

# **Evaluating the effectiveness of ALMPs— The Meta Perspective**

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## **Starting point**



- —Unemployment one of the most challenging economic / social problems in developed and developing countries → Policymakers struggle to find effective programs that help jobless find jobs and increase workers' productivity and labor income
- —Job training and other active labor market programs (ALMPs) have been promoted as a remedy for cyclical and structural unemployment

## **Starting point**



Early **U.S.** experience: MDTA (1960s), CETA (1970s), JTPA (1980s-1990s)

#### **European** experience:

- —Scandinavia 1970s forward, in particular Sweden
- —Germany 1990s forward
- —Denmark "flexicurity", UK "New Deal", etc
- —EU: "European Employment Strategy"
- —In 2003, EU-15 spent 65 Bio. Euros on ALMP

Latin America: Job training, increasing since the mid-1980s

### This talk



- —Basis: Evaluation of individual programs
- —How to systematize the evidence → Meta-analysis
- —Selected results: overall, by program type

## **Types of ALMPs**



- i. (Labor market) training → human capital accumulation
- ii. Private sector incentive programs → employer and worker behavior
  - a) Wage subsidies
  - b) Self-employment assistance / start-up grants
- iii. Direct employment in public sector → public job creation
- iv. Employment services → Information, job search assistance, "Services and sanctions"
  - → job search efficiency

## Effectiveness of individual programs



- —From the beginning, the effectiveness of training programs has been controversial
- —Mid-1970s: earliest "serious" evaluations in the U.S. (→ Orley Ashenfelter 1976, 1978)
- —identified the "selection problem" in evaluating ALMPs: participant selection driven by combination of self-selection, program rules, and incentives of program operators
- —how would trainees perform in the absence of training?  $(\rightarrow counterfactual)$

## Effectiveness of individual programs



- —Methodological discussion → Need for experimental evidence (RCTs) vs. nonexperimental methods: Matching, duration
- —Increasing availability and quality of data (interest and commitment by policy makers)
- —Status Quo: many ALMP evaluations, some experiments in US and LAC, mostly nonexperimental in Europe → specific program types discussed in the thematic sessions

→ How / what can we learn from the many individual program evaluations **overall**?



Collect evaluations of ALMPs across countries

Conduct narrative review or quantitative assessment of sample of studies → **Meta-analysis**Systematic collections:

- —Europe: Kluve (2010)
- —New sample worldwide: Card, Kluve, Weber (2010)
- —U.S.: Greenberg, Michalopoulos, Robins (2003)
- —World Bank ALMP: Betcherman, Olivas, Dar (2004)
- —World Bank: Youth Employment Inventory (2007)
- —(Heckman et al. 1999, Kluve and Schmidt 2002)



**Meta-analysis** = Statistical tool for synthesizing research findings across a set of individual studies that all analyze the same or a similar question, in the same or a comparable way.

Complements evidence from individual program evaluations.

Origin in health care sciences -> The Cochrane Collaboration -> typically aggregating identical RCTs

Social sciences -> The Campbell Collaboration -> aggregate evidence and investigate role of contextual factors

On other topics in (labor) economics: Minimum wages (Card and Krueger 1995), Returns to education (Ashenfelter et al. 2000)



Meta-Analysis in Kluve (2010) → Collect evaluations of ALMPs from all over Europe following a "protocol":

a)microeconometric studies assessing treatment effects at the individual level

b)empirical academic studies controlling for selection into treatment and control groups → counterfactual

c)studies evaluating particular program (i.e. no pooling)

d)studies assessing effects relative to non-participation, not relative to other programs



Resulting sample: 137 program evaluations

For each study: Does the evaluation find a significant positive, negative, or no significant impact of the program on post-program employment?  $\rightarrow$  75 +, 33 Ø, 29 –

Then analyze if there is a systematic pattern by program type:

1.	Training	(70)
2.	Private sector incentive programs	(23)
3.	Public sector job creation	(26)
4.	Services and Sanctions	(21)
5.	Youth programs	(35)

## Other factors that may influence program effectiveness



For each country at the time the particular program was implemented:

#### Labor market institutions

- —Gross replacement rate
- —Regulation on dismissal protection
- —Regulation on fixed-term contracts
- —Regulation on temporary work (OECD indexes)

#### **Economic context**

- —Unemployment rate
- —ALMP expenditure as % of GDP
- —GDP growth

Study design (method, sample size)







(a) Type of program and target group (omitted: training; adults/disabled) Direct employment program Private sector incentive scheme Services and Sanctions Young workers Ol40  (b) Research design and timing (omitted: OLS/selection/others; studies from the 1970s and 1980s)  Experiment Matching Ol51  Direct employment program Ol55 Ol280 Ol280 Ol290 Ol306 Ol40 Ol790 Ol306 Ol790 O
(omitted: training; adults/disabled)         Direct employment program       0.155       1.92       -0.216       -2.13         Private sector incentive scheme       -0.144       -3.52       0.280       2.91         Services and Sanctions       -0.205       -3.87       0.436       4.63         Young workers       0.140       1.79       -0.202       -1.94         (b) Research design and timing       (omitted: OLS/selection/others; studies from the 1970s and 1980s)       180       -0.202       -1.87         Matching       0.314       1.32       -0.356       -1.87         Matching       0.061       0.88       -0.095       -0.94         Duration       0.041       0.50       -0.064       -0.52         Study from the 1990s       0.115       1.45       -0.192       -1.50         Study from the 2000s       0.190       1.30       -0.248       -1.61         (c) Institutional context on the labor market       Index for dismissal protection regulation       0.067       1.77       -0.109       -1.76
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Index for fixed-term contracts regulation $-0.023$ $-0.80$ 0.037 0.80
Index for temporary work regulation $0.001$ $0.03$ $-0.001$ $-0.03$
Gross replacement rate $0.004$ $1.40$ $-0.006$ $-1.41$
(d) Macroeconomic environment
Unemployment rate $-0.022$ $-2.13$ $0.035$ $1.95$
ALMP expenditure (% of GDP) $0.060$ $1.12 -0.097$ $-1.13$
GDP growth $0.009   0.35   -0.015   -0.35$


## **Short vs. Long-Term effectiveness**



	Percent of Medium-term Estimates that are:			
	Significantly Positive (1)	Insignificant (2)	Significantly Negative (3)	
Short-term Impact Estimate:				
<ul> <li>a. Significantly Positive (N=30)</li> </ul>	90.0	10.0	0.0	
b. Insignificant (N=28)	28.6	71.4	0.0	
c. Significantly Negative (N=36)	30.6	41.7	27.8	

### **ALMP** effectiveness over time





## **Summary of evaluations: Training**



- —Mixed results: Modestly positive impact of training programs on post-treatment employment outcomes
- —Some recent evaluations point to positive training effects materializing in the long run → indicates importance of human capital acquisition
- —Positive training impacts are associated with times of high unemployment, indicating that during the latter training programs may benefit from a participant inflow with relatively good qualifications

## Summary of evaluations: incentive schemes

### **Private sector**



- —Significantly higher probability of showing positive impacts than training programs
- —Indeed, wage subsidies and start-up grants generally show positive effects
- —Caveat: not much is known about potential substitution or displacement effects and deadweight loss, though these are likely to play non-negligible role

## Summary of evaluations: creation

## Public job



- —Significantly lower probability of showing positive impacts than training programs
- —Indeed, direct job creation in the public sector very rarely has a positive effect on participants' employment probability. Quite the opposite: effects are frequently negative
- —Rather robust finding across reviews → many such policies discontinued
- —Can be useful as safety net

## **Summary of evaluations: Sanctions**

## Services and



- —Significantly higher probability of showing positive impacts than training programs
- —This type of ALMP seems particularly successful, as apparently many unemployed can be helped back into work with basic job search assistance. Also, sanction elements mobilize the unemployed
- —These measures are also likely cost-effective
- —Focus is on short-term impact

## **Summary of evaluations: More results**



- —Young people seem to be particularly hard to assist: Most youth programs do not show positive effects. Perhaps ALMP is not the right type of policy for this group → Preventive measures
- —Generally, longer-term evaluations show more positive results than short-term evaluations
- —Current ALMP evaluations show no differential impacts for men and women
- —Little systematic relation between contextual factors and program effectiveness. Exceptions → unemployment rate, restrictive dismissal protection legislation

### **Conclusions / Outlook**



- —Large number of ALMP evaluations exist, and several systematic reviews identify some persistent patterns in program effectiveness
- —Problematic: youth programs, public job creation
- —Promising: training in the long-run, job search assistance in the short-run, wage subsidies (?).
- —Combination of job search assistance early in the unemployment spell with other targeted program (training, wage subsidy) after few months
- —Importance of continuing to evaluate individual policies evident → also contributes to further improve future meta-analyses