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## TRAINING FOR THE PRACTICE OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION: SOME EVIDENCE FOR EUROPEAN WORKPLACES\*

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SOMMARIO: Abstract; Introduzione; 2. Background discussion: Training and workers' direct participation; 2.1. Employee participation: consultation and delegation within the firm; 2.2. The determinants of training within workplaces; 3. Data and variables; 3.1. Direct participation and training indicators; 3.2. Other controls; 4. Empirical analysis; 4.1. Econometric analysis; 5. Concluding remarks.

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#### **Abastract**

The present study uses data for European workplaces adopting direct participation schemes to investigate the determinants of training supporting group consultation and group delegation. The practice of employees' direct participation in decision making can take various forms: from the simple consultation to the more involving delegation of authority, or a combination of the two. We argue that their requirements in terms of training may be different. Also the role of work organisation arrangements and institutional features is investigated. We find that the intensity of training to support delegation and participation activities is rather small, and it is higher when both types of participation mechanisms are in place. Concerning the differences between workplaces using delegation and consultation, while the theory suggests that the former should make a more intense use of training, this prediction does not seem to be supported by the data.

2. Background discussion: Training and workers' direct participation

Employee participation practices have undergone significant changes in recent years. While traditional types of employee participation were concerned with various forms of collective involvement (i.e. collective bargaining) with the objective to work for a more equitable distribution of power within the organisation, 'new' forms of participation have emerged - especially in new knowledge-based sectors of the economy -- out of management strategies such as high performance work organisation (HPWO).

These are characterised by a higher direct involvement of workers in the decision process, and aimed at securing employee commitment to firm's objectives both through sophisticated information sharing procedures as well as performance appraisal linked to performance-related pay (Blinder, 1990). Interestingly, also the European Commission, by creating the European Information and Consultation Directive, has implicitly recognised the crucial social role of employees' higher involvement in decision-making as a way of promoting workplace democracy by removing the discretion from management and ensuring that workers can have a right to information and consultation about workplace changes (Sisson, 2002; Coriat, 2002).

These direct participation mechanisms have increased in importance and diffusion since managers seek to gain voluntary commitment from employees to organisational goals at times of higher competitive pressures and work insecurity (Kelly, 1998). Moreover, these forms of involvement are deemed to be effective in improving economic efficiency, fostering both firm's productivity and profitability¹. In particular, 'new' forms of employee participation, particularly those implying higher employees' involvement, may require a specific training directed to empower workers with the individual competencies and inter-personal skills needed to make employee information sharing, consultation and delegation mechanisms to be effective.

In fact, one might assume that this approach to work organization

goes along with considerable training efforts since working together in groups requires cooperative and communicative skills. It is only when employee knowledge and experience on those practices, nicely complements management's strategies on markets that the best outcomes may be achieved.

While in the literature a lot of attention has been given to the association between organisational practices and economic efficiency, the implications of training requirements have been mostly neglected. To overcome this lack of attention, we aim at investigating whether different forms of employee involvement induce specific investment in training at the workplace, and which of these different 'high-commitment work practices' require a higher training intensity. To this purpose we employ the 1996 EPOC Survey (Employment Participation in Organisational Changes) which provides information on direct participation and innovative human resource management styles as well as specific training at the workplaces level in ten European countries.

In this paper, we focus attention on "vocational" training specifically targeted to support workers' direct participation practices in the form of group consultation and/or group delegation at the workplace. In other words, we investigate the determinants of training within the sub sample of workplaces that have introduced some forms of workers' direct participation. Since workplaces using direct participation schemes are heterogeneous in several dimensions that may be relevant for training decisions, particular care should be used in the empirical analysis.

For example, there are different degrees of workers' direct involvement in the decision making activity, going from the simple consultation to more articulated forms in which workers can decide by their own on a number of specific topics. In the latter case, since the strategic decision taken by the management to decentralise the decision making is much more complex than in the case of simple consultation, it may affect the training activity.

Also, since in our sample we can identify workplaces according to the type of direct participation activity, as well as the intensity in the use of such practices (only one - either consultation or delegation - vs both), interesting insights on the relationship between work practices and workplace training can be derived.

The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relationship between participation, delegation – as well as other workplace characteristics – and training. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 contains the descriptive statistics and the main econometric results. The last section concludes.

2.1. Employee participation: consultation and delegation within the firm

Employee participation can take various forms, it can be individual or collective, and also direct or indirect. In the former type of participation, it is either the 'single' worker who is involved in the process (individual), or alternatively a 'group' of them who collectively interact with the management (collective). In the latter type, the extent to which employees are represented in organisational decision-making can range from management dealing directly with employees (direct) or management dealing with employee representatives (indirect).

The existence of economies of scale and transaction costs in employee participation – given the number of workers involved – contribute to make the indirect collective as the main form of participation. Collective bargaining, for example, is still the more diffused form of workers involvement, allowing employee participation in negotiations via elected representatives or fulltime officials, usually as part of a trade unions (Cully et al., 1999). Other forms of indirect collective participation can include social partnership agreements with trade unions, works councils, co-determination agreements and joint consultation committees.

However, 'new' forms of participation concern much more direct modes and employee involvement or employee empowerment, and most of them can be included under HPWO strategies. In particular, in the HPWO literature, a major role in organisation design and human resource management has been information sharing, consultation and delegation (Roche, 1999; Purcell et al, 2003).

For example, in the 1996 Employee Participation and Organisational Change (EPOC) survey used in this paper, various types of employee participation mechanisms have resulted to be positively associated with different compensation policies and better organisational and economic performance (Dell'Aringa et al. 2006). Often, new practices have been shown to facilitate employee-managerial relations during times of intense organisational change and re-organisation plans (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002).

In the 'new' forms of participation, often referred to 'high-commitment work practices' (HCWP), both the form of participation arrangements and the degree of involvement can go from one extreme to the other: 'no employee input' to organisational decisions, to 'complete delegation' for a situation of employee (total) control (Marchington et al., 1992). Summarising the main findings from the literature on participation, in Table 1 we report a stylised description of the main forms through which participation can be implemented. Moreover, these forms are rated on a progressive scale from 1 to 4, according to the degree of intrinsic participation they imply, going from 'no employee involvement' up to 'complete delegation'.

Table 1 - Degree of participation, information sharing and control over procedures

- [1] <u>No Involvement</u>: mainly refers to unilateral decisions by the employer without any information sharing with employees;
- [2] <u>Receiving Information</u>: refers to 'one-way' transmission by the employer to employees (or their representatives) of data relevant to the organisation;
- [3] <u>Consultation</u>: refers to two-way transmission between the employer and the employees (or their representatives), the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between them. These can include a variety of techniques such as attitude surveys, team briefings, quality circles and employee focus groups;
- [4] <u>Delegation-Employee Control</u>: this defines high employee commitment procedures where dialogue is seen as pre-requisite, but, in this case, employees have full control over the practices implemented. It concerns techniques such as self-managed teams, consultative committees or autonomous bodies;

Of course, the sharp distinction between different arrangements is rather artificial: in practice, in large organisations several arrangements concerning employees participation may coexist. In addition, it may be that in order to introduce some delegation of decision power a "platform" of pre-existing habit and familiarity with the practice of consultation is desirable. This is an interesting point, which will be addresses in more detail in our empirical analysis.

In any respect, a higher involvement of workers in the decision process, as the one induced by consultation and delegation mechanisms, may require higher levels of interpersonal skills. In this context, the ability to cooperate by working in groups becomes a key factor to obtain better performances. In principle, the firm may acquire these competencies on the market hiring more skilled workers, or it may decide to implement direct participation practices only when the existing workforce is endowed with a the desired level of competencies. Alternatively, the management may obtain higher levels of "vocational" skills providing substantial training to the employees involved in the direct participation process. In this perspective, we may expect that the need for training increases together with the degrees of involvement of workers in the decision process.

Indeed, employers can choose whether to adopt a 'high' or a 'low' road strategy in relation to their market strategies and employee relations. The choice of a 'high-power' objectives, as previously discussed, should necessarily combine high value-added products and services, high levels of investment and intense training activity, with high-trust industrial relations committed to employee involvement. On the other hand, when a 'low-power' objective is chosen both training investment and productivity are likely to be lower, while industrial relations tend to be more adversarial and based on winner-takes-all attitude (TUC, 2002).

Within this framework, the aim of this paper is to place under scrutiny a number of theoretical predictions concerning the relationship between direct participation and workplace training. First, we investigate whether, as suggested by the arguments outlined above, direct participation calls for an intense training activities. Second, we try to understand if delegation of decision power is associated with more training than "simple" consultation. Finally, we want to test whether the coexistence of both consultation and delegation mechanisms is associated with a higher training provision.

# 2.2. The determinants of training within workplaces

In the economic and in the industrial relations literature, the usual approach to study workplaces' training decisions is to analyse their determinants, i.e. those economic factors that, from a theoretical point of view, can have an influence on the likelihood and on the amount of the training offered. We argue that the decision of firms to use training as a tool to implement and reinforce practices of consultation and delegation is also going to be influenced by a number of factors that the existing literature considers as important in affecting training in general. Accordingly, we will take them into account as additional controls in the empirical analysis<sup>2</sup>.

Training differs significantly across countries, according – among others – to differences in the institutional setting both in the labour and education markets, which are likely to affect both benefits and costs of training.

Personal characteristics and the workforce composition are also relevant, as returns are linked to various attributes, especially formal qualification and skills (training individuals with higher levels of qualification will yield higher returns at lower costs).

Job attributes are also important. For example, full-time workers are more likely to receive training than part-time workers (reflecting both the period over which the investment is realized and the type of job that is involved), permanent as opposed temporary contracts are also more likely to be trained (Arulampalam, Booth, 1998).

Workplace characteristics may also affect the scope and the intensity of work-related training. Jacobs et al. (1996) ranked the relative importance of organizational factors "vis-à-vis" individual characteristics in U.S. companies, and concluded noting that ". . . the relatively powerful importance of establishment and job factors in structuring opportunities to receive worksite training and the relatively modest importance of individual factors. . . " (ibid, p. 174).

For example, larger workplaces by having greater costs of monitoring employees, are more likely to provide more training to improve productivity and lower turnover. They also tend to operate in more stable markets and to be characterised by stronger internal employment markets, which means lower risk associated with returns to training (Harris, 1999).

Many studies show considerable variation of the intensity of training by industry. Black and Lynch (1998) find that the industries less likely to report employer-provided formal training are apparel, construction, transportation, insurance, hotels, and business services, while finance, insurance and real estate industries are the most likely to provide job skill training to employees (Frazis et al., 1995). The public sector also seems more likely to engage in training probably because the risk of poaching by rivals is much lower (Harris, 1999).

The so called High-Performance-Workplace Practices (HPWP), such as team work, job rotation, etc., have been also found in a number of study to be important factors. Still, the direction of causality in the relationship between the adoption of such practices and the provision of training is difficult to establish. In theory, firms that adopt new practices should train their workers in order to provide them with the skills required to carry on those work practices. There is evidence, however, that many firms use a number of these practices without formally providing their workers with additional skills (Lawler, 1992). The adoption of new practices may be most successful in those establishments in which there is already a high degree of employer-employee commitment (as it is the case of the consultation and delegation practices here considered). If this commitment is linked to training, then firms adopting such practices would also have a high likelihood of providing training. Positive effects of at least some of these HPWP have been found, among others, in the studies of Frazis et al. (1995), Osterman (1995), Black and Lynch (1998)<sup>3</sup>.

Finally, the presence of unions can be important, also interacting with the practices of consultation and delegation. The channels through which unions affect training are potentially quite complex, and it is not immediately obvious that unionism will be associated with greater or lower intensity of training. The implications of unionism for training depend on whether the union effect is indirect – either through the compression of the wage structure (Booth et al., 2003), the employees relations in the organization (Green et al., 1999) -, or alternatively direct, through the negotiation of training.

A number of economic studies stress the efficiency–enhancing role of unions also in the field of workplace training: by reducing turnover rates, they provide employers with greater incentives to train and retain productive workers (Dustmann and Schonberg, 2004). Green et al. (1999) investigate whether there is any effect on training coming from the interaction between union presence and other plant characteristics (such as the presence of employee involvement and of a joint consultative committee). They find that the coefficient of the interaction term is and view this as an important evidence of an indirect positive union influence on training via collective the voice mechanism. Heynes and Stuart (1998) find a strong association between training experiences of unionised workers and the union involvement in the organisation.

Concerning profit opportunities, in firms where profit are greater, the available surplus may be shared at least partly with workers in the form of firm-financed general training. Surplus availability and unionism

are two factors that might reinforce each other in affecting the intensity of training. Finally, profit and rent opportunities might depend on the degree of competition existing in the product market where the firm operates.

#### 3. Data and variables

To study the features of training motivated by workers' direct participation we use the EPOC (Employee direct Participation in Organisational Change) Survey<sup>4</sup>. It covers workplaces with more than 25 employees in all the economic sectors (with the exception of the agriculture) for ten European countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK). Additional information refers to the largest occupational group<sup>5</sup>.

The overall response rate is approximately 18 percent, which creates obvious concerns for the treatment of non-respondents. Sensitivity checks in the form of telephone follow-ups for similar surveys in different countries revealed that there usually is no systematic relationship between flexible work organizations and the probability to be in the sample. Although a similar check has not been made for the EPOC survey and there is no direct evidence on that, there is no a-priori reason to believe this would not be the case here.

The Survey can be ideally divided into two parts. The first one collects information about the main characteristics of each workplace surveyed, such as the size, the sector of activity, the employment composition and the characteristics of its product (or service) market. The second part asks about the practice of direct participation in the largest occupational group and contains the questions on training issues. The questionnaire distinguishes between consultative participation (hereafter consultation), where the management retains the right to decide on work-related themes, and delegative participation (hereafter delegation), where employees organise their job independently and without feeding back to management. Direct participation concerns the organisation of work and of their tasks, as well as working conditions, and it can be individually or group-based<sup>6</sup>. Hence, direct participation is intrinsically different from indirect and representative participation through trade unions and work councils.

The information on training is available only for a subset of workplaces, namely those that responded positively to the questions about the presence of group consultation and/or group delegation. Hence, they form the sample available for our empirical investigation on the training's determinants. In absolute terms, they represent the 81 percent of the data set (5,786 obs.). Because of missing values, the final sample used in the empirical analysis contains 4,442 observations.

### 3.1. Direct participation and

We identify three categories of workplaces, depending on the type of direct participation adopted: (i) only group consultation; (ii) only group

#### training indicators

delegation; (iii) both of them. We create three dummies (CONS, DELEG, CONS&DELEG) taking value one when only group consultation, only group delegation or both are used, respectively. Table 2 shows the distribution of the workplaces across different direct participation practices: 23 percent of the sample only uses consultation; 6 percent only delegation; 71 percent use both. Thus, it seems that in the majority of cases delegation is more additive than substitute to consultation.

Information on training comes from two separate questions asking whether the management organised any training of employees to support its consultation (or delegation) group activities in very specific areas <sup>7</sup>. Hence, the training activity considered is the one specifically targeted to support direct participation activities and, more specifically, directed to either consultation or delegation practices<sup>8</sup>. Given the available information, we measure training by means of two ordered variables reporting the number of areas in which training is offered (consultation and delegation, separately): TRAINCONS and TRAINDEL, both ranging from 0 to 4<sup>9</sup>. The latter can be used to investigate (separately) the determinants of training for consultation and for delegation, and especially whether workplaces using both types of direct participation practices (CONS&DELEG = 1) train more than the average in both fields.

One limitation of all the above indicators is that they provide only "qualitative" information on the number of areas in which training is offered, not enabling us to directly investigate the effect of direct participation on the "real" intensity of workplace training<sup>10</sup>.

Table 2 – Variables' definition

VARIABLE	Definition
CONS	1 = only consultation; 0 = otherwise
DELEG	1 = only delegation of decision 0 = only consultation
CONS&DELEG	1 = both consultation and delegation 0 = otherwise
TRAINCONS	Number of training schemes to support consultation
	(from 0 to 4)
TRAINDEL	Number of training schemes to support delegation
	(from 0 to 4)
NETHERLANDS	1 = located in Netherlands; 0 = otherwise
GERMANY	1 = located in Germany; 0 = otherwise
SPAIN	1 = located in Spain; 0 = otherwise
DENMARK	1 = located in Denmanrk; 0 = otherwise
IRELAND	1 = located in Ireland; 0 = otherwise
FRANCE	1 = located in France; 0 = otherwise
ITALY	1 = located in Italy; 0 = otherwise
SWEDEN	1 = located in in Sweden; 0 = otherwise
UK	1 = located in the UK; 0 = otherwise
PORTUGAL	1 = located in Portugal; 0 = otherwise
MANUFACT.	1 = industry sector; 0 = otherwise
CONSTRUCTION	1 = construction sector; 0 = otherwise
TRADE	1 = trade sector; 0 = otherwise
PRIVATE SERVICES	S1 = private services sector; 0 = otherwise

PUBLIC SERVICES	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
SIZE_LESS100	1 = less than 100 employees; 0 = otherwise
SIZE100_200	1 = number of employees between 100 and 200; 0 =
	otherwise
SIZE200_500	1 = number of employees between 200 and 500; 0 =
	otherwise
SIZE500_1000	1 = number of employees between 500 and 1000; 0
	= otherwise
SIZE_1000MORE	1 = more than 1000 employees; 0 = otherwise
INDEPEND	1 = independent workplace; 0 = otherwise
PROFIT	1 = workplace profit-oriented; 0 = otherwise
STATESHARE	1 = workplace owned (maybe partly) by the state; 0
	= otherwise
FOREIGNCOMP	1 = workplace open to foreign competition; 0 =
	otherwise
INCRECOMP	1 = increased competition in the last three years; 0 =
	otherwise
WORKCOUNC	1 = work council at the workplace; 0 = otherwise
ADVISCOMT	1 = advisory committee at the workplace; 0 =
	otherwise
UNIONDENS	Union density (percentage points)
COVERAGE	1 = workplace covered by a collective agreement; 0
	= otherwise
ICT	1 = information and communic, tech introduced in
	the last three years; 0 = otherwise
HIGHSKILL	1 = the mean level of skills of the workforce is high;
	0 = otherwise
ORGCHANGE	Number of changes in work organization practices
	(from 1 to 5,
	std. dev. = 1.2)
	<del></del> /

#### 3.2. Other controls

As regards to innovative work arrangements, the EPOC survey contains information about the introduction in the last three years of several personnel practices, including: flattening of management structures, installation of team-based work organisation, job rotation of workers across different tasks, higher involvement of workers over a range of different issues. Using this information we define the variable ORGCHANGE, which counts the number of work practices introduced at the workplace, thus accounting for the "intensity" in the use of these work practices<sup>11</sup>.

On the industrial relations side, the survey asks for the presence of two different types of indirect employees representation recognised at the workplace: union representatives, representatives elected to a work council and representatives to an advisory committee established by managers. We condense this information through binary indicators (WORKCOUNC and ADVISCOMT) for, respectively, the presence of the

corresponding employees representation bodies, and a continuous variable for the percentage of union members in the largest occupational group (UNIONDENS). The latter is aimed at capturing not the "active" involvement of employees representatives in decision making but just the "de facto" bargaining power of unions.

Besides industrial relation and HPWO factors, several other characteristics may influence training at the workplace, including an ICT dummy, which takes value one in workplaces where information and communication technologies were introduced in the last three years. The effect of ICT on training is supposed to be positive, for new technologies can make the production process more flexible and decentralised, raising the need for incentives. The skill workforce level, is accounted for with the dummy HIGHSKILL, taking value one when a sufficiently high level of qualification (values one and two in a scale from one to five) is required for employees in the highest occupational group to perform their tasks.

The location of the workplace is captured by a set of country dummy variables, while other binary indicators controls for the sector of activity of the workplace. The number of employees, available from the data, is used to construct a set of dummies for firm size categories. Other dummy variables controls for other important workplace attributes such as: not being part of a larger firm (INDEPEND); shares owned by the state (STATESHARE); being profit oriented (PROFIT). Product market issues are summarised by binary controls for foreign competition (FOREIGNCOMP); significant increases of competitive pressures over the last three years (INCRCOMP); the main success factors for the workplace, such as price (SUCC\_PRICE is the corresponding variable), quality (SUCC QUALITY), variety (SUCC VARIETY), service (SUCC\_SERVICE).

### 4. Empirical analysis

A descriptive analysis of workplace characteristics, including the intensity of training, based on the practice of direct participation pay flexibility is contained in Table 3. Column (1) contains mean values of the variables used in the empirical analysis for the whole sample. The adoption of training to support the practice of direct participation is not common to all workplaces: 54 percent of firms using consultation do not train their employees in any area; the percentage is even higher (63 percent) in the case of training for delegation. Moreover, among workplaces reporting positive values, only a small percentage uses several training practices: for example, while approximately 35 percent of workplaces use one or two types of training for consultation (TRAINCON = 1 or TRAINCON = 2), only 10 percent three or four (TRAINCON = 3 or TRAINCON = 4). A similar pattern emerges also for TRAINDEL. These features are reflected in the mean values of the training indicators: 0.87 and 0.72 for TRAINCONS and TRAINDEL, respectively.

Table 3 – Descriptive statistics: full sample and subsamples by intensity of direct participation

		Ombo			Omby		Both	
	Full sample		Only		Only		consultation	
			consultation		delegation		& delegation	
		Std.		Std.		Std.	0. 0.0.0	Std.
VARIABLE	Mean	Dev.	Mean	Dev.	Mean	Dev.	Mean	Dev.
DK							0.084	
FRA		0.330		0.349				
GER		0.243		0.299				0.205
IRL				0.233				0.205
ITA		0.250		0.376				0.239
NL		0.311		0.272				0.328
PORT		0.281		0.364				0.249
SPA							0.035	
SWE		0.371		0.000		0.000		0.423
UK							0.142	
INDUSTRY							0.294	
CONSTRUCTION						0.381		0.288
TRADE_	0.081						0.082	
PRIV_SERVICE							0.245	
PUB_SECTOR							0.288	
SIZE_LESS100				0.466				0.480
SIZE100_200		0.409	0.227	0.419	0.212	0.410	0.207	0.405
SIZE200_500	0.220	0.414	0.238	0.426	0.205	0.405	0.215	0.411
SIZE500_1000	0.100	0.300	0.109	0.311	0.099	0.299	0.097	0.296
SIZE_1000MORE	0.113	0.317	0.107	0.309	0.059	0.235	0.120	0.325
SUCC_PRICE	0.491	0.500	0.466	0.499	0.527	0.500	0.497	0.500
SUCC_QUALITY	0.750	0.433	0.759	0.428	0.747	0.435	0.747	0.435
SUCC VARIETY	0.353	0.478	0.313	0.464	0.337	0.474	0.367	0.482
SUCC SERV	0.671	0.470	0.673	0.469	0.674	0.470	0.670	0.470
INDEPEND							0.396	
PROFIT		0.469		0.460		0.424		0.474
STATESHARE							0.250	
FOREIGNCOMP								
INCRECOMP							0.431	
TIME RED							0.095	
TIME_RED							0.312	
INCR TEMP							0.267	
INCR PARTIME								
WORKCOUNC							0.132	
							0.149	
								40.826
ICT							0.471	
HIGHSKILL							0.531	
ORGCHANGE					1.505	1.033	1.987	
TRAINCONS (§)			0.721	1.022	0.000	0.000		1.164
TRAINDEL (#)	0.720	1.106			0.388	0.820	0.748	1.122

TRAIN	0.720	1.087	0.721	1.022	0.388	0.820	0.748	1.122
CONS	0.230	0.421						
DELEG	0.061	0.240						
CONS_DELEG	0.709	0.454						
N. OBS.	4,442		1,021		273		3,148	
§: N. OBS								
AVAILABLE	4,169							
#: N. OBS.								
AVAILABLE	3,421							

As this preliminary evidence suggests, delegation is associated with a lower intensity of training as compared to consultation. This however, may be due to compositional effects that are not accounted for in simple descriptive analysis. Columns (2) and (3) show how workplaces with both consultation and delegation invest on average more in both type of training as compared to those with only delegation and only consultation: the value for TRAINCONS is 0.92 in the first case (CONS&DELEG = 1) and 0.72 in the second (CONS = 1), while the corresponding values for TRAINDEL are 0.74 (CONS&DELEG = 1) and 0.38 (DELEG = 1). However, we should also remind that also other factors may drive this result: for example, workplaces with both consultation and delegation are larger, more unionised, and, to the extent which these characteristics are positively associated with the number of types of training and with the propensity to have more direct participation practices, they affect the result. What is somehow surprising is the small mean value of the training indicator for workplaces using only delegation. In fact, according to the discussion of Section 2, we may expect higher training levels for delegation than for consultation. We will explore in more detail this issue analysing the results of the econometric exercise.

As far as other variables are concerned, while workplaces with only consultation or with both consultation and delegation are in our sample quite similar, those with substantial delegation of decision-making appear to be smaller, less unionised, more likely to be independent, less technologically advanced and less open to globalisation. In other words, they appear to be structurally different to the others.

A description of training patterns is given in Table 4, which tabulates the training indicators against a selected set of workplace characteristics used in our analysis. For ease of interpretation, we split the sample according to two binary variables (D\_TRAINCONS, D\_TRAINDEL), taking value one when TRAINCONS e TRAINDEL have positive values 12.

Table 4 – Distribution of mean characteristics across training activities (proportion)

	Training for	concultation	Training for delegation		
	no	consultation yes	no	Yes	
VARIABLE	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	
DK	0.073	0.093	0.083	0.100	
FRA	0.140	0.103	0.132	0.096	
GER	0.057	0.058	0.057	0.044	
IRL	0.093	0.139	0.075	0.129	
ITA	0.058	0.083	0.052	0.069	
NL	0.128	0.094	0.136	0.084	
PORT	0.087	0.090	0.065	0.066	
SPA	0.043	0.024	0.045	0.022	
SWE	0.206	0.140	0.219	0.205	
UK	0.114	0.177	0.135	0.186	
INDUSTRY	0.289	0.304	0.277	0.317	
CONSTRUCTION	0.120	0.059	0.116	0.069	
TRADE_	0.087	0.074	0.094	0.063	
PRIV_SERVICE	0.262	0.240	0.261	0.224	
PUB_SECTOR SIZE LESS100	0.242 0.403	0.323 0.289	0.252 0.404	0.328 0.301	
SIZE_LESS 100 SIZE100_200	0.403	0.209	0.404	0.301	
SIZE200_500	0.214	0.209	0.213	0.130	
SIZE500_500	0.210	0.124	0.130	0.242	
SIZE_1000MORE	0.073	0.124	0.000	0.113	
SUCC_PRICE	0.518	0.456	0.522	0.461	
SUCC QUALITY	0.731	0.771	0.742	0.755	
SUCC_VARIETY	0.339	0.371	0.346	0.396	
SUCC_SERV	0.659	0.685	0.668	0.675	
INDEPEND	0.434	0.358	0.429	0.370	
PROFIT	0.699	0.633	0.694	0.622	
STATESHARE	0.205	0.284	0.210	0.293	
FOREIGNCOMP	0.361	0.417	0.362	0.407	
INCRECOMP	0.433	0.439	0.433	0.424	
TIME_RED	0.104	0.089	0.105	0.092	
TIME_FLEX	0.279	0.340	0.280	0.351	
INCR_TEMP	0.253	0.272	0.258	0.277	
INCR_PARTIME	0.171 0.453	0.208	0.179	0.210	
UNIONREPR WORKCOUNC	0.453	0.531 0.376	0.469 0.333	0.559	
ADVISCOMT	0.315	0.376	0.333	0.349 0.179	
UNIONDENS	47.231	50.837	45.700	53.879	
COVERAGE	0.797	0.776	0.790	0.786	
ICT	0.737	0.776	0.730	0.760	
HIGHSKILL	0.481	0.564	0.483	0.580	
ORGCHANGE	1.666	2.218	1.715	2.347	
CONS	0.268	0.218			
DELEG			0.097	0.051	

CONS_DELEG	0.732	0.782	0.903	0.949
N. OBS.	2,245	1,924	2,155	1,266

Basic summary statistics reveal that the samples with and without training to support both delegation and consultation differ for a number of characteristics. The public sector is over represented in the group with training, and the same is true for larger workplaces. In addition, training is more likely in larger firms and in those more exposed to foreign competition. As regards to the industrial relations system, the presence of work councils, strong unions and advisory committees increase the likelihood of training, which is also positively associated with new work arrangements and the use of new technologies.

In the next section we analyse how these factors interact with direct participation strategies to determine training outcomes.

### 4.1. Econometric analysis

We use reduced form models to estimate the impact of different levels of involvement of employees in the decision-making on the probability to provide training for direct participation<sup>13</sup>.

Because the dependent variables (TRAINCONS, TRAINDEL) are discrete and ordered, we estimate the net impact of different participation practices (consultation vs delegation; either consultation of delegation vs both of them) by means of regression techniques based on probabilistic models (ordered probit) and controlling for a number of other workplace characteristics and personnel policies, such as the industrial relation climate and the work organisation arrangements. In addition, our estimates are obtained using weights to control for sector, size and country distortions present in the data, and robust (to heteroskedasticity) estimates are clustered by country [as observations might not be independent within a single cluster (country)].

We first pay attention to the effect of using both delegation and consultation on the number of training practices adopted. To this purpose, we estimate two different models; the first contains TRAINCONS as the dependent variable, while the second TRAINDEL. The set of covariates is the same. In particular, it includes the dummy CONS&DELEG. Its coefficient measures the shift in the probability to have a high number of training practices for workplaces in which CONS&DELEG equals 1.

Concerning the equation for TRAINCONS, the effect of using both consultation and delegation instead of consultation only is positive and significant. The same qualitative picture emerges when TRAINDEL is considered, but the positive effect is less robust. We interpret the evidence that the adoption of a more complex and developed structure of employees' direct involvement in decision making implies more training as follows. On the one hand, the simultaneous presence of consultation and delegation channels makes more difficult but, at the same time, more important the coordination between employees. This stimulate a higher

demand for a number of skills (the ability to communicate, to share data and information) that can be developed making a larger use of training. On the other hand, it may be possible that training for consultation and training for delegation are strategic complements, so that the simultaneous use of both direct participation techniques creates scale economies stimulating the joint use of training for delegation purposes.

We also observe that the effect of many other covariates is similar across models. In other words, several workplace characteristics affect training for direct participation independently to the specific purpose for which it is provided. This is comforting, since structural workplace attributes should affect the provision of training per se, and not the specific reason why it is offered. The effect of several covariates is consistent with the predictions of the theory. For example, the probability of high training practices increases with firm size and it is larger in the public sector.

Looking at the effect of other workplace characteristics, union density matters and has positive effects, but only for delegation. As we expect, the intensity of training increases when new technologies are in place and the organisation of work is more flat and decentralised (HPWO).

Next, we investigate the relationship between the number of training practices and the adoption of the practice of delegation. As we have discussed in previous sections, we want to clarify whether the use of a higher degree of involvement and autonomy of workers in decision making is accompanied, as it is suggested by theoretical predictions, by a higher provision of training as compared to consultation. The descriptive analysis has suggested that it is not always the case in our sample. Here, we want to investigate whether the same result applies controlling for observable workplace heterogeneity. However, this is not possible using either TRAINCONS or TRAINDEL, because they are not simultaneously defined over the sample of workplaces with and without delegation. Hence, we experiment with an indicator obtained merging information from the two training activities and including a delegation dummy among the set of regressors. More specifically, we construct the new variable TRAIN, which takes the value of TRAINCONS when CONS = 1 and of TRAINDEL when DEL = 1 or CONS&DELEG = 1, thus being able to account for the differences in terms of training between workplaces adopting just consultation and those adopting delegation (maybe in conjunction with consultation). We also create a new binary variable, SOME DELEG, taking value 1 when the workplace uses delegation, alone or in conjunction with consultation. While CONS&DELEG controls for the fact that, as found above, the joint adoption of consultation and delegation has a positive effect on the training indicator, the coefficient associated to SOME\_DELEG should capture the "net" effect of delegation by itself, i.e. the fact that the adoption of delegative direct participation, which imply a higher propensity of the management to share responsibility with workers, requires a higher training intensity than the simple consultation of employees. Results of column (3) indicate that delegation impacts negatively on the probability of having a high number of training practices. This result, which contrast the predictions from the theory, should not be interpreted in causal term, but, instead, as a simple correlation. One interpretation may be that the management decide to delegate only if the core workforce is skilled enough and, therefore, there is less demand for training. This seems to be confirmed by the coefficient for the variable that captures the need for skills (HIGHSKILL), which is positive and very significant.

### 5. Concluding remarks.

While there has been substantial work related to the effect of workers direct involvement in decision making on workplace efficiency and performance, less attention has been given to the analysis of the routes through which this can be achieved. We argue that, in this context, training activities targeted to employees involved in direct participation procedures may play a key role when work reorganisation and technological change occur.

More specifically, in this study we use a rich data set on European workplaces with information on (direct) participation practices, to investigate the determinants of training supporting group consultation and group delegation. Our main results are as follow. First, it does not seem that that the use of direct participation requires higher levels of training, and only half of the workplaces make use of it. Second, the higher the complexity of employees direct participation arrangements (both consultation and delegation as opposed to only one of them), the higher is the need for training, i.e. it seems that training for participation and training for delegation are complements. Finally, we do not find evidence workplaces using delegation instead of just consultation train more to support their participation schemes, as it would be implied by the theory (i.e. delegation require more skill and, therefore, more training). However, this effect should not be interpreted as causal, for it may be due to reverse causality problems: only when the workplace has "good quality" employees, who need less to be trained, it decides to introduce delegation mechanisms.

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- <sup>1</sup> It should be noted that, while in the literature several positive outcomes have been associated to the adoption of different forms of employee information, consultation and delegation mechanisms, yet it is not obvious which are the features through which better performance is achieved (Purcell et al, 2003).
- <sup>2</sup> The motivation is that we should not think at the global workplace training activity as the result of a unique investment decision, but, instead, as a decision vector. In this context, the intensity of training specifically devoted to facilitate the implementation of direct participation schemes can be thought as one of the vector components, and, therefore, subject to a set of constraints, such as the characteristics and the economic conditions of the workplace.
- <sup>3</sup> Other factors beside those examined so far related to the characteristics of establishments or firms may influence the amount of training provided to employees. Investment in physical capital and in information technology is one of them. Physical capital and information technology can have a positive effect as complements to human capital (Black and Lynch, 1998; Black and Lynch, 2001).
- <sup>4</sup> It was carried out by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in 1996. For a more detailed description of the Survey and of its sampling design, see Dell'Aringa et al. (2005).
- <sup>5</sup> The EPOC Survey used in all countries a standardised questionnaire, administered to general managers. In larger countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK) the gross sample included 5,000 workplaces while it was 2,500 in medium countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden) and 1,000 in the smaller ones (Ireland, Portugal). The stratification process differed across countries and was made according to population size, number of employees in industry and services and number of workplaces. Distortions and response bias problems regarding the sector and the size of the workplace are mitigated by the availability of specific weighting factors that allow to recover the original research universe in each country.
- <sup>6</sup> According to the Survey's design, consultation and delegation apply to non-managerial employees either individually or as a group, and in the questionnaire there are four separate questions (of the type yes/no) asking whether the workplace uses each type of direct participation practice (individual/group consultation/delegation). Multiple choices are of course allowed. When the respondent answers positively to any of these question, he/she is then asked a battery of questions on the nature, the content and the consequences of the direct participation practice considered. In the questionnaire, these questions are specific for each practice considered.
- <sup>7</sup> The first question is asked to those who have declared that the management consult (CONS = 1 or CONS&DELEG = 1) workers before taking decisions; the second is for those who responded positively to the question delegation of decision power (DELEG = 1 or CONS&DELEG = 1). In both cases, the structure of the question is the same, asking about training in the following areas: (i) collection and analysis of data; (ii) presentation skills; (iii) interpersonal skills; (iv) group dynamics; (v) other (and specify).
- <sup>8</sup> Due to the Survey design (i.e. the respondents to the question on training for delegation are those who actually use delegation; similarly for consultation), the distribution of valid answers is not the same across workplaces, for we have 4,169 observations for consultation and 3,421 for delegation. Of course, the two samples partly overlap, as for those workplaces using both direct participation schemes we have information on both types of training.
- <sup>9</sup> Although the range of values could go from 0 to 5, to avoid small cells problems we rescaled them from 0 to 4, imputing value 4 to workplaces with an original value 5. The value for TRAINCONS is missing for workplaces with CONS = 0, while the opposite is true for TRAINDEL.
- <sup>10</sup> For example, consider two workplaces offering training in the same number of areas. According to our coding procedure, they are assumed to use the same amount of training. However, the total time spent on training, which is the true measure of its intensity, can be very different. Moreover, when we construct variable TRAIN we put the same weight on the training for both consultation and delegation, while, for example, the intensity of training needed to develop skills for autonomous decision making may be di per se higher than what is required for (less demanding) consultation activities.
- <sup>11</sup> It is fair to say that in the set of variables related to HPWO we are probably missing some important aspect of work organisational changes. However, we are confident that our approach captures at least in broad terms the phenomena we aim to measure.
- <sup>12</sup> While TRAINCONS and TRAINDEL count the number of areas in which training is offered, thus giving an idea of the "intensity" of training, the corresponding two dummies condense this information in binary indicators that separate out workplaces with training (TRAINCONS >= 1; TRAINDEL >= 1) from those without (TRAINDEL = 0; TRAINCONS = 0), thus capturing its presence.
- <sup>13</sup> Particular care should be used in the interpretation of results as some workplace characteristics may be correlated with the adoption of both direct participation schemes and the intensity of training due to endogeneity or reverse causality problems (Handel and Levine, 2004). However, the lack of longitudinal data and of good candidate instruments in the survey prevents us to control for selectivity issues.