWCS analysis in this paper are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic.

[3] As a robustness check, all the analyses were run on the restricted set of countries that are covered in both PIAAC and EWCS: Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Sweden. The core results remain robust in this restricted sample.

[4] In the finance sector (and among adopters), large firms (>250 employees) were more likely to use AI in customer service and advice, but otherwise little difference was observable back in 2022 in terms of AI use by firm size. This may have changed now that the technology has become more mature and AI adoption has risen.

[5] Because of the nature of the tool, Copilot usage differs from Claude's, with considerably less focus on computer and mathematical tasks.

[6] According to the EWCS, the EU-27 working population has become more educated between 2015 and 2024 (+10.1pp in the share of workers educated to tertiary level, from 29.3% to 39.4%), while it has aged only marginally (+0.3 years, from 42.9 to 43.2) and the ratio between men and women has remained stable (male share 51.9% to 53.3%). According to PIAAC, the working population has become more educated between Cycles 1 and 2 (+8.0pp in the share of workers educated to tertiary level, from 36.9% to 45.0%), and older (+1.1 years), while the ratio between men and women has remained stable.

[7] In some models, binary industry variables were added, to ensure that the models captured changes in work organisation for a given set of activities, rather than changes in economic activities. However, doing so resulted in a significant loss in variation since occupations at the 2-digit level are heavily concentrated by sector. In EWCS, for example, 19 of the 40 ISCO-2 groups have more than 60% of their employment in a single sector. Industry fixed effects therefore absorb the exposure variable itself, not just sector-specific shocks.

OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers

Artificial intelligence and work organisation

No. 68

Using the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), this paper examines the relationship between occupational exposure to Artificial Intelligence (AI) and changes in work organisation between roughly 2011 and 2024, a period that encompasses the early diffusion of generative AI. Work organisation has evolved over this period, with manual tasks declining, problem-solving and information-processing tasks becoming more prevalent, and teamwork becoming increasingly common. AI may have played some role in these changes: occupations more exposed to AI have seen a smaller increase in monotonous tasks, while the frequency of some information-processing tasks has increased faster. That being said, rising educational attainment appears to have played a more significant role in some of these changes in work organisation, underscoring the continued importance of investments in education and training.

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