



Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull'Immigrazione

THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON RECEIVING COUNTRIES

The case of Italy

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“The Impact of the Crises on Migration”
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
OUTLINE:

- 1) Some quick background information on recent migration (and migration policy) trends in southern Europe
- 2) Overview and preliminary analysis of existing evidence on the migratory impact of the current crisis (main focus: Italy; main comparative reference: Spain)
- 3) Italian policy responses (with some comparative reference)
- 4) Implications and repercussions at EU (and Euro-Mediterranean) level

Background: a long-term restructuring of the global immigration geography: Southern Europe coming to the frontstage

- During the first half-decade of the 2000s, the EU as a whole has overtaken the US as main attractor of migrant flows worldwide.
- This dubious primacy has got even more marked with the boom of intra-EU mobility in the last 5 years.
- Within the EU, the relative weight of south-European countries as immigration magnets has constantly grown.

EU's five largest immigration countries (in terms of inflows, 000s, 1998-2008)




* Data based on population registers.

** Data based on residence permits or other sources
(Source: OECD 2009; Istat for Italy; INE for Spain 2008)

The increasing weight of Southern European countries is even more evident if we consider only workers' inflows (000s, 1998-2007)

Caveats:
-Seasonal workers GER
-Regularisations ITA ESP



(Source: OECD 2009)

The immigration boom which has taken place during the last decade in most Southern European countries has reignited past discussions on the possibility/usefulness to single out a **“Mediterranean immigration model”**

(see, for instance, FP6’s IDEA project: <http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/>)

Many interesting questions arise:

1. Is it possible/useful to talk of a Mediterranean model of immigration?
2. If so, and from a policy perspective: does such model contain innovative elements with reference to the European mainstream of the last decades?
3. From a long-term social and economic point of view: is such model sustainable?

A “Mediterranean model”? Similarities and divergences

STRUCTURAL ASPECTS	Low fertility/Rapid ageing	Different degree of exposure to irregular flows
	Large informal sector	Largely distinct migration systems
	Strong demand for low-skilled/ Complementarity with domestic labour force	Different sectoral distribution e. g.:
	Corporatist welfare/Demand for private welfare	- Italy: demand in manufacture - Portugal: not in agriculture
	Little-inclusive welfare Migrants as net contributors	
PUBLIC RESPONSES	<i>Repeated regularisations</i>	<i>Different degrees of politicization</i>
	<i>Use of quotas/ceilings</i>	<i>Different degrees of public alarm (but little comparative research)</i>
	<i>Experiments with worker-driven admission systems</i>	
	<i>High investment in border controls (PT?), low in integration (role of NGOs)(but ESP+PT)</i>	<i>Different approaches to nationality law (IT GR as “worst cases”)</i>

The migration impact of the crisis: what do we mean by that and how can we measure it?

Impact on what?

- flows (in): too early to say (apart from policy decisions on “discretionary flows”: see below)
- flows (out): lack of measurement tools
- labour market outcomes: growing but still partial evidence
- integration: too early to say (anyway, problems of definition and measurement)
- perceptions/attitudes of autochthonous population: too early to say/lack of regular comparative monitoring
- policy responses: lack of comparative monitoring and analysis

The impact of the crisis on labour market outcomes of immigrant workers: what can be said so far (focus on IT and ESP)?

- **Different timing** of the crisis (e.g. the Spanish “housing bubble” burst first; controversial how deep is now Italy into the job crisis curve?)
- **Delayed impact on jobs** (also due to time-limited welfare safety nets, e.g. Italian *Cassa integrazione*)
- **Asymmetrical impact** by economic sector:
 - particularly strong impact on some typically migrant-intensive sectors (construction, industry, restaurants/hotels)
 - comparatively lighter (and more indirect/delayed) impact on other typically migrant-intensive sectors (agriculture, health- and homecare)

The crisis highlights differences between two otherwise similar migrant-intensive socio-economic models

Sectoral distribution of foreign-born employment (15-64 years old, 2007, **Italy** and **Spain**)

Construction	14.8%
Manufacturing (durable)	13.4%
Private households	11.4%
Wholesale	10.8%
Hotels/restaurants	8.1%

Construction	21.0%
Hotels/restaurants	14.7%
Wholesale	13.0%
Private households	12.2%
Real estate, renting, business activ.	7.7%

(Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook 2009)

A different degree of vulnerability to the crisis is suggested also by different shares of immigrants in low-skilled occupations

Immigrant share of employment in the EU's five largest immigration countries (population 15-64; 2007)

	<i>All occupations</i>	<i>Low-skilled occupations</i>
France	11.2%	21.2%
Germany	12.8%	27.5%
Italy	9.0%	23.2%
Spain	15.9%	33.6%
United Kingdom	11.1%	14.4%


(Source: OECD 2009 based on European Union Labour Force Survey)

Different sectoral distribution helps explaining uneven occupational impact of the crisis on migrant labour

(Unemployment rates, native/foreign-born, Source: Istat for Italy, OECD for Spain)


Italy, 2007-2009 (Q2)

◆ Native-born ■ Foreign-born



Spain, 2007-2008

◆ Native-born ■ Foreign-born




Spain: traditionally higher unemployment levels; larger (and more steadily diverging) native/foreign-born gap


Italian evidence suggests that the migration impact of the crisis is differentiated also by gender

Unemployment rate in Italy
(all workers; foreigners only;
by gender; 2005-2009 Q2)
(Source: Istat)


Men and women



Men only




Women only



What about the impact by nationality? Local evidence from Italy


Africans (of which Moroccans represent the largest group) seem to fare particularly badly on the labour market in this phase

Recruitments of foreign workers by region of origin; percentage variations on same month of previous year; Jan. 2008-Apr. 2009



This too has certainly to do with the distribution by activity sector:
Africans are overrepresented in the manufacturing sector


Recruitments of foreign workers; distribution by sector of activity according to region of origin; 2008



Source: Piedmont Region, Regional Observatory on the Labour Market (ORML)

Heavier occupational impact on African immigrants? This would reinforce a long-term trend (“opening to the East, closure to the South”)

Italian residence permits by regions of origin, 1987-2007



(Source: Sciortino-Cvajner 2008)

An overview on policy responses: here too the Med-model seems to loose explanatory power

SPAIN	ITALY
<p><i>Contingente</i> (ceiling for non-seasonal workers to be recruited anonymously from abroad) cut from 15,731 in 2008 to 901 for 2009. Nominal hiring still uncapped.</p>	<p><i>Decreti-flussi</i> for 2009: down from 252,000 in 2007 to 230,000 (of which 150,000 homecare sector and 80,000 seasonals) in 2008 (but decision taken at the end of 2008)</p>
<p>Voluntary return programme based on (partially) anticipated payment of unemployment benefits (only 6,648 applications as of 5 August out of around 140,000 eligible migrants)</p>	<p>New regularisation scheme launched in August 2009; limited to personal and homecare workers: around 300,000 applications at the closure date (30 September 2009)</p>
<p>Major reform of immigration law, centred upon the reframing of illegal entry and stay as a criminal offence</p>	

Two opposite approaches:
Spain: tough on admissions/soft on rights
Italy: tough on rights/soft on admissions

Differentiated impact of the crisis → diverging response strategies: which implications for EU policies and Euro-Med relations?

- Weakening of possible “Mediterranean bloc” in EU-level migration policy-making
just when such bloc could gain potential thanks to the new institutional framework resulting from Lisbon treaty
- More generally, the differentiated impact of the crisis risks to make intra-EU divergences/tensions over migration even more acute
already examples: backlashes against intra-EU mobility and intra-company transfers
- Legal emigration opportunities for non-EU (especially North-African) migrants (at least temporarily) further reduced
- Unbalances in the Euro-Mediterranean even more marked
- Risk for North-African states to limit themselves to a role of partners in control policies towards sub-Saharan migration → potentially destabilising
- Looking beyond the short-term: more difficult and more necessary than ever

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Thank you!

Merci!