

WORKING PAPER

INAPP WP n. 78

On the emergence of cooperative industrial and labor relations


Gabriele Cardullo

Maurizio Conti

Andrea Ricci

Sergio Scicchitano

Giovanni Sulis



On the emergence of cooperative industrial and labor relations

Gabriele Cardullo

Università di Genova, Genova
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
cardullo@economia.unige.it

Maurizio Conti

Università di Genova, Genova
mconti@economia.unige.it

Andrea Ricci

Istituto nazionale per l'analisi delle politiche pubbliche (INAPP), Roma
an.ricci@inapp.org

Sergio Scicchitano

Istituto nazionale per l'analisi delle politiche pubbliche (INAPP), Roma
Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen
s.scicchitano@inapp.org

Giovanni Sulis

Università di Cagliari, Cagliari
Centro Ricerche Economiche Nord Sud (CRENoS), Cagliari
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
gsulis@unica.it

GENNAIO 2022

We thank Luigi Guiso for kindly making the dataset on free communes of Italy available to us and Salvatore Marsiglia for excellent research assistance. We also thank participants at the 36th Conference of the Association of Italian Labour Economists (AIEL 2021), in particular we thank Stefano Dughera, Andrea Garnero and Federica Origo for their comments and suggestions.

The opinions expressed here reflect only the authors' views and not their institutions'. The INAPP is not responsible for any use that can be made of the present results. The other usual disclaimers apply.

CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. Literature review. – 3. Historical background and transmission mechanism; 3.1 The Italian Medieval Commune and its offspring; 3.2 Transmission mechanism. – 4. Institutional background and data; 4.1 The industrial relation system in Italy; 4.2 Data. – 5. Identification. – 6. Results; 6.1 Main results; 6.2 Heterogeneity. – 7. Concluding remarks. – References

INAPP – Istituto nazionale per l'analisi delle politiche pubbliche

Corso d'Italia 33
00198 Roma, Italia

Tel. +39 06854471
Email: urp@inapp.org

www.inapp.org

ABSTRACT

On the emergence of cooperative industrial and labor relations

We explore the long run determinants of current differences in the degree of cooperative labor relations at local level. We do this by estimating the causal effect of the medieval communes – that were established in certain cities in Centre-Northern Italy towards the end of the 11th century – and that contributed to the emergence of a cooperative attitude in the population on various proxies for current cooperative labor relations for a (repeated) cross section of Italian firms observed over the period 2010-2018. Conditional on a large set of firm and municipality level controls, as well as a full set of province fixed effects, we find that firms located in municipalities that had been a free medieval commune now have higher current probabilities to adopt two-tier bargaining structures and to be unionized. We also report IV estimates that confirm our main results.

KEYWORDS: cooperation, industrial relations, two-tier bargaining, unions, persistence

JEL CODES: J50, J53, J59, N00

DOI: 10.53223/InappWP_2021-78

Cite as:

Cardullo G., Conti M., Ricci A., Scicchitano S., Sulis G. (2021), *On the emergence of cooperative industrial and labor relations*, Inapp Working Paper n.78, Roma, Inapp

1. Introduction

A growing body of literature in economics, sociology and political science has highlighted the powerful role that culture, to be understood as the set of beliefs, values, rules of thumb that different groups transmit fairly unchanged across generations (Guiso *et al.* 2006; Alesina and Giuliano 2015), exerts on the extent of trust and cooperation among individuals in various dimensions of life. Moreover, higher levels of trust and cooperation at local level are typically found to be positively correlated with local development through various channels, such as by fostering trade, innovation and financial development or by influencing the internal organization of firms and the labor market (Algan and Cahuc 2014, among the others). This literature has shown that local areas where individuals tend to display higher levels of trust and cooperation are also more likely to overcome the free rider problem in the provision of local public goods. This is precisely what Guiso *et al.* (2016), building on Putnam (1993), call social or civic capital, i.e. the set of shared beliefs and values that help a group to overcome the undersupply of public goods, especially in the pursuit of socially valuable activities¹.

More recently, various authors have shown, both theoretically and empirically, that current levels of trust and social capital at local level are often the by-product of the interactions between the (very) slow development of culture over time (Bisin and Verdier 2001) and past institutions, wars, or other types of economic and natural shocks, as shown by Tabellini (2010), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Alesina and Giuliano (2015), Buggle and Durante (2021), Belloc *et al.* (2016), Guiso *et al.* (2016), among others. This strand of literature has therefore made clear that long past institutions, by affecting the evolution of social capital, trust and cooperative behavior between individuals, might still have important effects on contemporary economic outcomes.

More specifically, in the field of labor and industrial relations, Aghion *et al.* (2011), building on Crouch (1993), show – in a seminal contribution – that past government attitudes towards unions might still exert a strong influence over current workers' preferences for unionization. Indeed, since participation to unions allows workers to experiment on cooperation with employers, and thus can be seen as evidence of cooperative labor relations², too pessimistic beliefs about the scope of cooperation, associated to repressive attitudes of governments in some European countries at the dawn of the modern workers movement, tend to lower current incentives to join unions in the first place in those very same countries. This in turn favors an increase in the demand for tight labor market regulation. Moreover, beside by shaping the current demand for state intervention in the labor market, more trust and cooperation in the realm of industrial relations can also have additional important microeconomic effects: indeed, by influencing the bargaining process within the firm, the

¹ The term social capital is associated to different definitions. In general, it combines the set of beliefs, values, rules of thumb that are found to foster trust and cooperative action. Some authors also distinguish between bonding social capital, which fosters trust and inclusiveness within a (small) group, and bridging social capital, which in turn favors collaboration across groups (Muringani *et al.* 2021). See also the distinction between limited and generalized morality in Banfield (1958).

² This is because the existence of a representative union can make voice attitudes more attractive relatively to exit ones.

degree of cooperation in labor and industrial relations might have important effects on firms' investment, innovation and productivity.

In this study we follow the insights of Aghion *et al.* (2011) and explore the long run determinants of current differences in the degree of cooperative labor relations at local level. We do this by estimating the causal effect of the medieval communes – that were established in certain cities in Centre-Northern Italy towards the end of the 11th century – on various proxies for current cooperative labor relations for a (repeated) cross section of Italian firms observed over the period 2010-2018. In particular, we analyze the impact that the presence of a free commune in the late Middle Ages still has on the quality of the current system of labor and industrial relations. The latter is proxied primarily by the presence of a two-tier agreement between the firm and the workers' representatives; moreover, following the results of Aghion *et al.* (2011), we also consider the presence of unions (work-councils) within a firm and the level of unionization (union density) as additional proxies of cooperative labor and industrial relations.

The theoretical mechanism that we consider is that the experience of the free commune, by fostering more positive stances towards non-family members and a more proactive attitude to take part to the community life, and by 'training' people to play a role in informal and formal associations, might have contributed to the creation of more positive attitudes towards the establishment of less-conflicting labor and industrial relations. Indeed, Guiso *et al.* (2016) show that, despite the disappearance of the institutions of the free medieval communes more than five centuries ago, the latter, by favoring the empowerment of individuals, might have contributed to the development of a deeper sense of civic attitudes and cooperative behavior (Alesina and Giuliano 2015). This, by fostering trust towards non-family members (as participation to communal life necessarily involved some form of cooperation across kinship lines), may still spur current degrees of cooperative relations. Interestingly, Guiso *et al.* (2016) show that, conditionally on controls, Italian municipalities that had once been exposed to the experience of a free commune are today more likely to have not-for-profit institutions and organ donation organizations, while cheating in school examinations is less widespread. Moreover, historical research (see section 3.1 below) has highlighted that a series of local institutions like guilds, mutual associations (which provided security services and mutual aid) and *confraternite* (religious associations whose main aim was to hold religious festivals but also to assist the poor or the sick) have been probably spurred by the participatory experience to public life that free communal institutions made possible³. More importantly, these institutions have survived the formal collapse of free communes more than five centuries ago and they were still active at the beginning of the XX century. The mere existence of these voluntary associations, which provided welfare assistance to their members and to the wider local community, might have thus helped to keep alive more participative attitudes in local communities and higher levels of generalized trust, thus instilling more positive beliefs about the workability of cooperation. In the realm of industrial relations, this might have favored on one side the formation of unions, but also a less confrontational stance between capitalists and worker representatives and, more broadly, positive beliefs in the possibility that industrial relations, like other features of social and economic life, do not necessarily entail a zero-sum game (Henrich 2020). The higher levels of social capital in the local communities that witnessed the

³ See also Greif (2006).

experience of the medieval free commune might therefore explain local variation in the current quality of labor and industrial relations at local level in contemporary Italy.

As mentioned above, the presence of a two-tier bargaining structure (Boeri 2014; Cardullo *et al.* 2020) might provide a very good direct proxy for the degree of cooperation of labor and industrial relations within the firm. In the Italian system of industrial relations, wage floors and working conditions are generally set by sectoral bargaining at national level (first stage) and cannot generally be undone at the firm level⁴. However, the second tier agreement, at the firm level, might be used to deal with features that are not covered in the national agreement, such as the existence and structure of performance-related-pay schemes, the levels of workers training provided by firms, or to agree with employees future investment plans and the split of rents that might be associated to future productivity gains. It seems fair to say that, in a world characterized by asymmetric information between workers and firms and by imperfect contracts, two-tier agreements are more likely to be reached whenever labor relations are more cooperative and parties tend to trust each other to start with (Arrow 1972).

In this study we also explore the effect of the experience of the free communes on the presence of unions within a firm (the so called RSU and RSA, see section 4.1) and on union density for two reasons. First, following the insights of Aghion *et al.* (2011), because they might both be seen as an (admittedly) imperfect proxy of cooperative labor and industrial relations. Indeed, their cross-country empirical results show that countries with higher union density are also those with a larger share of both executives and workers that report positive beliefs in cooperative industrial relations⁵. Second, because, independently from whether or not one agrees on unions as favoring the development of cooperative labor relations, the free commune experience, by increasing trust towards non-family members, might have helped to overcome the free rider problem workers face when deciding whether or not to join a union (Booth 1985; Naylor 1989).

In our empirical analysis we use a repeated cross section for a representative sample of firms active in the Centre-North of Italy – where the experience of the free communes unfolded – in order to assess casual impact of social capital associated to the experience of medieval free commune on cooperative labor relations by comparing firms in ‘treated’ municipalities – i.e. firms that are based in municipalities that once were free medieval communes – to firms in control ones – i.e. firms that are based in municipalities that were not medieval free communes. The identification assumption is that, conditionally on rich set of firm level controls, industry fixed effects, municipality controls as well as province fixed effects, the presence of a medieval free commune is exogenous, i.e., not correlated to

⁴ But on this see Cardullo *et al.* (2020) and Damiani *et al.* (2019). See also section 4.1.

⁵ The literature is not unanimous about how the effects that union structures might have on the development of a cooperative system of labor relations. On one side, some scholars tend to view unions as rent-seekers, thereby leading to conflicting labor relations. Nevertheless, there is also a long-standing tradition (e.g. Freeman and Medoff 1984) that sees unions as bodies that might favor the option value of voice over exit, thus favoring the development of cooperative labor relations, as forcefully argued by Aghion *et al.* (2011). As far as the role of work councils is concerned, they again might help workers to have their concerns heard by managers, thus possibly favoring cooperative labor relations. However, if dominated by conflicting unions, this mechanism might become mute. Indeed, Addison and Teixeira (2019) found that, in Germany, work councils are associated to lower strikes, provided they are not unionized. We will discuss the institutional setting concerning union representation in Italy in section 4.1.

unobserved time invariant municipality characteristics that might explain both the establishment of a free commune and current propensity to unionize and more generally to establish cooperative labor relations. The inclusion of province fixed effects ensures that the identification is achieved by comparing firms in treated and control municipalities that are located within relatively small local areas; moreover, we include additional controls for the current economic conditions of the municipalities, as well as for both geographic characteristics and proxies for the level of economic development of the various municipalities at around 1300 C.E.

However, because one might not completely rule out the existence of such unobservables at municipality level, we also pursue an additional identification strategy. We follow Guiso *et al.* (2016) and we instrument for the free medieval commune using a dummy variable equal to one for those municipalities that used to have a bishop before the establishment of the free commune. Indeed, as shown by Guiso *et al.* (2016), who relied on history research on the origins of Italian free medieval communes, bishops acted as a sort of commitment device for the different layers of civil society that gave rise to the sworn pact which created the commune in the first place. Moreover, Guiso *et al.* (2016) show that, while the presence of a bishop affects today's social capital in a reduced form equation in the Centre-North of Italy, this does not happen in the South, which did not witness the historical experience of free communes; this in turn is indirect evidence for the validity of the exclusion restriction.

Again, we find that being exposed to an area whose culture and attitudes still reflects the participatory behavior, cooperation and trust favored by the experience of the free medieval commune, tends to significantly increase the likelihood of two-tier bargaining agreements are signed at the firm level as well as to foster unionization, through the set up of union representation (work councils) and through higher union density, thus contributing to the development of cooperative industrial relations.

This study speaks to different strands of literature, which are surveyed in more detail in section 2. First, our paper is related to the very large and growing literature on the long run effects of culture and institutions (and their interplay) on current individual behavior (Alesina and Giuliano 2015; Tabellini 2010; Belloc *et al.* 2016; Algan and Cahuc 2014; Voth 2021, among the others)⁶. Second, this paper contributes to a small subset of this literature on the long run effects of culture and institutions, namely the very few studies that have explored the role of past formal and informal institutions in shaping the current systems of labor relations, such as the family (Alesina *et al.* 2015) or political history, as in Aghion *et al.* (2011) and Mueller and Philippon (2011)⁷. In particular, with respect to Aghion *et al.* (2011), we make a step further by arguing that cooperation in industrial and labor relations might arise out of more long-term implicit rules that favor cooperation among the individuals living in particular local areas; in other words, the origin of the current quality of labor relations might be embedded in the trust endowment and, more broadly, in the social capital of local areas. More importantly, we use additional proxies for cooperative labor relations; indeed, unlike Aghion *et al.*

⁶ See also Bisin and Federico (2021).

⁷ As we discuss in the next section, this paper is also related to the literature on determinants of union membership (Farber *et al.* 2021) and, in particular, on the role that past unionism traditions plays in shaping current unionization attitudes in local communities (Bryson and Davies 2019, among the others). Finally, the paper is related to the literature on two-tier bargaining arrangements (Boeri 2014) and to the literature that analyses the role played by social ties for incentives in the workplace (Bandiera *et al.* 2011).

(2011), that focus on union membership, we use firm level data and consider the presence of unions within a firm as well as union membership, but also the existence of a two-tier bargaining agreement, which is clearly a superior proxy for the existence of cooperative labor relations, especially with respect to surveys conducted on samples of top executives of multinational firms, as in Mueller and Philippon (2011) but also in Aghion *et al.* (2011).

The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a more in-depth review of the different literatures to which this paper is related. Section 3 discusses the origins of Italian medieval communes and explores in some more detail the mechanisms that might explain while current labor relations tend to be more cooperative in municipalities that used to be a free commune in the Middle Ages. Section 4 presents the institutional background and discusses the data, while section 5 contains the identification assumptions. Finally, section 6 provides the empirical results and section 7 concludes.

2. Literature review

The gist of our paper is that past institutions (the free communes in Italy between the end of the 11th century and the beginning of the 12th), even by means of the development of other formal and informal organizations, gave rise to a cultural change whose effects in terms of labor market relations are still visible today. Under this light, the present work situates itself within the vast and varied literature that investigates the interdependence of institutions and culture and their impact on economic outcomes⁸. Accounting for all the works that deal with these topics is beyond the scope of our work, so in this section we discuss the papers that are more closely related to ours in its most relevant aspects: the historical period under analysis, the importance of past local institutions, the labor market variables subject of our study⁹.

As concerns the first two features, the work of Guiso *et al.* (2016) is the one most closely connected to ours. They argue that the emergence of free cities in Italy allowed the formation of a set of civic and cooperative values whose effects are still visible today: the percentage of blood donations and nonprofit organizations, as well the frequency of not cheating at a national exam, is higher in cities that experienced that period of independence in late Middle Ages. Their work validates the conjecture first advanced by Putnam (1993), who had claimed the poor quality of local and regional institutions in some parts of Italy at the end of the 20th century is the consequence of a shortage of trust, cooperation, and participation (all traits that are at the basis of the so-called ‘civic capital’). In turn, such regional discrepancies are a function of whether the given area had experienced a period of independence almost one thousand years before.

Other papers have also focused on the importance of past local institutions within the same country. Tabellini (2010) shows that regions with higher illiteracy rates and worse political institutions (between the 1650 and the end of the 19th century) tend to show specific cultural traits (less

⁸ There is not a unique definition for the term culture. For Guiso *et al.* (2006) culture is that set of “customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.” Sometimes culture and informal institutions are terms used interchangeably.

⁹ Alesina and Giuliano (2015) provide a thorough survey on this literature.

confidence and trust) that in turn negatively affect output per capita. Di Liberto and Sideri (2015) assess how the quality of local public institutions affects economic performance in Italy. The endogeneity problem is addressed by using as instrumental variables the different types of foreign dominations that ruled Italian regions between during 1560 and 1659¹⁰.

In studying the connection between present industrial relations variables and past institutions our work is close to Aghion *et al.* (2011). They show current beliefs about the quality of industrial relations (measured by surveys conducted on workers and executives) depend on the attitude of past governments towards organized labor¹¹. Data on these historical attitudes are taken from Crouch (1993) that documents the different approaches followed by the European states to deal with the emerging labor organizations. Crouch claims that the quality of labor relations today depends on the attitudes showed by the states over the 19th century: countries in which governments avoided a direct intervention and favored a cooperative approach between social partners exhibit better labor relations today¹².

The inquiry on the cross-country differences in labor market regulation is also at the basis of Alesina *et al.* (2015). Their focus is on the role played by family ties. They find a negative relationship between the structure of the family dating back at least to the Middle Ages and the extent of the regulation in the labor markets. In countries where family ties are strong, workers are less willing to search for a job far away from their home. To avoid firms exploiting such immobility in terms of higher rents, people in the countries will demand for a tighter regulation in the labor market. In their model such a mechanism is self-reinforcing, as in turn it will be optimal to choose a higher degree of family ties when the labor market is heavily regulated.

Central to the main thesis of our work is the concept of long-term persistence. A recent and detailed survey of Voth (2021) exposes the conceptual challenges of the growing body of persistence papers must deal with. He stresses the importance to disentangle the role of cultural and institutional variables from the geographical ones, as well as the limits of resorting to culture as transmission mechanism across centuries without providing detailed evidence on that.

The present paper is also linked to the literature on the persistence of union membership and its transmission across generations. Empirical works on this subject can be divided in two main groups. One branch has focused on the link between union joining behaviour and the family background. For instance, Blanden and Machin (2003) have shown that in UK the likelihood to join a trade union is higher in children of unionized fathers. In the same vein Bryson and Davies (2019) obtain that such intergenerational link is stronger for daughters and when both parents are unionized.

The second group of empirical works studies the geographical variation of union membership. It is now a well-established result that the unionization rate in a determined area is positively influenced

¹⁰ Gennaioli and Reiter (2007) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannu (2013) also gauge the role of precolonial local institutions on the performance of modern African countries.

¹¹ The negative relationship between civiness and regulations is also studied in Aghion *et al.* (2010). In their model, individuals expecting to live in an uncivic society will demand for regulations which in turn stifles the formation of trust, whereas the opposite occurs if individuals expect to live in a civic community.

¹² The analysis of Crouch (1993) is also used by Mueller and Philippon (2011) to examine the relationship between family ownership and the quality of labor relations. Their conclusion is that the share of family firms is larger in countries where labor relations are hostile.

by the presence in the past of industries characterized by high levels of organized labor. Holmes (2006) shows the positive relationship between union membership in care homes and grocery stores in West Virginia and Pennsylvania and the unionization of the old coal and steel sectors in the same places. In some parts of the UK (Wales, Scotland, Northern England) such persistence remains despite the substantial structural changes occurred in the 80s (see among the others Beynon *et al.* 2021).

Atheoretical rationale for these findings may rest on the idea that union membership is an experience good (Holmes 2006; Bryson and Gomez 2005), that may be properly evaluated via direct or close associates' experience. Moreover, experience goods are chosen by paying less importance to the traditional advertising channels and following more the suggestions of friends and relatives. Another explanation is offered by Booth (1985) who emphasizes the role of social custom: being part of a union in areas where they are viewed favorably increases your reputation, whereas a negative stigma may arise in regions where organized labor is unpopular.

What is important to stress here is that both the experience good framework and the social custom one offer an explanation for the path dependence of union membership observed in data. Such spillover effects (intergenerational or among peers) highlight the crucial role played by "regional and local variations in the inherited and socialized traditions, customs and cultures". In this sense, the present work belongs to the same area of research, with the notable difference that our paper, by looking at the very long-term origins of industrial relations, cannot offer insights at the same level of precision (i.e. within the family) of this body of research.

The paper is also related to the small literature on the emergence and the effects of two-tier bargaining structures on different firm outcomes. Boeri (2014) discusses the emergence of two-tier bargaining across countries, arguing that their adoption is mostly related to three different factors: product market competition, decentralization of production and extension of the terms of bargaining, and (at least in the euro area), the introduction of the common currency. Using the ECB Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) Survey for a sample of EU countries, he also shows that firms that adopt such structures are larger than those who do not engage in two-tier bargaining, are mostly concentrated in manufacturing (with some role also in non-traded services and financial sectors) and that are more likely in firm in which union presence and coverage is high, suggesting that the adoption of two-tier structures is positively related to the presence of unions, and thus it is linked to the emergence of cooperative labor relations. However, as Boeri (2014) clearly suggests, an important limitation of this strand of analysis is the non-random adoption of two-tier structures across firms. Endogenous sorting of firms into different bargaining regimes impedes the identification of causal links between two-tier bargaining and outcomes (in particular, adjustments to shocks).

Similar identification problems are present in Cardullo *et al.* (2020). Using a representative sample of Italian firms, they report a positive correlation between two-tier bargaining and investment in physical (and intangible) capital. Devicienti *et al.* (2017) partly overcome the above endogeneity issues by estimating in the first stage the probability of adopting a two-tier scheme using propensity score methods. They also find that firms with two-tier structures increase their technical efficiency. Finally, Damiani *et al.* (2019) study the effects of derogations (opting out clauses) from national collective agreements on employment dynamics. They find that although both hirings and separations increase with respect to firms that do not adopt such schemes, the net employment effect is not statistically different for the two groups. If any, the authors detect differences in the use of temporary contracts for firms opting out from collective agreements.

The paper is also connected to studies that analyze the role of social ties for incentives in the workplace and their relationship with standard monetary incentives to solve agency problems (see Bandiera *et al.* 2011 for a review). Bandiera *et al.* (2008) analyze the formation and the emergence of social ties (social capital in their language) among co-workers within a firm. They report a leading role for the following: common nationality, possibility of physical interactions, time of arrival at the firm, and living in the same area¹³. Bandiera *et al.* (2009) further investigate the role of social connections across different levels of the hierarchical structure, i.e., managers and employees. They show that managerial incentives interact with workers' effort through social connections: high powered incentives for managers are associated to better incentives for high ability workers, with much less role for social connections. Finally, Fehr and List (2004) use experimental evidence to show that high levels of trust generate trustworthiness, and that the latter explains the initial level of trust. In other words, trust and trustworthiness coevolve, suggesting that reciprocity is crucial element for such interactions.

3. Historical background and transmission mechanism

3.1 *The Italian Medieval Commune and its offspring*

During the 10th century in Western Europe population became more urbanized, as advances in agriculture (the three-field system) resulted in greater productivity and intense competition. At this early stage, the vacuum in the exercise of power over the city, implied by the declining influence of the Holy Roman Empire, was filled by the bishop (if he was present in the city) together with a small assembly of *boni homines* (literally, good men) (Cardini and Montesano 2006). Things began to change in the middle of the 11th century, when the upper classes (in large parts, mounted knights and landowners) in Northern Italy more than in other parts of Europe, attributed themselves greater autonomy in the management of the city. This process was not possible in Southern Italy where the invasion of Normans between 1061 and 1091 led to the creation of a strong central authority.

The first documentary evidence of a free commune in Italy goes back to the end of the 11th century. The urban population could be broadly divided in two groups, the elite (the already mentioned mounted knights and the landowners) and the *minores* (the plebs). In this first stage, the city was run by a small assembly of *consules*, with a one-year mandate, that were the expression of the aforementioned elite. Two features made the political system less oligarchic. First, the members of the elite were formally citizens as the others before the law and the communal tribunals. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the two groups were quite permeable, so that *minores* could climb the social ladder and become part of the elite.

Of course, the Empire reacted with hostility in relation to the growing degree of autonomy showed by the communes. The period between 1158 and 1183 constitutes a defining moment in the conflict between the Emperor Frederick I and the Italian communes. The year 1158 is the year of the second

¹³ In Bandiera *et al.* (2010), social incentives are shown to affect both individual worker productivity and firm performance in general.

Diet of Roncaglia, an assembly of the nobles and ecclesiasts of the Holy Roman Empire and representatives of Northern Italian cities. The official documents resulting from the Diet aimed to reassert the Empires' prerogatives over a broad range of topics, from taxes to the nomination of judges. The communes' dissatisfaction over the results of the Diet led to the war. The decisive battle of Legnano in 1176, in which the imperial army was defeated by the Lombard League, an alliance of free-cities of Northern Italy, persuaded Frederick I to resort to diplomatic methods. Under the peace of Konstanz in 1183 most of the imperial prerogatives foreseen under the Diet of Roncaglia were de facto granted to the communes.

It is after this period of turbulence that begins the second stage of the communal age, the so-called *podestà* period. Cities became richer and more densely populated. This made the previous system of government obsolete. The growing number of minors willing to assume more power inflamed social tensions. The solution was the appointment of a *podestà*, a professional politician chosen outside the city, with a one-year mandate to run the government. Such an arrangement was hardly authoritarian: an assembly had the right to check the behaviour of the *podestà* and the judicial system was also independent. The political system became more complex, as the number of city stakeholders increased: corporations, *compagnie d'armi* (militias), *mercanzie* (confederation of corporations, from the 14th century) all put forward their interests and political and economic agendas, sometimes reaching mutually beneficial agreements, in other cases provoking overt conflicts (Greci 1995; Artifoni 1990). It is important to stress that the growing importance of corporations and other intermediate bodies within the urban civic life was a characteristic feature of the free-cities in Northern Italy (Greci 1995). In the Southern regions, under the Norman rule, corporations were less present and less strong, confirming the hypothesis that the autonomy of the communities from a central power was a crucial breeding ground for the proliferation of such a variety of interest groups.

The excessive fragmentation of the political system into a plethora of different interest groups was in some cases the main cause of the end of the communal age and the advent of the Signoria (govern of the lord or *Signore*), occurred during the 14th century. This transition took different forms. In some cities the mandate of the *podestà* became lifelong, in other circumstances a rich and powerful citizen gained access to power. In most cases, the *Signore* was no longer under the control of the communal assemblies and statutes. Still, it was explicitly expressed that his power came from the people's decision. Only in the late 14th and early 15th centuries, the *Signorie* were transformed in principalities, in which the ruling dynasty exercised its power thanks to the explicit recognition of the Empire or the Church, and the main political entity was no longer the city but the regional state.

The most recent historiography (see Chittolini 1989, among the others) tends to emphasize the continuity between the communal age and the advent of the *Signorie* and then the principalities. Indeed, in many cities the institutions (Statutes, councils, offices) at the basis of the civic system remained in place and the lord was "more an organizer, mediator, and coordinator of urban interests than a statemaker aiming at the absorption of cities into his own different territorial organizations. [...]. Thus, the formation of a system of regional states, which often took the form of principalities, did not mean that cities decayed in the face of rising states. Although the remarkable trajectory of the independent city-state came to an end almost everywhere, its heritage still left a strong imprint on the Renaissance political order" (Chittolini 1989).

3.2 *Transmission mechanism*

How is it possible that a historical event occurred almost one thousand years ago may explain the geographical disparities for some relevant industrial relations variables in present day Italy?

Our hypothesis is that the free city experience was the breeding ground for the development of those social skills and that kind of civic engagement that are the necessary ingredients for an active and participated system of industrial relations. This claim is corroborated by a stream of research that highlights the peculiarity of the social and political environment of the Italian communes compared to other forms of government present in Italy and Europe in the same period. The free commune system was hardly authoritarian, even during the so-called *podestà* period. Rather, it can be viewed as an agglomeration of different interest groups, in some cases in overt conflict with each other, in other cases in search of mutual agreements. For interest groups we mean all those 'intermediary institutions' representing the stances of a (small or large) fraction of the population, but distinct from the formal branches of the communal government¹⁴. It is well known that such institutions prospered and gained political clout in the communal system, whereas their importance was much limited in the Southern parts of Italy, under the Normans rule (Rutenburg 1973; Greci 1995). This was not by chance, but precisely because of the relative autonomy they could enjoy in the communes compared to the centralizing power of the Normans.

The most prominent examples of intermediary institutions were the guilds, associations that regrouped people doing the same activity (usually artisans and merchants). If part of the literature has taken an essentially negative view on the guilds, seen as rents extractors that controlled the price and stifled competition, some research has re-examined their contribution to the economic progress in medieval and early modern Europe, in terms of innovation, technological change and entrepreneurship (Epstein and Prak 2008), as a provider of a public good (i.e., by reducing asymmetric information via quality control) and as a welfare institution that insures its members against income and health risks. The growing relevance of the guilds within the free-cities is recognized by many scholars, that identify the 13th century as the period when they ceased to be organizations just operating in the product and labor markets and become a linchpin of the communal political system (Artifoni 1990).

Under this lens, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals living in the communes became more conscious of the advantages of being part of an association and that this propensity to affiliate persisted over the centuries, even after the dissolution of the free-city experience. This explains why in present times both union density and active involvement in labor relations (measured as the share of second level negotiations) are larger in those places.

This argument holds even for other intermediary bodies that either originated in or gained strength under the free-city period. The *compagnie d'armi* or *società d'armi* were militias composed by residents of the city whose original goal was to protect the commune against invasions. The Italian

¹⁴ The role played by intermediary bodies in offsetting the autocratic tendencies of a sovereign power has been highlighted by Montesquieu (1748). Limits on the abuse of power by the sovereign come not only via the division of state functions but also through the mitigating role played by such autonomous entities. For a recent overview on the importance (and, according to some scholars, the decline) of the intermediary bodies see Urbinati (2015) and Krause (2000).

philosopher and politician Antonio Gramsci was one of the first scholars that emphasized the relevance of such militias as social aggregator (see Hoare and Nowell-Smith 1971). Indeed, the war against the emperor in the second half of the 12th century had forced the enlistment of many citizens of lower classes. The repeated battles (whose fortunes much depended on the role of the infantry) helped to create a team spirit that remained even in periods of peace. Thus, especially during the 13th century, the *società d'armi* became one of the vehicles for the participation of the plebs to the governance of the Commune, in some cities contrasting the aristocracy in cooperation with other associations, in other circumstances as an autonomous player (see Artifoni 1990). Interestingly, Gramsci observed that in the modern states that came after the dissolution of the communal era the exercise of power was more centralized, but that the variety of organizations and institutions active in that period did not disappear completely: “The Modern State [...] abolishes certain autonomies, which nevertheless are reborn in other forms, as parties, trade unions, and cultural associations” (Gramsci 1975, 54)¹⁵. Other organizations that gained importance in the communal era were the *confraternite*, religious associations whose primary (but not exclusive) tasks involved charity for the needy, education activities, and health assistance for its members¹⁶.

In conclusion, it is clear that the relevance and the diffusion of these organizations differed greatly across cities. If establishing a direct causal link (in both directions) between the formation of the free communes in Northern Italy and the emergence of intermediary institutions is not certain, the historiography broadly agrees on the fact that the Communal institutions and such entities reinforced each other. Our theoretical mechanism indicates that the advantages of being part of a group, the willingness to engage in the civic life by promoting your own interests and points of view persisted over centuries, remained under the surface during more authoritarian periods and are still discernible today once we look at the level of cooperation of labor market and industrial relations.

4. Institutional background and data

4.1 The industrial relation system in Italy

According to the most recent comparative studies (OECD 2017), in two thirds of OECD countries, collective bargaining takes place mainly at company level (single-employer bargaining), while national/sectoral bargaining (multi-employer bargaining) plays a significant role only in continental Europe¹⁷. The decentralization of collective bargaining is a consolidated and global trend, which began in the 1980s and intensified in the 1990s, and which now, the great recession has renewed, given the interruption in some central and sectoral bargaining countries (Visser 2016). There are also big

¹⁵ For the purpose of our paper, it is worthwhile to mention another apt remark: “Communes were therefore a trade union kind of state, that never succeeded in overcoming this phase to become a fully-fledged one, as Machiavelli vainly indicated” (Hoare and Nowell-Smith 1971).

¹⁶ In some cities the distinction between guilds and *confraternite* was less apparent than it seems nowadays.

¹⁷ Recent estimates among OECD countries and EU member states show that trade union density has decreased since the 1990s and it is currently around 30-40% in the private sector, while the employers’ organization density is around 50%.

differences across EU Member States with respect to supplementary reward systems: according to the last estimates of the European Company Survey (ECS), 62% of European establishments use at least one of the different types of variable pay. The most used system is related to individual performance according to management appraisal, which is realized by 43% of companies. Other common types are payment by results (34% of companies), profit-sharing (30%) and pay linked to group performance (25%) (Eurofound 2020).

The Italian industrial and labor relations system presents a two-tier bargaining (TTB) structure, with a relevant sectoral tier and a supplementary decentralized tier where bargaining is usually realized at the company/local level (Devicienti *et al.* 2017). The first level of bargaining (*Contratti Collettivi Nazionali di Lavoro* - CCNL) is the national collective one, with contractual labor agreements that extend virtually *erga omnes* at the sectoral level: it sets minimum wages schedules and work standards at the industry-level, and is targeted to preserve the purchasing power of wages (i.e. targeted to inflation). The second level is the decentralized one, with firm (or establishment) level agreements that supplement the national collective contracts: it negotiates additional components of wages and other regulatory aspects, and is linked to firm's economic performance. Firm-level agreements are not allowed to prevail on national collective contracts, that represent the minimum requirements (floors) in terms of wage agreements and working conditions¹⁸.

Although there are no official data on the diffusion and content of second level bargaining, recent estimates show that the coverage is from 15 to 25 percent of firms and about 60% of employees and, being prevalent in manufacturing and larger firms (Damiani and Ricci 2014). Survey data for Italy report that the incidence of decentralized bargaining is greater in manufacturing and larger firms. The majority of second-level agreements (over 60%) regards wage increases related to productivity gains, while agreements containing workplace organizational changes, performance-based human resource management practices and employment flexibility are related to the remaining 40% of cases (Damiani and Ricci 2014; Devicienti *et al.* 2017). Boeri (2014) shows that coverage of two-tier bargaining increases with firm size. In particular, it covers about 50% of firms with more than 200 employees in Europe, while such percentage is about 20% for firms below 50 employees. Moreover, he shows that second level agreements are more likely to be found in Energy (about 60%) and Manufacturing (around 50%) firms, while Construction and Trade sectors have less than 20% of firms with two-tier in place. Interestingly, Market services and financial intermediation firms lie in the middle with about 30% of firms adopting such bargaining schemes.

In this institutional setting, unions are the other relevant part in the bargaining process¹⁹. In particular, union presence at the firm level takes place through somewhat different forms. On the one hand, traditional union representation emerges through union membership, with a proportion of employees being union members. On the other hand, union representation is also related to the presence of RSA

¹⁸ An exception applies in the areas of economic distress, where local-level bargaining has the possibility to derogate from higher-level agreements to preserve employment levels, improve job quality or fight undeclared work (D'Amuri and Giorgiantonio 2014).

¹⁹ Regarding the representativeness criteria for trade unions, currently there are no certified rules: as a result, in the last two decades there was a boost in sector-level collective agreements signed by smaller unions. Starting from 2005 the number of national collective agreements currently registered at CNEL has nearly tripled, being equal to approximately 885 (Lucifora and Vigani 2021).

(*Rappresentanze Sindacali Aziendali*) or, more recently, RSU (*Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie*). As discussed in the literature (see Cardullo *et al.* 2020; Devicienti *et al.* 2017), although RSA and RSU are quite similar to traditional work councils along some dimensions (voting on their set-up is attributed to all workers at the firm level, independently on union status), on the other hand they have some peculiar characteristics that can make them closer to traditional union representation bodies. As an example, members elected in RSA/RSU boards are chosen from different lists provided by the most representative union organizations at the local and national level, turning in a very strict connection between union representatives and these bodies. Moreover, although firm level two-tier agreements can be signed by RSA and RSU, this process also involves local union representatives within the framework of the national collective agreements. Still, two-tier bargaining may also take place at the firm level without considering union representatives.

4.2 Data

The empirical analysis is based on the last three waves of the *Rilevazione su Imprese e Lavoro* (RIL) conducted by Inapp (the Italian National Institute for Public Policy Analysis) in 2010, 2014 and 2018 on a large representative sample of partnerships and limited liability firms operating in non-agricultural private sector. A subsample of the included firms (over 35%) is followed over time, making the RIL dataset partially panel over the period under study.

Each wave of the RIL questionnaire provides a rich set of information on industrial relations at workplace. Most important to our purposes, RIL data allows us to collect detailed information on trade union presence (RSA/RSU) and union density – defined as the ratio between the number of unionized workers over the total number of employees –, on agreements on second level (two-tier) bargaining and performance related pay, on the occurrence of an opting out clause and so on.

As for key explanatory variables we consider municipality-level measures of civicness and historical characteristics obtained from Guiso *et al.* (2016), that are discussed in more detail below. Moreover, we take advantage from the rich set of information provided by the RIL survey on management and corporate governance, workforce characteristics and firms productive specialization. In particular, we have data on the individual profile of the entrepreneurs, on the ownership structure and managerial selection, which allows us to control for important sources of firm heterogeneity. Further we add information about workforce composition (education, contractual agreements, gender, occupation level, citizenship), firm's productive specialization and competitive behavior (employment, sales per employees, foreign trade agreements, multinational status, innovation etc.) and other variables describing economic activities (sectors) and location (region, province and municipality).

Out of the overall data source, we excluded firms with less than 10 employees, where second level bargaining and other measures of industrial relations are relatively unstructured. In table 1 we provide descriptive statistics for each wave of the RIL dataset on the main variables of interest, i.e., our dependent variables and our main controls. As expected, presence of unions has declined over time, moving from 0.24 in 2010 to 0.18 in 2018. A similar trend emerges for union density, that drops to 0.049 in 2018, it was 0.103 in 2010. On the other hand, the presence of two-tier bargaining is somewhat constant, being about 11% over the observation period.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics firm level

	2010		2014		2018	
	Mean	Std dev	Mean	Std dev	Mean	Std dev
Dependent variables						
Two-tier bargaining	0,111	0,314	0,109	0,312	0,107	0,310
Union presence (work councils)	0,243	0,429	0,201	0,401	0,183	0,387
Union density	0,103	0,192	0,058	0,154	0,049	0,138
Management characteristics						
Age>50	0,334	0,472	0,351	0,477	0,354	0,478
34<age<50	0,270	0,444	0,230	0,421	0,258	0,438
age<35	0,081	0,273	0,044	0,204	0,048	0,214
Female	0,124	0,329	0,113	0,317	0,128	0,334
Workforce characteristics						
Share of tertiary ed	0,088	0,162	0,100	0,168	0,135	0,219
Share of upper sec ed	0,430	0,282	0,465	0,269	0,487	0,285
Share of lower/no ed	0,482	0,329	0,435	0,307	0,377	0,314
Share of female	0,358	0,271	0,338	0,259	0,361	0,257
Share of executives	0,045	0,093	0,039	0,087	0,041	0,088
Share of white collars	0,363	0,306	0,370	0,292	0,345	0,298
Share of blue collars	0,591	0,333	0,591	0,316	0,614	0,321
Share of fixed-term contracts	0,135	0,208	0,106	0,176	0,180	0,217
Share of immigrants	0,074	0,135	0,064	0,124	0,079	0,144
Firms characteristics						
Multinationals	0,035	0,185	0,029	0,167	0,035	0,183
Product innovation	0,438	0,496	0,400	0,490	0,446	0,497
Process innovation	0,377	0,485	0,374	0,484	0,402	0,490
Foreign markets	0,314	0,464	0,385	0,487	0,337	0,473
Trade agreements	0,139	0,346	0,144	0,351	0,180	0,384
ln (sales per employee)	11,731	1,271	11,788	1,252	11,708	1,270
9<n of employees<50	0,883	0,322	0,855	0,352	0,864	0,343
49<n of employees<250	0,098	0,297	0,126	0,332	0,116	0,320
N of employees>249	0,020	0,138	0,019	0,136	0,020	0,140
N of Obs	6,096		9,290		10,511	

Note: two tier bargaining is a dummy equal to one for firms with a two-tier agreement in place; Union presence (work councils) is a dummy equal to one for firms with a RSA/RSU in place (see section 4.1 for details); Unions density is the ratio between union members over total employees. Management characteristics are dummy variables. Shares are characteristics are calculated at the firm level. Multinationals, product innovation, process innovation, foreign markets, trade agreements are dummies. Sampling weights applied.

Source: Our calculations on RIL 2010-2014-2018 sample data


Data at municipality level come from Guiso *et al.* (2016). We refer to their study for detailed explanations regarding the creation of each variable. Here we briefly explain how the main variables of interest are derived. In particular, following the original source, we define as free communes those municipalities that were independent in 1176. In our sample, as reported in table 2, about 30% of observations refer to firms that are currently located in municipalities that were a free-commune in the past. Remaining controls refer to urbanization dummies in 1300, geographic location dummies and finally, modern characteristics of the municipalities, such as population levels and Gini inequality index measured as of 2001²⁰. In figure 1 we provide a map with details on the main variable of interest, the free commune.

²⁰ As we will explain in the Identification section, in some specification we adopt an IV strategy, using the presence of a bishop as instrument for free-commune.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics municipality level

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Free commune	0,30	0,46	0	1
Medium pop.	0,03	0,18	0	1
Large pop.	0,25	0,43	0	1
Costal	0,16	0,36	0	1
Near the sea	0,02	0,13	0	1
Altitude	0,17	0,20	0	2,04
Population 2001	0,27	0,61	0	2,55
Gini inequality	0,41	0,04	0,30	0,61

Note: free commune is a dummy equal to one for municipalities that experienced a free-commune in the Middle Ages. Medium and large population are dummies for population size in the Middle Ages. Coastal, near the sea and altitude are geographic dummy variables. Population 2001 is expressed in millions inhabitants and rounded. Gini income inequality index varies at municipality level. Source: Guiso *et al.* (2016)

Figure 1. Free communes in the Middle Ages

Note: we refer to their study for detailed explanations regarding the creation of each variable. In particular, following the original source, we define as free-commune those that were independent in 1176. Source: data at municipality level are from Guiso *et al.* (2016)

5. Identification

As already discussed in the Introduction, we seek to identify the long-term causal effects of the experience of the medieval free commune on current quality of the system of industrial relations in a representative sample of Italian firms in the Centre-North (where free medieval communes developed) by comparing selected features of the system of industrial relations (presence of unions, union density, presence of a two-tier bargaining agreement) in firms that are located in ‘treated municipalities’ – i.e. those municipalities that experienced a spell of free commune in the late Middle Ages – with those that, in turn, characterize similar firms that are however located in ‘control municipalities’ – i.e. those that never experienced a spell of a free commune in the Middle Ages.

The identification strategy involves the estimation of the following equation by OLS:

$$IR_{impt} = \alpha FC_{mp} + \beta X_{impt} + \theta M_m + u_p + v_{impt} \quad (1)$$

where i indexes firms, m municipalities, p provinces and t the RIL waves 2010, 2014 and 2018, respectively. As already discussed, the sample is a repeated cross section with a panel component, i.e. a fraction of the sample is made up by firms that are observed over the three waves.

More specifically, the dependent variables IR may represent, alternatively i) a dummy taking the value of 1 if firm i , located in municipality m and province p in wave t is recorded as having a second level agreement is adopted at the firm level, ii) a dummy indicating whether a formal union representation is in place at the firm level and, iii) the percentage share of unionized workers over total employment. FC is equal to 1 if firm i , in province p , is located in a municipality m that was exposed to the institutions of a free commune in the late Middle Ages.

Moreover, X is a vector of firm level controls, which capture firm level differences in corporate governance, management characteristics, workforce composition and firm productive specialization, besides a full set of industry and year dummies. In turn, M represents a vector of some historic²¹, geographic²² as well as modern²³ characteristics of the municipality m where firm i is located.

²¹ We consider dummy variables for whether municipality m was a large or medium town as of 1300, as in Guiso *et al.* (2016). These two dummies proxy for historic urbanization, which is considered a good proxy for per capita incomes in the Middle Ages. As a result, these dummies are meant to capture possible unobservables that might have explained both the establishment of a free commune in the Middle Ages as well as the long run patterns of growth that might be correlated with the current quality of firm level industrial relations. Ideally, one would need city size as of 1000 C.E., when most communes were established; unfortunately, the information as of about 1300 is as far as back that one can go. It is interesting to note that Bosker *et al.* (2013) show that, all over Europe, the establishment of a free commune was not correlated to initial city size. However, they also show that the presence of a commune was associated to stronger future population growth. This suggests that controlling for city size as of 1300 should be enough.

²² We consider a dummy for whether the municipality is near to the sea, its altitude as well as a dummy for coastal municipalities. These geographic characteristics can be considered proxies, among the others, for the trade potential of a municipality, which in turn can foster trust and cooperative behavior. See also Bosker *et al.* (2013).

²³ We consider predetermined modern characteristics of the municipalities, such as population levels and the Gini index of inequality, both measured as of 2001.

Finally, up represents a full set of province fixed effects capturing the province where each firm is located during wave t , while v_{impt} is an error term. The inclusion of the province fixed effect²⁴ controls for any time invariant heterogeneity at the province level, which in turn ensures that identification of (1) is achieved by comparing firms in treated and control municipalities that are located within the same province, thereby effectively controlling, e.g., for historic differences in past local institutions which might still affect current institutional quality²⁵, or by regional specific shocks that might have affected trust and institutional development²⁶. Moreover, the historic, geographic, and current municipality controls should capture, within any given province, possible heterogeneity among municipalities, while firm level controls are supposed to take into account possible differences among firms.

As noted above, the identification assumption is that firms in untreated municipalities represent a valid counterfactual for those located in treated ones. The inclusion of the municipality controls as well as of the province fixed effects are therefore precisely meant to make the identification assumption more credible.

Nevertheless, one might still argue that FC_{mp} is capturing local unobservables, even within the same province, that drive both the establishment of a free commune and the current quality of industrial relations. For instance, some Italian municipalities were important trade centers during the Middle Ages: if trade is associated to more development, and this brings with it more trust and civic engagement, then one might find better quality industrial relations in 'treated' municipalities, but independently from the effects brought about by the institutions of a free commune²⁷.

However, if the identifying assumptions in equation (1) were violated, then we may not be identifying the causal impact of the free commune on the current quality of the system of industrial relations. Therefore, we follow Guiso *et al.* (2016) and consider an IV approach.

Indeed, according to many historians, the emergence of a commune was more likely in cities that were already seats of a bishop. This is because bishops were usually the guarantors of a sworn pact between prominent citizens that stood as the linchpin of the free commune state. Moreover, bishops could punish the pact breakers with the exclusion from the religious communion. Interestingly, Guiso *et al.* (2016) find that current social capital is positively associated to the presence of a bishop before the year 1000 C.E. only in the Centre-North of the country, i.e., where free communes arose. Authors interpret this lack of correlation between today's social capital and the presence of an early medieval bishop in the South of Italy (where no room for a greater autonomy at city level was possible under the rule of the Normans) as suggestive that the exclusion restriction for using the existence of a bishop as an instrument for FC in equation (1) is likely to hold.

²⁴ Italy is currently divided into 110 provinces, with populations ranging from 70 thousand people to 3.7 million people (average about 0.5 million).

²⁵ For instance, Di Liberto and Sideri (2015) use province-level data and found that the current public administration quality is significantly influenced by the quality of past local institutions associated to the past dominations that prevailed in Italy in the XVI and XVII centuries.

²⁶ Buggle and Durante (2021) find that European regions which were characterized by more significant climate variability before the industrial revolution are characterized by higher current levels of trust.

²⁷ We control for proxies of per capita income as of 1300 C.E., as well as for geographic characteristics that might have favored trade in the Middle Ages, like location near the coast, but the controls are clearly imperfect.

In other words, the identification assumption that we make is that the presence of a bishop around the year 1000 C.E. affects today's quality of industrial relations only because it favored the establishment of a free commune in the late Middle Ages, and not directly²⁸.

6. Results

6.1 Main results

We set the scene in column [1] of table 3 with a parsimonious specification that includes, for the entire set of our dependent variables reported in panels A, B and C, as main regressor a dummy equal to 1 for those firms located in a municipality where a free-commune was present in the Middle Ages. In this specification we also include (arguably exogenous) baseline controls as province, year, sector fixed effects and a quadratic in employment. We find that the experience of a spell of free commune in the late Middle Ages for firms located in the Centre-North of Italy is positively associated to the current to the probability of having a two-tier agreement in place and to the presence of unions (work councils). Interestingly, results also suggest that the free commune experience is also related to traditional measures of union strength, as in our case, union density. The coefficients of interest in column 1, panels A and B of table 3 are broadly similar and statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting that two-tier agreements are mostly signed in firms with unions and that the two regressions are broadly capturing the pattern of emergence of cooperative labor relations.

We augment the set of controls in order to check the robustness of our main results in column 2 of table 3. In particular, we consider the possibility that some municipality level characteristics may have impacted both on the probability of the emergence of a free-commune in the Middle Ages and on the quality of current industrial relations today. On the one hand, we consider the role of geographic and modern municipality characteristics as the current population levels and Gini inequality index that, again, may be correlated to the emergence of good quality labor relations. On the other hand, we include other municipality levels controls (geographical location, historical population, among the others) that may impact both the establishment of a free commune in the Middle Ages as well as the long run patterns of growth that might be correlated with the current quality of firm level industrial relations. The inclusion of the two sets of controls does not change the overall picture: firms located in municipalities that in the Middle Ages experienced a free-commune have higher probabilities of experiencing cooperative labor relations in terms of two-tier agreements, presence of unions (work councils), and union density. The coefficients of interest are of similar magnitude with respect to our previous parsimonious specification, although the statistical significance is barely reduced, in particular for two-tier bargaining.

²⁸ In particular, in the case of heterogenous treatment effects, the IV estimation of equation (1) should deliver an estimation of a Local Average Treatment Effect, i.e. it should identify the effect of the free communes on cooperative industrial relations in firms located in municipalities that became free communes because of the original presence of a bishop (the so called compliers).

Table 3. Main results

	[1]	[2]	[3]
Panel A: dep. var. Two-tier bargaining free commune	0.036*** [0.008]	0.028* [0.014]	0.033** [0.014]
Obs	29553	29553	25888
Panel B: dep. var. Union presence (work councils) free commune	0.033*** [0.009]	0.036*** [0.014]	0.043*** [0.014]
Obs	28517	28517	24971
Panel C: dep. var. Union density free commune	0.010*** [0.004]	0.014** [0.007]	0.016** [0.007]
Obs	28971	28971	25478
Controls employment	yes	yes	yes
Year, sector, province	yes	yes	yes
Municipality controls	no	yes	yes
Firms characteristics	no	no	yes
Workforce characteristics	no	no	yes

Note: dependent variables: panel A is a dummy equal to one for firms with a two-tier agreement in place; panel B is a dummy equal to one for firms with a RSA/RSU (union representation) in place; panel C is the ratio between union members over total employees. Controls at the bottom of the table refer to regressions in panels A, B and C. All regressions controls for number of employees, number of employees squared, sectors of activity, province fixed effects and year fixed effects. Municipality controls include altitude, coastal location, near sea, dummies for population in the middle ages, current population, Gini inequality index; firm characteristics include dummies for age and gender of the manager, foreign trade, log of sales per employee, multinationals, product innovation, process innovation, foreign trade agreements; workforce characteristics controls for the composition of the employee by education, gender, contractual arrangements, occupation and citizenship. Standard errors clustered at municipality levels in parentheses.

Source: our elaborations on RIL 2010-2014-2018 data

In order to control for additional firm level characteristics that may impact on the emergence of cooperative labor relations today, in column 3 of the same table, we augment our models with a set of firm level characteristics. We include managerial demographic characteristics (age and gender of the manager), workforce composition (shares by education, gender, type of contracts, share of immigrants, main occupations etc.), firms' productive characteristics (export in foreign markets, trade agreements, (log of) sales per employee, innovation and multinationals dummies). Of course, this set of controls might be endogenous, and a bad control problem might arise with our estimates. Reassuringly, our coefficients of interest are barely changed, suggesting that the size of the effect is not driven by the inclusion of such controls. If any, the statistical significance of our estimates improves with the respect to the previous set of regressions²⁹. The fact that the step-by-step introduction of a such rich set of controls leaves the impact of the free commune on our proxies for current cooperative industrial relations barely unaltered is clearly reassuring, and possibly suggests that unobservables might not very important in our identification setting.

As far as the magnitude of the coefficients is concerned, we note that the impact of the free medieval commune is quite important, especially in the case of the two-tier bargaining. Indeed, our results suggest that being located in a municipality that used to be free medieval commune is associated to

²⁹ In tables not reported, but available from the authors upon request, we run the same regressions on the sample of firms located in the municipalities in the North of the country, thus excluding those located in the Center. Results are confirmed.

an increase of about 3.5 per cent on the probability that a two-tier bargaining agreement exists in a given firm. This is a quite large effect if we consider that, in our sample, such agreements exist in just 11 per cent of our firms. In the case of the two other proxies of cooperative industrial and labor relations, the magnitude of the effects is perhaps slightly smaller but not negligible.

As discussed in the Identification section, although our OLS estimates control for a large set of current and past observable characteristics both at the firm and municipality level, there still could be some unobservable characteristic that may be positively correlated to our main regressor of interest, i.e. the dummy for being a free-city states in the Middle Ages. In that is case, our OLS estimates cannot be given a causal interpretation of the effect of free- commune on the quality of industrial relations. Hence in table 4, we report the results for our IV estimates in which we instrument the dummy for the free-commune with a dummy equal to one for the presence of a bishop in the past. While we extensively discussed the rationale for using such instrument in previous sections, here we just mention that the emergence of a commune was more likely in cities that had a bishop in place. Our first stage estimates, that are reported at the bottom of the table, confirm our expectations. Indeed, the bishop dummies positive and highly statistically significant; second, standard test for identification suggest that we do not have a weak identification problem³⁰.

Table 4. Instrumental variables estimates

	Two-tier bargaining		Union (work councils)		Union density	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Free commune	0.061*** (0.011)	0.093*** (0.034)	0.041*** (0.012)	0.029 (0.035)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.043** (0.017)
Controls employment	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year, sector, province	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Firms characteristics	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Workforce characteristics	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Obs	29523	25866	28489	24951	28946	25459
First stage statistics						
Excluded instrument bishop	0.649*** [0.000]	0.328*** [0.000]	0.645*** [0.000]	0.328*** [0.000]	0.647*** [0.000]	0.328*** [0.000]
Weak identification F	262.29	43.02	254.28	42,35	258.95	42.54
P-value	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]

Note: dependent variables: columns 1 and 2 is a dummy equal to one for firms with a two-tier agreement in place; columns 3 and 4 is a dummy equal to one for firms with a RSA/RSU (union representation) in place; columns 5 and 6 is the ratio between union members over total employees. Controls at the bottom of the table refer to regressions in panels A, B and C. All regressions controls for number of employees, number of employees squared sectors of activity, province fixed effects and year fixed effects. Municipality controls include altitude, coastal location, near sea, dummies for population in the middle ages, current population, Gini inequality index; firm characteristics include dummies for age and gender of the manager, foreign trade, log of sales per employee, multinationals, product innovation, process innovation, foreign trade agreements; workforce characteristics controls for the composition of the employee by education, gender, contractual arrangements, occupation and citizenship. Standard errors clustered at municipality levels in parentheses.

Source: our elaborations on RIL 2010-2014-2018 data

³⁰ Complete first stage results are available from the authors upon request.

Results from our IV regressions, reported in table 4, confirm our main OLS results, both for the more parsimonious specification reported in columns [1], [3] and [5] and for the fully saturated model with the entire set of controls and fixed effects reported in columns [2], [4] and [6]³¹. This is true for the three dependent variables used as proxies of high quality cooperative industrial and labor relations. The estimated effects for our IV are slightly larger than the OLS ones. For example, the estimated coefficient for the presence of a two-tier agreement at firm level is equal to 0.09 (against 0.06 obtained in the OLS regressions)³². This somewhat larger effect in the IV estimates might suggest that OLS are downwards biased, possibly because of, e.g., some local unobservables at municipality level that favored the birth of a medieval free commune but that currently discourage cooperative labor relations. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that OLS and IV might be estimating different average treatment effects: indeed, IV estimates should identify a local average treatment effect, namely the effect of the free medieval commune on compliers, i.e. firms located in those municipalities that become a free medieval commune precisely because of the presence of a bishop. If the effect of the free medieval commune experience is heterogenous across locations, then it is possible that the local average treatment effect is different from the average treatment effect estimated by OLS.

6.2 Heterogeneity

In what follows, we further investigate our main results of a positive correlation between the presence of a free-commune in the Middle Ages and our firm level measures of cooperative industrial relations today. As a matter of fact, two-tier bargaining, work councils and unions are more likely to be observed in large firms and in particular sectors.

As Boeri (2014) notes, two-tier bargaining covers about 50% of firms with more than 200 employees in Europe, while such percentage is about 20% for firms below 50 employees. Union presence may be also correlated to firm size, especially in some industries where unions are stronger, as for example in large manufacturing establishments. To further investigate this issue, in table 5 we report results for our fully saturated models including the entire set of controls and fixed effects as reported in column 3 of table 3 and splitting the sample according to firm size (above and below 50 employees). Interestingly, we find that the positive effect of being located in a municipality that used to be a free medieval commune on cooperative labor relations is positive in both cases with coefficients that are of similar magnitude, but turns out to be statistically significant only in the case of smaller firms. This may suggest that long run determinants of cooperative labor relations are relatively more relevant in firms in which interpersonal interaction is more frequent and in which are more likely to be closer in every day operations.

³¹ The parsimonious specification corresponds to the OLS estimates reported in column 1 of table 3, the fully saturated one corresponds to column 3 of the same table.

³² We also run our IV regressions on the sample of firms located in the North, thus excluding those located in the Centre of Italy. Again, our main results are confirmed.

Table 5. Estimates by firm size

	Below 50 employees			Above 50 employees		
	Two-tier [1]	Union [2]	Density [3]	Two-tier [4]	Union [5]	Density [6]
Free commune	0.031*** (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.009 (0.008)	0.034 (0.025)	0.031 (0.021)	0.026** (0.011)
Controls employment	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year, sector, province	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Firms characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Workforce characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Obs	15731	14829	15620	10152	10137	9853

Note: dependent variables: columns 1 and 4 is a dummy equal to one for firms with a two-tier agreement in place; columns 2 and 5 is a dummy equal to one for firms with a RSA/RSU (union representation) in place; columns 3 and 6 is the ratio between union members over total employees. Controls at the bottom of the table refer to regressions in panels A, B and C. All regressions controls for number of employees, number of employees squared, sectors of activity, province fixed effects and year fixed effects. Municipality controls include altitude, coastal location, near sea, dummies for population in the middle ages, current population, Gini inequality index; firm characteristics include dummies for age and gender of the manager, foreign trade, log of sales per employee, multinationals, product innovation, process innovation, foreign trade agreements; workforce characteristics controls for the composition of the employee by education, gender, contractual arrangements, occupation and citizenship. Standard errors clustered at municipality levels in parentheses.

Source: our elaborations on RIL 2010-2014-2018 data

In what follows, we explore another important aspect related to the emergence of cooperative industrial relations. Economic theory suggests that the emergence of cooperative solutions is more likely to emerge in an environment in which the parties have already experienced past cooperation and in which reciprocal trust has emerged as an equilibrium outcome. We argue this is more likely to happen if – *ceteris paribus* – firms (and unions) have been operating for a longer time and had the possibility of cooperating. In table 6, we shed some light on this issue by splitting the sample according to firm's age, where we arbitrarily choose the cutoff of 10 years of firms' age. We expect that in younger firms it will take time to build this type of relationships and thus long run effects may matter less, even if the social environment is potentially favorable in this respect. Results, that should be taken with particular care, given the small sample size for very young firms, confirm our expectations: the positive effect of past free-commune experience seems to emerge only for firms that are well established in the economic environment³³.

Finally, we split our sample in two subsamples depending on the macro sector of activity of firms. We do this for different reasons. On the one hand, there is a large literature that shows that union presence and density vary across sectors for reasons related to the elasticity of labor demand and rent availability. Traditionally, unions were stronger and more present in industrial manufacturing sectors with a somewhat less relevant role in the service sector, although we observe a clear decline over time. Similarly, two-tier bargaining varies a lot across and also within sectors (see Boeri 2014), and our sample confirms this variability with two-tier bargaining ranging from 20% in public utilities to less than 3% in hotels and restaurant. Our results, corresponding to the fully saturated model including the entire set of controls and fixed effects in column 3 of table 3, and reported in table 7, suggest that

³³ In tables not reported, but available from the authors upon request, we also experiment using different cut-off for firm's age. We choose 5 years, and results are confirmed, although the sample size for young firms turns out to be highly reduced, amounting to less than 500 firms.

the size of the estimates is broadly similar for the entire set of our dependent variables, even if our coefficient of interest is precisely estimated only in the case of the service sector.

Table 6. Estimates by firm age

	Entry less than 10 years			Entry above 10 years		
	Two-tier [1]	Union [2]	Density [3]	Two-tier [4]	Union [5]	Density [6]
Free commune	0.035 (0.034)	0.030 (0.038)	0.014 (0.019)	0.031** (0.015)	0.042*** (0.015)	0.016** (0.007)
Controls employment	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year, sector, province	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Firms characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Workforce characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Obs	2335	2554	2490	23352	22616	22987

Note: dependent variables: columns 1 and 4 is a dummy equal to one for firms with a two-tier agreement in place; columns 2 and 5 is a dummy equal to one for firms with a RSA/RSU (union representation) in place; columns 3 and 6 is the ratio between union members over total employees. Controls at the bottom of the table refer to regressions in panels A, B and C. All regressions controls for number of employees, number of employees squared, sectors of activity, province fixed effects and year fixed effects. Municipality controls include altitude, coastal location, near sea, dummies for population in the middle ages, current population, Gini inequality index; firm characteristics include dummies for age and gender of the manager, foreign trade, log of sales per employee, multinationals, product innovation, process innovation, foreign trade agreements; workforce characteristics controls for the composition of the employee by education, gender, contractual arrangements, occupation and citizenship. Standard errors clustered at municipality levels in parentheses.

Source: our elaborations on RIL 2010-2014-2018 data

Table 7. Estimates by macro-sector

	Industry			Services		
	Union [1]	Two-tier [2]	Density [3]	Union [4]	Two-tier [5]	Density [6]
Free commune	0.034 (0.022)	0.025 (0.020)	0.017 (0.011)	0.054*** (0.020)	0.040** (0.018)	0.015* (0.008)
Controls employment	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year, sector, province	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Firms characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Workforce characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Obs	14504	14983	14718	10464	10902	10757

Note: industry sectors includes: mining and public utilities; food and tobacco; clothing and wood; textiles, wood, paper; chemicals and metal products; machinery and equipment; other manufacturing; construction. Service sectors includes: wholesale and trade; transport; hotels and restaurants; information and communication; financial and insurance activities; other services; education, health and other private services. Controls at the bottom of the table refer to regressions in panels A, B and C. All regressions controls for number of employees, number of employees squared, sectors of activity, province fixed effects and year fixed effects. Municipality controls include altitude, coastal location, near sea, dummies for population in the middle ages, current population, Gini inequality index; firm characteristics include dummies for age and gender of the manager, foreign trade, log of sales per employee, multinationals, product innovation, process innovation, foreign trade agreements; workforce characteristics controls for the composition of the employee by education, gender, contractual arrangements, occupation and citizenship. Standard errors clustered at municipality levels in parentheses.

Source: our elaborations on RIL 2010-2014-2018 data

7. Concluding remarks

In this paper, we have explored the long run determinants of the emergence of cooperative labor relations. Indeed, a large literature has documented that high levels of trust and cooperative attitudes

are positively correlated to development along various dimensions at local level. Moreover, current levels of social capital are found to be highly persistent over time, with a key role for historical institutions to explain current levels of trust and cooperation.

We provide empirical evidence on the emergence of cooperative labor and industrial relations using Italian data for a sample of firms observed over the period 2010-2018. We find that, conditional on a large set of observable characteristics at the province, municipality and firm level, higher levels of trust and cooperation in the past (proxied by the presence of a free-commune in the Middle Ages) are positively correlated to cooperative attitudes in the labor market today. In particular, we find a positive relation with the presence of second-level bargaining agreements at the firm level and with different proxies for the presence of unions.

We also complement our main empirical results using an instrumental variable strategy. Following Guiso *et al.* (2016), we report that the emergence of a free-commune was more likely in cities that were already seats of a bishop. Our IV estimates confirm our main findings of a positive relation between the free-commune experience and current cooperative labor and industrial relations. Finally, we consider heterogeneous effects along various dimensions by splitting our sample according to some observable firm characteristics. In particular, we consider heterogeneous effects depending on firm size, firm age and sector of activity. In all cases, we do find some evidence of differential effects that call for potential avenues for future research.

References

- Addison J.T., Teixeira P. (2019), Strikes, employee workplace representation, unionism, and industrial relations quality in European establishments, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 159, pp.109-133
- Aghion P., Algan Y., Cahuc P. (2011), Civil society and the state. The interplay between cooperation and minimum wage regulation, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 9, n.1, pp.3-42
- Aghion P., Algan Y., Cahuc P., Shleifer A. (2010), Regulation and distrust, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125, n.3, pp.1015-1049
- Alesina A., Algan Y., Cahuc P., Giuliano P. (2015), Family values and the regulation of labor, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 13, n.4, pp.599-630
- Alesina A., Giuliano P. (2015), Culture and institutions, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 53, n.4, pp.898-944
- Algan Y., Cahuc P. (2014), Trust, growth, and well-being. New evidence and policy implications, in Aghion P., Durlauf S.N. (eds.), *Handbook of economic growth Vol. 2*, Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp.49-120
- Arrow K.J. (1972), Gifts and exchanges, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 1, n.4, pp.343-362
- Artifoni E. (1990), Corporazioni e società di "popolo". Un problema della politica comunale nel secolo XIII, *Quaderni storici*, 25, n.74 pp.387-404
- Bandiera O., Barankay I., Rasul I. (2011), Field experiments with firms, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 25, n.3, pp.63-82
- Bandiera O., Barankay I., Rasul I. (2010), Social incentives in the workplace, *Review of Economic Studies*, 77, n.2, pp.417-458
- Bandiera O., Barankay I., Rasul I. (2009), Social connections and incentives in the workplace. Evidence from personnel data, *Econometrica*, 77, n.4, pp.1047-1094
- Bandiera O., Barankay I., Rasul I. (2008), Social capital in the workplace. Evidence on its formation and consequences, *Labour Economics*, 15, n.4, pp.724-748
- Banfield E.C. (1958), *The moral basis of a backward society*, Florence MA, Free Press
- Belloc M., Drago F., Galbiati R. (2016), Earthquakes, religion, and transition to self-government in Italian cities, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 131, n.4, pp.1875-1926
- Beynon H., Blakely H., Bryson A., Davies R. (2021), The persistence of union membership within the coalfields of Britain, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 59, n.4, pp.1131-1152
- Bisin A., Federico G. (2021), Merger or acquisition? An introduction to The Handbook of Historical Economics, in Bisin A., Federico G. (eds.), *The Handbook of Historical Economics*, New York, Academic Press-Elsevier, pp.xv-xxxviii
- Bisin A., Verdier T. (2001), The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 97, n.2, pp.298-319
- Blanden J., Machin S. (2003), Cross-generation correlations of union status for young people in Britain, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 41, n.3, pp.391-415
- Boeri T. (2014), *Two-tier bargaining*, IZA Discussion Paper n.8358, Bonn, IZA
- Booth A.L. (1985), The free rider problem and a social custom model of trade union membership, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 100, n.1, pp.253-261

- Bosker M., Buringh E., van Zanden J.L. (2013), From Baghdad to London. Unraveling urban development in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, 800-1800, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 95, n.4, pp.1418-1437
- Bryson A., Davies R. (2019), Family, place and the intergenerational transmission of union membership, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 57, n.3, pp.624-650
- Bryson A., Gomez R. (2005), Why have workers stopped joining unions? The rise in never-membership in Britain, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 43, n.1, pp.67-92
- Buggle J.C., Durante R. (2021), Climate risk, cooperation and the co-evolution of culture and institutions, *The Economic Journal*, 131, n.637, pp.1947-1987
- Cardini M., Montesano F. (2006), *Storia medievale*, Firenze, Le Monnier Università
- Cardullo G., Conti M., Sulis G. (2020), A model of unions, two-tier bargaining and capital investment, *Labour Economics*, 67, article 101936
- Chittolini G. (1989), Cities, city-states, and regional states in north-central Italy, *Theory and society*, 18, n.5, pp.689-706
- Crouch C. (1993), *Industrial relations and European state traditions*, Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Damiani M., Pompei F., Ricci A. (2019), Opting out, collective contracts and labour flexibility. Firm-level evidence for the Italian case, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 58, n.3, pp.558-586
- Damiani M., Ricci A. (2014), Managers' education and the choice of different variable pay schemes. Evidence from Italian firms, *European Management Journal*, 32, n.6, pp.891-902
- D'Amuri F., Giorgiantonio C. (2014), *Diffusione e prospettive della contrattazione aziendale in Italia*, Questioni di economia e finanza n.221, Roma, Banca d'Italia
- Devicienti F., Manello A., Vannoni D. (2017), Technical efficiency, unions and decentralized labor contracts, *European Journal of Operational Research*, 260, n.3, pp.1129-1141
- Di Liberto A., Sideri M. (2015), Past dominations, current institutions and the Italian regional economic performance, *European Journal of Political Economy*, 38, pp.12-41
- Epstein S.R., Prak M. (2008), *Guilds, innovation and the European economy. 1400-1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Eurofound (2020), *European Company Survey 2019. Workplace practices unlocking employee potential*, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union
- Farber H.S., Herbst D., Kuziemko I., Naidu S. (2021), Unions and inequality over the twentieth century. New evidence from survey data, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136, n.3, pp.1325-1385
- Fehr E., List J.A. (2004), The hidden costs and returns of incentives. Trust and trustworthiness among CEOs, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2, n.5, pp.743-771
- Freeman R., Medoff J. (1984), *What Do Unions Do*, New York, Basic Books
- Gennaioli N., Rainer I. (2007), The modern impact of precolonial centralization in Africa, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12, n.3, pp.185-234
- Gramsci A. (1975), *Quaderni dal carcere. Edizione critica dell'Istituto Antonio Gramsci, a cura di Valentino Gerratana*, Torino, Einaudi
- Greci R. (1995), Le corporazioni. Associazioni di mestiere nell'Italia del Medioevo, *Storia e Dossier*, 99, pp.61-106
- Greif A. (2006), *Institutions and the path to the modern economy. Lessons from medieval trade*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

- Guiso L., Sapienza P., Zingales L. (2016), Long-term persistence, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 14, n.6, pp.1401-1436
- Guiso L., Sapienza P., Zingales L. (2006), Does culture affect economic outcomes?, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20, n.2, pp.23-48
- Henrich J. (2020), *The WEIRDest people in the world. How the West became psychologically peculiar and particularly prosperous*, London, Penguin Books
- Hoare Q., Nowell-Smith G. (1971), *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, New York, International Publishers <<https://bit.ly/3qUmt58>>
- Holmes T.J. (2006), *Geographic spillover of unionism*, NBER Working Paper n.12025, Cambridge MA, NBER
- Krause S. (2000), The spirit of separate powers in Montesquieu, *The Review of Politics*, 62, n.2, pp.231-265
- Lucifora C., Viganì D. (2021), Losing control? Unions' representativeness, 'Pirate' collective agreements and wages, *Industrial Relations*, 60, n.2, pp.188-218
- Mueller H.M., Philippon T. (2011), Family firms and labor relations, *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 3, n.2, pp.218-245
- Muringani J., Fitjar R.D., Rodríguez-Pose A. (2021), Social capital and economic growth in the regions of Europe, *EPA: Economy and Space*, 53, n.6, pp.1412-1434
- Naylor R. (1989), Strikes, free riders, and social customs, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 104, n.4, pp.771-785
- Nunn N., Wantchekon L. (2011), The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa, *American Economic Review*, 101, n.7, pp.3221-3252
- OECD (2017), *OECD Employment Outlook 2017*, Paris, OECD Publishing
- Putnam R.D. (1993), Social capital and institutional success, in Putnam R.D., Leonardi R., Nanetti R.Y., *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, pp.163-186
- Rutenburg V.I. (1973), Arti e corporazioni, in Romano R., Vivanti C. (a cura di), *Storia d'Italia. I documenti. Vol.5*, Torino, Einaudi, pp.615-642
- Tabellini G. (2010), Culture and institutions. Economic development in the regions of Europe, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 8, n.4, pp.677-716
- Urbinati N. (2015), A revolt against intermediary bodies, *Constellations*, 22, n.4, pp.477-486
- Visser J. (2016), What happened to collective bargaining during the great recession?, *IZA Journal of Labor Policy*, 5, n.9, pp.1-35
- Voth H-J. (2021), Persistence. Myth and mystery, in Bisin A., Federico G. (eds.), *The Handbook of Historical Economics*, Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp.243-267

