Migration and the Global Recession

A Report Commissioned by the BBC World Service

Michael Fix, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Jeanne Batalova, Aaron Terrazas, Serena Yi-Ying Lin, and Michelle Mittelstadt

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About the Migration Policy Institute

The Migration Policy Institute is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank in Washington, DC dedicated to analysis of the movement of people worldwide.

MPI provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic and thoughtful responses to the challenges and opportunities that large-scale migration, whether voluntary or forced, presents to communities and institutions in an increasingly integrated world.


MPI is guided by the philosophy that international migration needs active and intelligent management. When such policies are in place and are responsibly administered, they bring benefits to immigrants and their families, communities of origin and destination, and sending and receiving countries.

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# Table of Contents

**Executive Summary** ............................................................................................................................ 5  
A. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 5  
B. On the Threshold of the Crisis: A Migration Snapshot ................................................................. 5  
C. One Year After: Migration Viewed through the Lens of Selected Corridors ................................ 6  
D. Recession and Policy: How Countries Have Responded ............................................................ 9  
E. Remittances ........................................................................................................................................... 10  
F. The Recession and Immigrants’ Well-Being ..................................................................................... 14  

I. Setting the Context: A Snapshot of Worldwide Migration .................................................................15  
A. Global Migrants ................................................................................................................................. 15  
B. Immigrants as Workers .................................................................................................................... 17  
C. Immigrant Workers and Recession ................................................................................................. 19  

II. How the Recession Has Dampened the Movement of Economic Migrants to and from the Major Destinations .............................................................................................................. 20  
A. General Economic Data on OECD Countries ............................................................................... 20  
B. Impact of Recession on Different Types of Migration Streams and Movements ....................... 21  
C. Major Migration Corridors ............................................................................................................... 27  

III. How the Recession Has Affected the Internal Movement of Economic Migrants: A Study of China ........................................................................................................................................................... 49  
A. Background ........................................................................................................................................ 49  
B. Employment Challenges Facing Rural Migrant Workers .......................................................... 50  
C. Policy Measures to Alleviate the Unemployment Situation of Rural Migrant Workers ......... 54  

IV. Policy Changes and Selected Impacts in Immigrant-Receiving Countries with Rising Unemployment ................................................................................................................................. 56  
A. Policies Restricting Immigrants’ Access to the Labor Market .................................................... 56  
1. Taiwan ................................................................................................................................................. 57  
2. South Korea .................................................................................................................................... 59  
3. Australia .......................................................................................................................................... 60  
4. United States ................................................................................................................................ 63  
5. Canada: Going Against the Tide ..................................................................................................... 63  
B. The Advent of Pay-To-Go Schemes ............................................................................................... 64  
1. Spain .................................................................................................................................................... 65  
2. Japan .................................................................................................................................................. 67  
3. Czech Republic .............................................................................................................................. 70  

V. Remittances: Overlooked Trends ....................................................................................................... 77  
A. Background ....................................................................................................................................... 77  
B. Remittance Inflows .......................................................................................................................... 78  
C. Remittance Outflows ....................................................................................................................... 81
Executive Summary

A. Introduction

The global financial crisis that followed the collapse of the investment house Lehman Brothers in September 2008 can be viewed as having a deeper and more global effect on the movement of people around the world than any other economic downturn in the post-World War II era of migration.

In this report commissioned by the BBC World Service, the Migration Policy Institute seeks to explore the myriad impacts of this crisis on migration flows, remittances, and on migrants themselves as they adjust to the sweeping economic changes set in motion by the deepest global financial downturn since the Great Depression.

The report presents and substantiates three propositions:

1. The recession has dampened the movement of economic migrants to the major immigrant-receiving regions of the world. And, counter to the widely held public perception, immigrants overwhelmingly are choosing to stay put in their adopted countries rather than return home despite very high unemployment and lack of jobs.

2. While the overall picture is one of sharp remittance decline, some regions are experiencing remittance increases or are holding steady. Though remittances have dropped globally amid the downturn, they remained an important stable source of income for immigrant-sending countries as other financial streams, including lending and other forms of foreign private investment, have proven much more volatile.

3. The recession has hit migrants and their financial well-being particularly hard, with repercussions not only for the migrants themselves and their households but for immigrant-sending and receiving countries alike.

With some evidence that an economic recovery, however anemic, may be underway, we could be at a hinge point with regard to immigration flows as some would-be immigrants may seek to move in anticipation of growth. If so, we soon will be able to determine the degree to which the shifts in migration and remittance flows that we have seen in the year following Lehman’s collapse — and that we document here — have been structural or cyclical.

B. On the Threshold of the Crisis: A Migration Snapshot

At the threshold of the recession, in 2005, the number of international migrants stood at an all-time high of 195 million — a level two and a half times greater than the 75 million recorded in 1960.
Trends in international migration are often misperceived. In the first place, the share that migrants represent of the world population is relatively low: they make up about 3 percent of world population and the world’s workers. While the immigrant share of the total population by major world region is largest in Oceania (including Australia and New Zealand) and Northern America, the biggest concentrations of immigrants are in Europe, followed by Asia. When migration is viewed through a country (versus a regional) lens, the United States in particular stands out: while it accounts for one in 20 world residents, it is home to one in five of the world’s migrants.

Illegal migration may be less of a worldwide phenomenon than many realize. The United Nations estimates there are roughly 20 to 30 million unauthorized migrants worldwide, composing 10 to 15 percent of the world’s immigration stock. An estimated 11 million unauthorized immigrants live in the United States, according to US government estimates. Along with temporary migrant workers, unauthorized immigrants represent the flows most closely linked to the economy, and thus the ones most likely to fall in poor economic times.

As the financial crisis descended, immigrants were having a significant effect on employment growth in many industrialized countries. While they represented one in six workers in the United States, they constituted one in two new workers in the United States and nearly seven in 10 new workers in the United Kingdom.

In terms of workers, low-skilled migrants still represent the bulk of global migration flows, although high- and low-skilled immigrants now represent equal shares of migrants to the 30 countries that compose the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the so-called club of wealthy nations.

Many of the immigrant workers hardest hit by the recession are vulnerable for a number of reasons: their low local-language skills and limited educational credentials; their concentrations in boom-bust sectors such as construction; their contingent work contracts and arrangements; and the discrimination they face that can be exacerbated in times of recession. The newest hired workers, as well as workers from nationalities that entered a labor market most recently, also may lack social and job networks that can help cushion the impact of recession.

C. One Year After: Migration Viewed through the Lens of Selected Corridors.

There is no single, global trend that captures the ways the recession has affected migration flows. The effects are nuanced and varied, depending greatly on the character of the flows (permanent, temporary, illegal, and humanitarian); whether they are to or from a destination country; and the region of the world involved. Still, a look at some of the major migration corridors around the globe makes clear that the recession has had a profound impact on what amounts to one of the most personal and important decisions a person can make: Where to live and work.
**United States and Mexico**
Annual flows from Mexico to the United States have declined from 1 million to 600,000 from 2006 to 2009 largely as a result of a drop in illegal immigration. Legal immigration levels have remained largely unchanged. As a result, the overall number of Mexicans in the United States (constituting the country’s largest immigrant group) has remained essentially unchanged during a period when it would have been expected to grow by 1 million.

But migration to the United States is only half of the story. There has been virtually no change in return flows to Mexico despite the fact that unemployment rates for Mexican and Central American immigrants in the United States have more than doubled. These trends lend support to the proposition that people’s decisions whether to return home are predicated on what is happening in the sending-country economies to an even greater degree than changes in the receiving country economy. In sum, people are staying put on both sides of the border.

**United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Accession 8 (A8) Countries**
The United Kingdom and Ireland have witnessed a rapid turnover of workers from the eight Eastern European countries (referred to as the A8) that joined the European Union in 2004 — particularly Poland. For example, of the 1.4 million A8 workers who had come to the United Kingdom between May 2004 and March 2009, almost half had returned by the end of 2008 — a result of contractions in the UK and Irish economies at a time of growing opportunities in Poland. Circulation of workers to and from the United Kingdom and Ireland has been made relatively simple because of the two countries’ decision to recognize EU freedom-of-movement provisions and allow A8 nationals to work with no restrictions prior to the 2011 effective date.

**Spain/Romania/Morocco**
After a near sevenfold increase in the share of immigrants among the total population over the past decade, Spain’s immigrant population has suffered massive labor-force dislocations in the current recession. The result has been declining (by a quarter) total immigrant inflows among Eastern Europeans; Romanian and Bulgarian migrants declined by more than 60 percent. Like the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, Eastern Europeans with the right of return and some Moroccans who have legal permanent residence appear to be leaving Spain and returning to their home countries. The National Statistics Institute estimates that the number of migrants leaving Spain nearly doubled from 120,000 in 2006 to 232,000 in 2008. However the bulk of unauthorized Sub-Saharan African and Latin American migrants are staying put, in large measure because of poor economies in their home countries.

**Movements to and from the Gulf States**
The picture in the Gulf region, which has been heavily reliant on contract labor migration, is a mixed one — in part because the Gulf economies have experienced the recession very differently.

- **India/Gulf States**: While emigration to the Gulf States is down, there is no evidence of large-scale return of low-skilled migrants to India — partly as a result of their concentration in recession-sheltered Saudi Arabia.
• **Bangladesh/Gulf States:** The recession has prompted the Bangladesh government to look for new overseas markets for its workers and to provide them financial support in the Gulf Cooperation Council states themselves — exemplifying the role that migrants’ own governments are playing to mitigate the recession’s impacts.

• **Philippines/Gulf States:** Along similar lines, the Philippine government has embraced “full-blast” market development efforts that are likely to sustain Philippine emigration and limit returns — a key priority for a nation with fully a quarter of its labor force working overseas, in 190 countries.

• **Nepal/Gulf States:** Nepalese workers’ emigration patterns responded to the relative economic strength of the destination countries, with flows to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates falling and those to Saudi Arabia rising.

**China**

Migration, of course, is not just an international but also an internal phenomenon — and also is subject to the impact of the economic crisis. China’s 140 million migrant workers, who have left rural areas for work in the nation’s industrial coastal cities, represent a case in point. Many of these workers have settled in the eastern provinces where they work in export-driven, labor-intensive industries — a sector that has been particularly hard hit by the recession. These migrant workers have experienced high relative unemployment rates as a result of the global financial slowdown and those who are employed suffer from lower wages and poorer working conditions than other Chinese workers.

In what amounts to the world’s largest annual movement of people, tens of millions of rural migrant workers return home each year from the cities where they work, to reunite and celebrate the Chinese New Year with their families. About 70 million people — or half of all rural migrant workers — returned to their home provinces during the 2009 Chinese New Year, in a massive natural phenomenon known as the “spring movement.” But during this recessionary year, more workers went back than in previous years, the annual ritual started earlier than usual, and, at least initially, more people did not return to the cities, according to a new survey.
But while 14 million (or 20 percent) of the 70 million who returned to rural provinces remained there, 56 million (80 percent) returned to the coastal cities where they had been living — another form of “staying put” in the face of the economic crisis. In some ways the results are not surprising: almost all of the workers (86 percent) who returned to rural areas for the spring movement and stayed were unemployed.

The government has responded to comparatively high rural and urban unemployment rates among the migrant workers by instituting an array of policies ranging from worker training and infrastructure-directed stimulus spending, to promoting the emigration of the rural migrant workers.

D. Recession and Policy: How Countries Have Responded

Confronted with the most severe economic crisis in decades and rising unemployment, governments in locations across the globe embraced a range of policies to suppress the inflow of migrants, encourage their departure, and protect labor markets for native-born workers.

From Malaysia and Thailand to Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Australia, South Korea, and Russia, many governments have sought to restrict access to their labor markets by halting, or at least decreasing, the numbers of work permits for foreigners. Others, such as the United...
Kingdom, tightened admission requirements. And while the policy focus of many of these countries was on reducing the entry of low-skilled workers, the United States placed restrictions on some companies seeking to bring in the highly skilled.

Swimming against the tide was Canada, which briefly considered the idea of reducing permanent legal immigration rates in response to the global economic downturn but then proceeded to leave its permanent levels unchanged, and in fact saw employer demand for temporary workers rise. One province, Alberta, saw a 340 percent rise in the number of temporary workers, from 13,000 in 2004 to 58,000 in 2008. Moreover, in January 2009, Alberta sanctioned a program to entice US temporary skilled workers through a fast-track program for Canadian permanent residency.

The adjustment of visa levels and entry requirements was not the only policy tool deployed by countries responding to the economic crisis. Others sought to make it harder for migrants to live and work illegally by stepping up enforcement and curbing access to public services. Italy, for example, passed legislation criminalizing unlawful presence and preventing unauthorized migrants from accessing public services such as education and emergency medical care, while authorizing citizen patrols to assist police in combating crime and responding to immigration violations. In early 2009, the French government conducted a series of high-profile worksite raids as part of a redoubled effort to remove illegal immigrants but also to create additional jobs for unemployed legal workers.

One of the more interesting policy responses has been the advent of “pay-to-go” schemes that encourage unemployed migrants to return home. In direct response to rising unemployment, Spain, the Czech Republic, and Japan are offering economic incentives such as paid one-way tickets home and lump sum payments typically pegged to unemployment insurance benefits in exchange for migrants’ promise to leave the country for some period of time or even indefinitely.

The programs, which take a page from a 1977 French program designed to repatriate migrant workers, have had only modest results to date, in part perhaps because they do not take into account migrants’ motivations to stay or leave (such as consideration of the opportunities at home, investments made to emigrate, and existing social and family ties in the country of destination).

The United Kingdom is experimenting with a variation on the pay-to-go concept: Offering assistance to migrants before they reach their destination. With hundreds of migrants massed across the Channel in Calais, France, waiting to attempt illegal entry to the United Kingdom via ferry or train, the British and French governments announced in July 2009 that they would offer a plane ride home, 2,000 euros in cash, and resettlement assistance and retraining for Calais migrants willing to return home.

E. Remittances

As the economic crisis has spread beyond its origins as a fairly localized real estate and construction bust in the United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain, and as migrants
have faced rising unemployment, international remittance flows have also slowed. But just as the economic crisis has taken an uneven toll across regions and countries, shifts in remittance flows have varied by region and country.

**Regional Trends**

Between 2000 and 2006, remittances grew at similar high pace across Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia, South Asia, Europe, and Central Asia (growth in the two other world regions, the Middle East and North Africa region and Sub-Saharan Africa, was much more modest).

Growth slowed in the Latin America and Caribbean region between 2006 and 2007 (largely reflecting the slowdown in the US construction industry) and was nearly flat between 2007 and 2008. In 2007-2008, growth also slowed in Europe and Central Asia as the recession spread to Western Europe and Russia.

At the same time though, remittances to East and South Asia have continued to grow rapidly. In almost every year between 2000 and 2006, the Latin America-Caribbean region was the leading remittance recipient. But since 2006 it has been surpassed by both East and South Asia. In short, remittances to Asia are rising as those to Latin America and Europe stagnate.
Figure 2. Remittances to Many Developing Countries Have Slowed (Annual Growth, 2005 to 2009)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annual change in remittance flows, 2005 to 2009</th>
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Notes: 2008-2009 data compare January to June totals for Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, and Turkey. January to July totals for El Salvador, Honduras, and Pakistan; first quarter totals for Poland, Moldova, and Jordan; and first semester totals for Ecuador.

Source: Migration Policy Institute tabulations of Central Bank data

Country Trends: Declines

The countries that saw the steepest declines in remittances in 2008-2009 were, in order: Turkey, Moldova, Poland, Ecuador, Morocco, Mexico and Kenya: thus traversing Asia, Europe, South America, and Africa. Sharp declines, then, were not restricted to any one
sending region, but were concentrated among middle- and not low-income countries — at least in the early stages of the recession in 2008.

Three countries have apparently felt the effects of recession longer, suffering declines in remittance flows in both 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 (year-to-date): Ecuador, Morocco, and Mexico.

The steepest year-to-year declines can be seen in Turkey. Moldova saw the second steepest decline in remittances. This decline is deeply consequential since one-third of Moldova’s 2007 GDP came from remittance income — making it the world’s third most remittance-dependent nation. Remittances make up a much smaller share of Turkey’s GDP, so its decline has less far-reaching effects on national income.

Mexico has seen drops in the total volume of remittances for both 2007-2008 (-4 percent) and 2008-2009 (-12 percent). The average monthly amount per transaction also declined, from about $343 in 2007 to $329 in 2009.

Ecuador’s remittances have fallen sharply as a result of the high concentrations of Ecuadoreans in the United States and Spain — two countries among the hardest hit by the recession.

Remittances to Honduras have fallen dramatically since the US recession began, but preliminary data for July 2009 suggest a slight rebound. Since Honduran migrants in the United States have a similar demographic and labor force profile as other Central American migrants and remittance flows to these countries do not appear to have rebounded, this surge is more likely due to the political instability in Honduras. There is some consensus that migrant remittances generally increase during times of political crises at home.

**Country Trends: Increases**

Four countries saw their remittances flows grow in 2008-2009 despite the recession. The largest gains were made by Pakistan and Bangladesh, followed by the Philippines and Cape Verde. One common element: the first three countries send large shares of their emigrants to Saudi Arabia, whose economy was less hard-hit than other Gulf States. Pakistan and Bangladesh also export migrants to India.

Although the growth in remittances to the Philippines has slowed, overall remittances continue to rise: During the first half of 2009, remittances increased about 3 percent each month from the previous year. Thus despite the recession, year-to-year flows of remittances to the Philippines have risen for the past four years.
Although remittances are declining in some places, they are still increasing in importance relative to other financial flows, while some families and communities are becoming more dependent on remittances than ever before.

As Figure 3 indicates, at least at the outset of the recession, remittance flows proved to be less volatile sources of income than either exports or foreign investment for the remittance-dependent countries of Mexico and the Philippines.

**F. The Recession and Immigrants’ Well-Being**

A significant deterioration in immigrant employment rates can be observed across a wide number of countries — for example among Mexicans and Central Americans in the United States, among virtually all nationalities in Spain, and among foreigners in Portugal. But these trends are not universally observed across all countries. Unemployment among the foreign born did not significantly increase between 2007 and 2009 in many European countries, and the employment gap between the native and foreign born in some European countries actually narrowed between the first semester of 2007 and the first semester of 2009.

Unemployment rates among the general population are also on the rise in many major migrant-sending countries. In Mexico, unemployment has risen but underemployment has gone up more dramatically. The unemployment rate is increasing across Eastern Europe and the recession has virtually erased all of the employment gains made in the Baltic countries since they joined the European Union.

The latest poverty data show that, on the eve of the recession, immigrants were far more likely to be poor than natives — a trend that likely has only increased.
I. Setting the Context: A Snapshot of Worldwide Migration

A. Global Migrants

The number of international migrants (defined here as persons who left their country of birth or citizenship for at least a year) is at an all-time high in absolute numbers. According to United Nations (UN) estimates released in August 2009, the number of global migrants was 195 million in 2005 — which is 2.5 times greater than the 75 million recorded in 1960 — and their number was projected to grow by 9.6 percent to nearly 214 million by 2010. Despite the growth in volume, however, migration across borders remains an exception. The share of international migrants among the entire world population has been small, ranging from 2.5 percent in 1960 to a projected 3.1 percent in 2010.

Figure 1. International Migrants by Region of Destination, 1990 to 2010


2 In most cases, data on the international migrant stock for at least two points in time was used as a basis for using an exponential growth rate to estimate the international migrant stock on July 1 of 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. The 2010 projected numbers do not take into account the impact of recession.
• In absolute numbers, the largest concentration of immigrants is in Europe, followed by Asia, and Northern America. Immigrants constitute the largest share of the total population in the Gulf States, Oceania, Northern America, and Europe, respectively.

• The number of international migrants was projected to increase by 80 percent in Northern America and by 41 percent in Europe between 1990 and 2010, while remaining essentially the same in Latin America (defined to include the Caribbean). According to updated UN estimates, Latin America and Asia each lose an estimated 1 million people annually through emigration.3

• The United States accounts for less than one in 20 of the world’s residents (4.5 percent) but is home to one-fifth (20 percent) of the world’s migrants.

• Migration is typically a “neighborhood affair.” Those who cross national borders usually move to nearby countries, for example, from Indonesia to Malaysia, Mexico to the United States, or Poland to Germany.

• The United Nations estimates there were roughly 20 to 30 million unauthorized migrants worldwide, comprising around 10 to 15 percent of the world's immigrant stock in 2004.4 Illegal migration is present in all major world regions. About 11 to 12 million unauthorized migrants resided in the United States (2008),5 about 618,000 in the United Kingdom (2007),6 and nearly 210,000 in Japan (2007).7

• By the end of 2008, an estimated 15.2 million persons were global refugees and 26 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs are not counted as international migrants).8

• The immigrant population has increased in the past decade in most countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), often referred to as the club of wealthy nations. Immigrants represent an especially high share of the population in Australia, Canada, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Switzerland. Other countries, such as Spain, the Slovak Republic, and

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7 OECD, International Migration Outlook, Special Focus: Managing the Labour Migration Beyond the Crisis (Paris: OECD, 2009).
Ireland, still do not report as high shares of immigrants but have seen a spectacular increase in the absolute and relative number of immigrants in recent years.

**Definitions**

*The foreign born* are defined as persons born outside of the country in which they currently reside. The foreign-born population includes both foreign and naturalized citizens. *Foreign population* refers to persons who do not have citizenship of the country in which they reside. Foreign population may include persons born abroad who kept the citizenship of their home (or another) country as well as children born in a host country to parent/s who are foreign nationals. Some countries report data on both the foreign-born and foreign population (e.g., Spain and Netherlands), while others only on one group (e.g., Australia and Canada typically report data on the foreign-born population; South Korea and Japan report data mostly on the foreign populations).

**B. Immigrants as Workers**

The overwhelming majority of international migrants move — whether permanently or temporarily — in search of better economic opportunities. Migrants with temporary work permits have been especially hard hit by the recession, because they are most closely linked (along with illegal immigration flows) to the economy.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and International Labor Organization (ILO) (unless stated otherwise):

- There are about 100 million global migrant workers, who account for about 3 percent of the global workforce of more than 3 billion people.

- Except for a few countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, where the foreign population outnumbers citizens, stocks of temporary foreign workers are generally small relative to the size of the destination country’s labor market.

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10 Global workforce refers to people age 15 and older who were employed or unemployed but looking for work.

11 According to UN estimates, international migrants’ share of the total population was 69 percent in Kuwait, 70 percent in the United Arab Emirates, and 81 percent in Qatar in 2005. The overwhelming majority of these migrants are contract workers from developing Asian countries. Luxembourg also has a high proportion of foreigners among its labor force (66 percent in 2007); most of these workers are fellow Europeans.
• Low-skilled migrant workers still represent the bulk of global labor migration flows, but since 1995 the arrival of highly educated migrants has been equal in share to that of the low-skilled among a number of OECD countries. This is mostly due to newly introduced policies to attract foreign talent. Among skilled workers, the majority move to or within the developed world.

• Immigrants account for a growing share of workers in many OECD countries, rising eightfold in Spain as a share of the total workforce (from 1.1 percent to 9.0 percent) between 1991 and 2007; and fivefold in Italy, from 1.3 percent to 6.6 percent.

• Migration has had a significant impact on employment growth in a number of countries. For example, while immigrants represent one in 11 workers in Italy overall, between 1997 and 2007, they accounted for two in three new Italian workers. The contribution of migration has been even more apparent in the United Kingdom: while one in nine UK workers in 2007 was an immigrant, seven in ten new workers were born abroad.

• With the exception of migration to southern Europe and migration under free-movement agreements, virtually all legal labor migration for low-skilled jobs in OECD countries is through temporary programs. Many of these involve intra-OECD or intra-European Union (EU) migration, such as the German seasonal workers program or working holidaymaker programs in Australia and the United Kingdom. Programs involving workers from outside the OECD or the European Union tend to be small, involving mostly seasonal workers. In recent years, for example, the United States H-2A visa (for seasonal agricultural workers) and H-2B visa (for temporary non-agricultural workers) programs have admitted some 150,000 persons, many of them from Mexico, a fellow OECD country. Mexico itself takes in about 40,000 agricultural workers every year, mostly from Guatemala.

• The pattern of educational attainment of native-born adults in most high-income countries represents a diamond shape: About 25 percent have a college degree, 60 percent a secondary school certificate, and 15 percent less than a secondary certificate or high school diploma. Migrants from developing countries living in industrialized countries differ from both adults at home and abroad, as their distribution resembles an hour-glass shape when arranged by years of education: About 35 percent have a college degree, 30 percent a secondary school certificate, and 35 percent less than a high-school diploma. In most developing countries, the distribution of adults by years of education has the shape of a pyramid: a few well-educated persons at the top and most workers with less than a secondary school certificate or high school diploma grouped near the bottom.

12 Holidaymaker programs vary substantially in eligibility requirements and terms by country, but the idea is to offer eligible nationals of other countries (usually students) an opportunity to study and/or travel combined with short-term employment.
C. Immigrant Workers and Recession

Immigrants are more likely than the native born to be affected by the economic crisis. In most cases, they are more likely to be fired first and they tend to have higher unemployment rates than their native counterparts.

There are a number of reasons why immigrant workers are hit harder by worsening economic conditions, among them because they:

- Are concentrated in sectors that are more sensitive to business-cycle fluctuations such as construction, wholesale, export-oriented manufacturing, and hospitality. Immigrants employed in health and education might be better off during the economic crisis, for example, because those sectors experience less immediate disruption resulting from economic contraction.
- Have less secure contractual arrangements such as temporary, seasonal, and illegal employment.
- Experience selective layoffs and discrimination in the labor market. A number of studies in the United States, Canada, and Europe indicate that applicants with foreign or ethnic names were less likely to be invited for job interviews than those with native names despite equivalent education and work experience: a trend that is likely to be exacerbated during economic downturns.
II. How the Recession Has Dampened the Movement of Economic Migrants to and from the Major Destinations

A. General Economic Data on OECD Countries

The current economic recession in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries appears to be reaching a trough following the deepest decline in more than 60 years, according to the OECD’s latest Economic Outlook. More recently, continental Europe’s two largest economies, Germany and France, reported positive (if small) GDP growth for the second quarter of 2009 — beating forecasts of continued contraction. Similarly optimistic data from Indonesia, Poland, and Brazil suggest that the worst of the recession may be over at least for some countries. However, the US economy continues to contract (albeit at a slower pace than before) and several of Europe’s other big economies (the United Kingdom and Italy) continue to decline. Spain and Ireland, whose economic growth led Europe until recently, continue to contract at an alarming pace.

But the recovery of the global economy is likely to be weak and fragile, job growth anemic, and the economic and social damage caused by the crisis long-lasting. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that crises that are associated with financial shocks that are highly synchronized across countries and regions tend to yield slow and lackluster recoveries.


More than 57 million people will be unemployed in OECD countries by the end of 2010, according to OECD estimates — a 53 percent increase over the 37.2 million unemployed at the end of 2008, when the average jobless rate was 6.8 percent. The expected increase will bring OECD-wide unemployment to 9.9 percent at the end of 2010, its highest level since the 1970s. The International Labor Organization (ILO) projects that there will be between

13 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Unemployment in OECD countries to approach 10% in 2010, says OECD” (news release, June 23, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33927_43136377_1_1_1_1,00.html. OECD is comprised of 30 of the world’s high- and upper middle-income countries (the United States, France, and Germany as examples of the former, and Mexico and Turkey as examples of the latter) that promote democracy and market economies.


210 million and 239 million unemployed persons worldwide in 2009, corresponding to global unemployment rates of 6.5 percent and 7.4 percent respectively.16

B. Impact of Recession on Different Types of Migration Streams and Movements

The effects of the economic crisis on migration are complex and hard to predict; however, evidence from prior recessions and research on the current one suggest that differing migration streams (illegal, temporary worker, permanent, humanitarian, and international students) are affected by and respond to changing economic conditions differently.

Across migration streams, however, it is apparent that data from around the world do not provide evidence for, and indeed cast serious doubt on, the notion that the recession has led to massive return migration.17

Return migration often depends more on a complex interplay of the economic, social, and political conditions in migrant-source countries than simply on job prospects in countries of destination.18 It stands to reason that economic immigrants will not be likely to return to their country of origin in large numbers if they have worse economic prospects at home.19 Because the current recession is global, migrants cannot relocate to regions with better work opportunities as they did during previous recessions that were more confined to a few countries or regions (e.g., the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998).20

Other factors, of course, also contribute to the reluctance to return, although they may carry less weight than poor home-country economies. These include increased border enforcement, which makes back-and-forth movement across borders increasingly difficult, dangerous, and costly; as well as the resilience of social networks that unauthorized immigrants can tap into during hard times.21

21 Papademetriou and Terrazas, Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, Policy Challenges, and Implications.
As we note above, the recession affects the movement of differing immigration streams — unauthorized, temporary, permanent, and humanitarian — differently, with the impact greatest on unauthorized and temporary streams. We discuss each below.

1. Unauthorized Migrants

Economic migrants come in search of work and more often than not either have a job in hand or rely on their social networks to get one quickly. Unauthorized migrants are perhaps the best example of economically motivated movers, appearing to be most sensitive to changes in economic and labor market conditions.

- Research in the United States indicates a strong correlation between economic opportunities and the flows of unauthorized migrants. Loss of jobs in construction and hospitality has affected immigrant workers to a greater degree than their native counterparts. (According to the US Census Bureau’s March 2007 Current Population Survey, about one-third of Mexican and Central American immigrants age 18 and older were employed in the construction sector.) The unemployment rate among Mexican and Central American immigrants rose especially rapidly, more than doubling from 4.7 percent to 11.1 percent between July 2007 and July 2009.

- At the same time, evidence from US and Mexican population surveys showed a recent steep decline in the number of Mexicans coming to the United States. US population survey data show that while the annual number of new arrivals from Mexico to the United States was 653,000 between March 2004 and March 2005, and 424,000 between March 2007 and 2008, the estimated annual inflow dropped to just 175,000 between March 2008 and March 2009 — the lowest total this decade. This finding is reinforced by analyses of US Border Patrol apprehensions data showing that fluctuations in migrant apprehensions closely track changes in labor demand.\(^{22}\) Given that 55 percent of Mexican immigrants in the United States are unauthorized, experts conclude the recent steep slowdown in the flows from Mexico is largely driven by unauthorized Mexican migrants staying home, primarily in response to limited economic prospects in the United States.\(^{23}\) As we discuss below, the flow of legal immigrants from Mexico has not changed.

- According to a recent Frontex analysis there was a decline in illegal border crossings in the European Union in early 2009: the number of illegal border crossings in the first quarter of 2009 was 50 percent less than in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 16 percent less than in the first quarter of 2008. In its report, the agency noted that as economic opportunities deteriorated in EU countries, fewer unauthorized migrants were arriving in Europe.

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\(^{22}\) Research done by Pia Orrenius from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas cited in Papademetriou and Terrazas, *Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, Policy Challenges, and Implications*.

The Spanish Interior Ministry reported that, for the first time in years, not a single immigrant boat was intercepted off the Canary Islands in April and May 2009. The total number of apprehensions for illegal arrivals by sea between January-July 2009 in Greece decreased 20 percent between 2009 and 2008, dropping to 5,767 from 7,263 a year earlier, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Athens. UNHCR expects the number of attempted crossings to increase right after the summer, as that is the peak season for sea arrivals.

As in the case of the United States, it is hard to disentangle the impact of the recession on illegal migration from that of increased enforcement. Besides a significant reduction in labor demand in economic sectors that traditionally employ migrant workers, such as construction and manufacturing, many EU Member States also have reinforced their internal measures against employers of illegal migrants while stepping up their use of return programs, enforcing residence laws more strictly, and stiffening border controls. Examples of stepped-up enforcement measures include:

- In early July 2009, Italy’s Parliament approved legislation that imposes tough measures aimed at fighting illegal immigration and boosting security on the streets.
- France’s Minister of Immigration Eric Besson has pledged to dismantle the improvised camp set up by some 800 to 1,000 UK-bound unauthorized immigrants in the city of Calais, not far from the entrance of the Channel tunnel to England.

2. Temporary Workers

Another group whose movement is sensitive to economic conditions is temporary workers. These workers arrive with visas that typically require that they work for a specific employer. The recession has slowed new employment of temporary foreign workers, both because employers have requested fewer workers and because some governments have halted the recruitment of new foreign workers. For example:

- The number of H-1B visa applications for skilled workers submitted by US companies to US Citizenship and Immigration Services was significantly lower in 2009 than in previous years. 163,000 H-1B applications were logged in the first few days of April 2008, 2.5 times the congressionally mandated cap of 65,000 H-1B visas for the entire 2009 year. Only 45,000 such petitions had been received as of

25 Email correspondence with Ariana Vassilaki, UNHCR Athens.
26 Associated Press, “Recession stems oft-fatal boat migration to EU.”
27 April 1st is the first day when the applications can be submitted for the next-year employment
Recent data show that while the number of overseas Filipino migrant workers increased between 2007 and 2008 overall, slightly fewer Filipinos left the country for overseas employment in December 2008 (89,800) than in either November 2008 (106,600) or December 2007 (95,300).

The flow of Nepali migrant workers decreased by 13 percent during the last fiscal year due to the economic crisis. During fiscal year 2008-2009, 217,164 individuals left the country for employment, compared to 249,051 in 2007-2008.

Many temporary worker programs are used by governments to fill gaps in agriculture, resort, and other seasonal services; or to fill sectoral labor gaps (household domestic help). These programs, then, are treated as a valve that can be loosened when labor demand rises and tightened when it falls. It is not surprising then that South Korea, Russia, Taiwan, Australia, and Thailand, among others, have cut the number of temporary foreign worker permits they issue to protect their domestic workers (for a detailed discussion, see Section IV, Policy Changes and Selected Impacts in Immigrant-Receiving Countries with Rising Unemployment). Other governments have gone a step further, requiring that employers lay off temporary foreign workers before natives (Malaysia).

Canada has followed a different path, imposing no new restrictions on the number of temporary workers, which has grown from 125,367 in 2004 to 251,235 in 2008 (by 22 percent). Certain regions were clear magnets for temporary worker flows thanks to abundant labor market opportunities combined with local governments’ welcoming policies. The province of Alberta experienced nearly 340 percent growth in the number of temporary foreign workers, from 13,167 in 2004 to 57,707 in 2008, and is now third after Ontario (91,276) and British of Columbia (58,307). During the same time, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Yukon experienced more than 150 percent growth in the number of temporary foreign workers.

During the first quarter of 2009, the number of non-permanent residents, (i.e., including foreign workers and international students and their family members) increased by nearly 23,800 (compared to an increase of 15,600 in the same quarter of 2008).
population of most Canadian provinces grew in part because of the arrival of these temporary residents.
3. **Permanent Immigrants**

Other migrant streams are less likely to respond to changing economic conditions, in particular those who come for permanent settlement. Below we examine recent data from the United States, Australia, and Canada: countries known for their long history of permanent settlement. In each case we see stable to rising permanent immigration flows despite the recession and differing emphases of the three nations’ immigration systems — the United States on family, Canada and Australia on skills.

**The United States**

The number of immigrants receiving legal permanent visas in the United States (or “green cards”) has been stable despite the economic downturn. One explanation is that would-be immigrants — especially family-based immigrants who account for two-thirds of all US permanent immigrants — have to wait in line for years to obtain a US permanent visa. Thus, many would be unlikely to postpone their plans based exclusively on economic considerations. To illustrate, the current waiting time for unmarried adult children of US citizens is at least five years; for married adult children it is more than eight years; and for siblings of US citizens from the Philippines is about 23 years. Backlogs for employment-based immigrants are shorter, depending on immigrants’ nationality. Certain skill-based immigrants from China and India have to wait for at least four years before their applications for permanent residence will be considered.32

Despite the long waiting times, those who immigrate via employment sponsorship might be more sensitive to recession-driven changes. The number of applications for US permanent visas that require direct employer sponsorship fell by more than 50 percent between 2007 and 2008 (from 235,000 to 104,000), and only 36,000 applications were submitted in the first eight months of fiscal year 2009.33

At the same time anecdotal evidence suggests that many H-1B skilled temporary workers — the main channel to employment-based green cards — have lost their jobs and some have left the country, a development that might dampen future demand for green cards.

 Nonetheless, given the relatively small proportion that employment-based visas represent of all permanent immigration visas (only 15 percent or so), even if the recession affects employer-sponsored migration, the resulting impact on permanent immigration to the United States is likely to be small.34

**Australia**

The Australian and Canadian permanent immigration systems emphasize skills- and employment- driven immigration to a greater degree than the United States. Of the 205,940 persons who became permanent settlers in Australia in fiscal year 2007-2008, 52 percent

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33 Anabelle Garay, “Petitions for US worker green cards down sharply,” Associated Press, August 6, 2009, [http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jIws3_TYnHE_ds12yt0HK_tvBXowD99TEDF00](http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jIws3_TYnHE_ds12yt0HK_tvBXowD99TEDF00); Fiscal year starts on October 1 and ends on September 30.

34 Papademetriou and Terrazas, *Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, Policy Challenges, and Implications*. 
(107,469) were admitted under skill-based visas. According to the most recently available data, the number of foreigners who became family and skills-based permanent immigrants increased between July-December 2007 and July-December 2008, by 15 and 19 percent respectively. In sum, at least as of December 2008 no decline was evident in permanent immigration to recession-spared Australia in either family or skills-based immigration.

**Canada**

The number of economic or skill-based permanent immigrants to Canada also increased between 2007 and 2008, from 131,244 to 149,072, or by 14 percent. Given recent increased policy emphasis on employer sponsorship, the share of employer-sponsored immigrants rose from 7.4 to 9.7 percent of the total economic principal applicants while self-sponsored immigrants decreased slightly from 31.4 to 29.1 percent. Overall, legal admissions to Canada appear quite stable, falling slightly to 50,800 new immigrants (skill, family, and humanitarian) in the first quarter of 2009, from 53,147 during the first quarter of 2008 and 53,549 in the fourth quarter of 2008.

4. **Refugees**

Given the reasons refugees and other humanitarian migrants move — to flee persecution, conflict, or natural disaster — their flows are not typically closely tied to economic and job-market conditions. This is apparent in the case of the United States, where the government recently raised the refugee ceiling from 70,000 to 80,000 in response to an expected rise in refugee resettlement from Iraq, Iran, and Bhutan.

In 2008, 60,108 persons were actually admitted to the United States as refugees. This figure represents a 46.1 percent increase compared to the corresponding number in 2006 (41,150) and a 24.7 percent increase over 2007 (48,218).

C. **Major Migration Corridors**

There is no single, global trend that captures the many ways in which the economic crisis has affected migration flows. The effects are nuanced and varied, depending greatly on the character of the flows (permanent, temporary, illegal, and humanitarian); whether they are to or from a destination country; and the region of the world involved. Still, a look at some of the major migration corridors around the globe makes clear that the recession has had a profound impact on what amounts to one of the most personal and important decisions a person can make: Where to live and work.

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United States – Mexico

Flows from Mexico to the United States have declined mostly as a result of drops in illegal immigration; we do not see parallel increases in return migration.

- Mexico is by far the leading sending country to the United States. There were 11.7 million Mexican-born persons in the United States in 2007, accounting for nearly a third of the 38 million foreign-born residents and two-thirds (65 percent) of the 18.1 million Hispanic immigrants in the United States. The United States is the destination for nearly all people who leave Mexico, and about one in ten people born in Mexico lives in the United States.

- More than half (55 percent) of Mexican immigrants in the United States are unauthorized; this share is even higher among recent arrivals from Mexico: 80 percent to 85 percent of Mexicans who have been in the United States for less than a decade are unauthorized.\(^{39}\)

- The Mexican-born population in the United States, which had been growing earlier in the decade at a rate of over 350,000 people per year, stood at 11.8 million in July 2009. That figure is not significantly different from the 12.1 million Mexican immigrants in July 2008 or the 11.8 million in July 2007 — in large measure because of the sizeable decline in illegal inflows. As Figure 1 indicates, if prior trends had continued the Mexican population in the United States today would have been roughly 1 million larger than it is.

- Patterns of migration between the United States and Mexico have been quite varied. Many Mexican immigrants settle permanently: nearly one in five new legal permanent residents in 2008 was from Mexico.\(^{40}\) At the same time, large numbers also move both ways across the US-Mexico border throughout the year, sometimes staying for only a few months. Mexican-US migration thus ebbs and flows seasonally, with larger northbound flows in the spring and summer and larger southbound flows in the fall and winter.

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Prior to the economic downturn, unauthorized male immigrants had higher labor-force attachment (94 percent) than either their native-born (83 percent) or legal immigrant (86 percent) counterparts. The recession has had a harsh impact on employment of Latino immigrants. In particular, the unemployment rate for Mexican and Central American immigrants (11.4 percent in June 2009) is 2.6 times greater than the rate recorded two years ago (4.4 percent) and is greater than the unemployment rate for native-born Americans (9.5 percent). As Figure 2 shows, the unemployment rate among Mexican and Central American immigrants has risen dramatically from about 5.4 percent on the eve of the recession in November 2007 to about 11.4 percent in June 2009 (not seasonally adjusted).

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Figure 2. Unemployment Rate by Race, Ethnic Group, or Nativity, January 2000 to July 2009

Notes: Unemployment rates are not seasonally adjusted, which means that comparisons should be made only for the same quarters of different years and not for successive quarters of the same year.

- Despite rising unemployment and slowing inflows, the Pew Hispanic Center finds no evidence of an increase in the number of Mexican-born migrants returning home from the United States.\(^{42}\) (See Figure 3.) At the same time the inflow of migrants from Mexico to the United States fell from a little over 1 million in 2006-2007 to less than 650,000 in 2008-2009.

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Evidence of falling Mexican emigration is reinforced by data from the US Border Patrol showing that apprehensions of Mexicans attempting to cross illegally into the United States decreased by a third between 2006 and 2008, from 981,069 to 661,773.43

- Data from the Mexican government’s “Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico,” also confirm this trend, showing that in the first quarter of 2009 the number of migrants from Central and Southern Mexico heading to the United States fell to about 359,000, down from about 600,000 in the first quarter of 2008. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4. Central and Southern Mexican Migration to United States, 2000-2009


- Additional data from the Mexican government’s “Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico” show that return migration from the United States appears to have declined in recent years (the first quarter of each year). About 210,000 migrants returned in the First Quarter (Q1) 2007 compared to about 199,000 in Q1 2008, and 166,000 in Q1 2009. Figure 5 indicates that there appears to have been more returns to Mexico at the time of the last recession, in 2001 (240,000). Between fiscal year 2004 and 2009, the US government budget for border enforcement rose 82 percent, from US$6 billion to $10.1 billion, largely to increase the number of border patrol agents and build physical and “virtual” fencing along the US-Mexico border.44 But even before the last round of border enhancement, some scholars argued that stepped-up border enforcement in effect locks unauthorized migrants in the country, i.e., the more risky and expensive it is to move back and forth, the more likely unauthorized migrants will settle permanently in a country. Frontex has reached a similar conclusion regarding the European region based on the analysis of its own data, stating that “by reducing circularity in migration, enhanced border management probably keeps in Member States a number of illegal migrants who would have otherwise left."45

Figure 5. Mexican Migrant Return to Mexico, 2000-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Migrants Returning (thousands)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>148</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>166</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


2. United Kingdom – Accession 8 countries (A8)

In sharp contrast to the situation between Mexico and the United States, where the recession appears to have prompted little return migration, the United Kingdom has witnessed a rapid turnover of workers from the eight Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004 (referred to as the A8 countries) and a significant dropoff in A8 immigration — particularly from Poland. Return migration to Poland and in-migration to other EU countries from the United Kingdom have been enabled, in part, by EU freedom-of-movement provisions, which have made it easier to circulate between A8 countries and those EU-15 countries that chose to lift restrictions to free labor movement of A8 nationals before the required date of 2011. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden did so immediately in 2004.

- Both the number (see Figure 6) and the share of the total foreign population and foreign workers in the United Kingdom have been on the rise since 1996. Between 1995 and 2008, the number of non-UK nationals more than doubled (from 1,948,000 to 4,196,000) along with the number of foreign workers in the United Kingdom (from 862,000 to 2,283,000). The proportion of foreigners in the total UK population and total UK employment also more than doubled between 1995 and 2008.

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46 A8 refers to the eight Eastern European countries that joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. At the time of accession, their per capita income was about 40 percent of the European average. Although Malta and Cyprus also joined the European Union at the same time, they are considered a distinct group because both are small islands with higher standards of living relative to Eastern Europe. As a result, their nationals could work anywhere in the Union without delays or restrictions.

47 Foreign persons and workers are defined as those who do not have UK citizenship.
Europeans account for half of the UK foreign workforce, somewhat more than their share of the foreign population (46 percent). The Irish used to predominate but their share of all foreign workers has fallen from 22.6 percent in 1995 to 7.2 percent in 2008. The numbers of A8 Europeans in the labor force have grown rapidly, reaching just under half a million, or 21.8 percent, of all foreign workers in 2008.48

In just two years A8 workers overtook Ireland to become the largest group of workers in the United Kingdom. There were 358,000 Polish workers in 2008, up from 151,000 two years earlier; compared to 165,000 Irish workers in 2008, up from 152,000 in 2006. Polish workers accounted for 15.7 percent of all UK foreign workers in 2008.

Before 2008, the booming UK economy proved an attractive destination for many citizens of the new EU Member States. Together with restrictions elsewhere in Europe, high unemployment at home, favorable exchange rates, and pent-up demand, a wave of immigration from the accession countries was unleashed. About 1.4 million people from the A8 arrived in the United Kingdom between May 2004 and March 2009.49 In 2007, A8 workers made up almost half of the United

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Kingdom’s labor immigration flow. Not all of the new migrants have stayed: the population of A8 migrants at the end of 2008 was approximately 700,000, suggesting that approximately half had returned home as of the end of 2008. The sheer size of the inflow has meant that Polish nationals, despite the high churn, jumped from being the United Kingdom’s 13th-largest foreign-national group at the end of 2003 to number one by the end of 2008.

- Over time, the share of the foreign-born workforce engaged in highly skilled occupations has declined (in 2004, 43.6 percent of foreign nationals were classified as highly skilled; in 2008, the proportion stood at 38.3 percent). This shift in skill balance has been brought about by the inflow of workers from the A8 countries, only 12 percent (15.8 percent in 2006) of whom were in highly skilled occupations, while over half (57 percent) were in low-skilled occupations, compared to 20 percent of other immigrants and 18 percent of natives.\(^{50}\)

- A8 migrants typically receive low wages and are concentrated in unskilled work, often despite high levels of education. In many cases the new migrants have precarious employment and housing arrangements, are vulnerable to exploitation, or lack support networks and access to information.\(^{51}\)

- The recent migration stream from A8 countries is marked by several important characteristics: It is temporary and circular (involving several trips, sometimes on a seasonal basis); and characterized by uncertainty about the duration of stay.\(^{52}\) In many cases, migration requires as little planning as the purchase of a coach ticket or short-hop plane flight. As a result, migrants can come for short periods (data from the Worker Registration Survey consistently points to the fact that large proportions only intend to stay in the United Kingdom for a few months), or have undefined plans (migrant surveys have shown that recent A8 migrants are less certain about their future plans than other immigrant groups). It follows that this form of free-access labor mobility is more responsive to changing economic conditions both in the destination and origin countries.\(^{53}\)

- However, it is not just the United Kingdom’s faltering economy that has lowered the inflow and created incentives for circularity. The economies of Eastern Europe have also prospered in recent years, notwithstanding the complex picture created by the recession. For example, the Polish economy has grown faster, the UK-Polish unemployment “gap” (see Figure 7) has substantially decreased and the exchange rate with the United Kingdom has strengthened in the past five years. (In 2004 the


\(^{51}\) Sumption and Somerville, *The UK’s New Europeans*.

\(^{52}\) Direct comparison of Eastern European migrants and other migrant groups is difficult. Estimates using data from the 1990s, before EU enlargement, show that among immigrants who stayed for at least a year in the United Kingdom, 40 percent of men and 55 percent of women had left five years later. This number would inevitably be larger if it included migrants who stayed for less than one year before returning home. A noteworthy example is the growing number of corporate transferees in computer science and telecommunications, who come to the United Kingdom on work permits for relatively short periods. For more, refer to Madeleine Sumption and Will Somerville, *The UK’s New Europeans: Progress and Challenges Five Years after Accession* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming 2009).

exchange rate was 7 zloty to the British pound, falling to 5 zloty in 2007, and currently running (albeit with recent fluctuations) at 4 zloty to the pound.

- In 2006, unemployment rates in Poland were more than double those in the United Kingdom (13 percent versus 5.7 percent). By 2008, they were roughly the same in both the third and fourth quarter (6.7 percent versus 6.2 percent in the fourth quarter). Polish rates began to accelerate, though, in early 2009, partially reducing incentives for Polish migrants to return to Poland.

Figure 7. Quarterly Unemployment, Age 15 and Older for Poland and United Kingdom, 2006-2009

![Quarterly Unemployment Rates of Persons Age 15 and Older, Poland and the United Kingdom (not seasonally adjusted)](chart)

**Source:** Eurostat, Table "Unemployment Rates of Workers, Age 15 and Older."

- The recession’s overall effects on migration to the United Kingdom, especially from Eastern Europe, can be seen in approved applications under the UK Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). There has been a substantial decline in the number of approved applications to A8 workers under WRS that started in Q3 2007.

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54 Changes in the Worker Registration Scheme provide a rough measure of inflows of A8 countries. Nationals of the A8 countries who wish to take up employment in the United Kingdom for a period of at least a month are generally required to register with WRS. Approximately one-third of A8 workers are estimated not to be registered with the scheme either because they are exempt because they are (a) self-employed; (b) have been working legally and continuously for 12 months or more; (c) are working for an employer not established in the United Kingdom; or simply because they wish to avoid official registration and the fee it entails.
In total there were 21,275 approved applicants to WRS in Q1 2009, compared to 46,645 in Q1 2008 and 50,320 in Q1 2007. This downward trend has continued since Q3 2007. The number of WRS applications in Q1 2009 is the lowest since EU enlargement in 2004.

The largest group of workers from A8 countries in both Q1 2007 and Q1 2009 was from Poland (71 percent and 58 percent of all A8 workers, respectively). The number of approved applications from Poland declined from 41,195 to 12,480 between Q1 2007 and Q1 2009.\(^{55}\)

Applications from Romanian (-22 percent) and Bulgarian (-38 percent) workers, whose countries joined the European Union in 2007 and as a result obtained expanded access to the UK labor market, also dropped between Q4 2007 and Q4 2008.\(^{56}\)

3. Spain-Romania and Spain-Morocco

After a sevenfold increase in the share of immigrants over the past decade, Spain’s immigrant population has suffered massive labor force dislocations in the current recession. Immigrants were attracted to Spain and encouraged by the government to come and work in the booming construction, tourism, hospitality, and domestic-service industries. But Spain’s growth has come to a painful stop and the country is being forced to

\(^{55}\) Migration Policy Institute analysis of the WRS data.

\(^{56}\) Sumption and Somerville, *Immigration in the United Kingdom*. 

37
rethink its economic-development model. The result has been sharply declining immigrant inflows. As in the United Kingdom, Eastern Europeans with the right of return (and some Moroccans who have legal permanent residence) appear to be leaving Spain and returning to their home countries; but the bulk of Sub-Saharan African and Latin American migrants seems to be staying put, in large measure because of poor home economies.

- Spain was Europe’s leading country of immigration between 2000 and 2007, adding more than 4.8 million immigrants in seven short years, bringing the total foreign population in 2008 to 5.3 million out of a total population of 46 million. In 2008, Spain’s foreign population was higher than that of the United Kingdom (4.2 million). Foreigners’ share of the total Spanish population rose sevenfold from 1.6 percent in 1998 to 11.4 percent in 2008.
- Moroccans accounted for the largest share of immigrants in Spain from 1998 through 2007, but were surpassed by Romanians in 2008. In 2008, there were 716,000 Romanians, up from an estimated 2,000 in 1998, 208,000 in 2004, and 527,000 in 2007. Other large immigrant communities in Spain in 2008 were Moroccans (653,000) and Ecuadoreans (428,000). Thus since the late 1990s, Spain has absorbed a large, extraordinarily diverse immigrant flow from three continents: Europe, Africa, and South America.
- According to municipal register statistics, more than 920,000 foreigners moved to Spain in 2007, up 15 percent over the previous year. The main source countries in 2007 were Romania (174,000), Morocco (71,000), and Bolivia (46,000), accounting for almost one-third of all new migrants in 2007 (see Figure 9).
- Prior to 2005, legal labor migration channels were very limited, so much of the migration into Spain was illegal. There were six legalization programs (1985-1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001, and 2005) through which hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants were granted legal status. About 550,000 unauthorized workers submitted applications for the 2005 regularization program: 83 percent were successful. New opportunities, including easy recruitment of Romanians and Bulgarians, have since directed much of the migration to Spain into legal channels. The official estimate of the size of the unauthorized migrant population was about 300,000 in early 2008.

57 The “Residential Variation Statistics” is elaborated by the Spain’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) based on new registrations and registry removals in the municipal registers of inhabitants due to changes in residence. Migratory annual flows are thus obtained both at a domestic level (between the different Spanish municipalities), and at a foreign level (between Spanish municipalities and foreign regions). Statistics from the Municipal Registries include both immigrants with legal residence in Spain as well as unauthorized immigrants. (Spanish legislation permits all immigrants regardless of legal status to register with the municipalities where they reside.) As a result, data from the Municipal Registers always show larger numbers of immigrants than official federal government administrative data. Nevertheless, data from the Municipal Registers also suffer from quality deficiencies and are an inexact metric of the actual foreign-born population for several reasons: some immigrants never register with their municipality of residence and are therefore omitted from the data; others move to a new municipality and are registered twice (or more times, at least for some period of time); others depart from Spain without notifying municipal authorities of their departure and remain included in the data after they are no longer present in the country.
59 OECD International Migration Outlook, Special Focus: Managing the Labour Migration Beyond the Crisis (Paris, France: OECD, 2009).
• In 2007, immigrants’ share of all employed workers in Spain was 15.6 percent; 33.6 percent among low-skilled workers. Immigrant employment represented 42 percent of total employment growth between 1997 and 2007.

• In 2008, the number of new arrivals fell 25 percent to 692,000 from 920,000 in 2007. The greatest decline came from other European countries. For example, the flows from Romania and Bulgaria fell by more than 60 percent. There were slight declines in the number of migrants who came from Africa and Oceania in 2008; flows from the Americas declined by a quarter and those from Asia by 10 percent.

• The flow of Moroccan immigrants to Spain — a more established population that largely has legal residence and often arrives through family channels — declined less than the Bolivian and Romanian flows, which are more recent and labor-market driven.  

60 Evidence from the Romanian immigrant population suggests that many registered with municipal authorities for the first time in 2007 (as a result of their newly acquired legal status when Romania joined the European Union) although many of these immigrants had lived in Spain illegally for some time. This may explain some of the rapid "rise" in the immigrant population observed in 2007. See Miguel Pajares, *Inmigracion y Mercado de Trabajo, Informe 2009* (Madrid, Spain: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigracion, 2009).
The immigrant share of the Spanish construction labor force more than doubled, from 10 to 24 percent between 2000 and the fourth quarter of 2008. Construction boomed, and some 865,000 building permits were issued in 2006 alone. As the sector contracted sharply, 123,000 foreign workers lost their jobs (compared to 27,000 who became unemployed in 2007). About 117,000 foreign workers lost jobs in the service sector in 2008.
• The unemployment rate among the Spanish-born grew from 8.5 percent in Q4 2005 to 17.4 percent in Q1 2009, and from 10.2 to 28.4 percent over the same period among the foreign born. Spain had recorded the highest unemployment rate in the European Union already by July 2008 and half of the jobs lost in the European Union during the first six months of the recession were in Spain: an average of 8,600 jobs a day.

• There is no consensus among experts on whether there has been a very large exodus of migrants from Spain in a time of economic crisis because of data limitations. According to the National Institute of Statistics, in 2008 outflows were on the rise. About 232,000 migrants left Spain in 2008, a 17 percent increase over the 199,000 who left in 2007 and a 93 percent increase over the 120,000 who left in 2006. Figure 11 shows a decline in monthly arrivals during 2008 and an increase in monthly departures of foreigners between December 2008 and March 2009. However, because

61 Q1-2009 data: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Población Activa, data requested by the Migration Policy Institute.
62 The various EU countries officially entered the recession at different times — mostly in the second half of 2008. Spain officially entered recession in the fourth quarter of 2008 while other countries such as Denmark entered recession as early as June 2008.
residents often do not notify the municipal authorities of their departures and thus remain on the records, out-migration is likely to be underestimated.

Figure 11. Number of Spain’s In- and Out-Migrants in the Foreign-Born Population, Monthly Estimates, January 2007 to March 2009

- As EU citizens, Romanians can enter Spain relatively freely but, as such, are ineligible for Spain’s voluntary return programs. According to residence permit data, only 5,700 Romanians left Spain in 2008; 4,000 did so in 2007. Spanish researcher Miguel Pajares, who conducted interviews with Romanian community associations as well as Romanian consular officials, labels the gradual departure of Romanian immigrants from Spain “the silent return.” In the city of Alcalá de Henares, which hosts a substantial Romanian population, community associations claim that people are gradually “disappearing.” Officials at Romania’s embassy in Madrid and its consulates in Barcelona, Bilbao, Castellón de la Plana, Seville, and Zaragoza have also noticed lower demand for services, although there are no data to substantiate these claims. In early 2009, the Romanian embassy in Madrid began negotiating an

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agreement between the public work-placement agencies of the two countries to allow Spain’s agency to advertise open positions in Romania.

• Few Moroccans appear in Spanish return statistics: only 2,700 Moroccans left in 2008 and 2,500 in 2007. These findings are largely confirmed by Moroccan associations. Nevertheless, recent anecdotal evidence suggests that while Moroccan men might not leave, they are sending their family members (wives and/or children) home, to ensure that at least some members maintain their residence permits in Spain. Instead of going to Morocco some Moroccan migrants move elsewhere in Europe (e.g., France and Belgium) where they have family networks.

4. India-Gulf States

After a sharp rise in the flow of unskilled Indian immigrants to the Gulf States — the number doubled between 2004 and 2008 alone — flows have slowed. Data from the Gulf governments are hard to come by, but the anecdotal evidence indicates that there have not been large-scale returns to India.

• Since the 1950s, overseas labor migration from India has consisted of two distinct groups:
  o One is composed of persons with technical skills or professional expertise who have principally migrated to industrialized countries in the West, a process that started in the early 1950s and accelerated in the 1990s. It is estimated that by 2000, around 1.25 million mostly skilled Indians had emigrated to the industrialized West. Indian migrants with higher education such as engineers, IT specialists, and doctors are working in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Of the 409,600 skilled foreign-worker admissions to the United States in 2008 under the high-tech H-1B visa, 38 percent were from India. Indian students accounted for 15 percent of the 623,805 international students enrolled in US universities in 2007-2008. Indians also accounted for more than 40 percent of the estimated 22,000 entries under the UK Highly Skilled Migrant Program.
  o The second, far larger, group of Indian migrants is comprised primarily of unskilled or low-skilled workers whose principal destination has been the oil-rich Gulf region. It is estimated that by 2000, the Gulf Region countries had become home to more than 3 million Indian migrant laborers. More than 848,000 visas were issued to low-skilled Indians in 2008, an increase of 78
percent from 2004 (see Figure 12).73

- Of the 849,000 low-skilled workers who went abroad for work in 2008, 41 percent went to the United Arab Emirates; and another 27 percent went to Saudi Arabia. Altogether 96 percent of Indian low-skilled overseas workers who left India in 2008 moved to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.74

- It is difficult to statistically gauge the real impact of the recession on either departures for work or returns home. At this point, experts say that “there is no large-scale return migration to India due to the crisis.”75 As for departures, the preliminary evidence suggests that fewer low-skilled Indian workers are leaving for work abroad. In the first three months of 2009, about 171,000 low-skilled workers left to work abroad — a significantly slower pace of departures than was seen in the previous year.

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73 The Emigration Act of 1983 requires low-skilled Indians seeking work abroad to obtain "emigration clearances." Those who completed the Secondary School Leaving Certificate (SSLC) will get the Emigration Clearance Not Required (ECNR) Passports. They can go anywhere in the world and do not need any clearance from the Indian government. Persons who do not possess an SSLC have to obtain ECR passports. However, if an ECR passport holder wants to work in a Western country as a construction worker, this worker does not need a clearance from the Indian government. The Indian government has certified 17 countries as Emigration Clearance of Required (ECR) Countries.

74 The Council includes the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain.

75 See, for example, “No large-scale impact of recession on Indian workers abroad,” http://blog.taragana.com/n/no-large-scale-impact-of-recession-on-indian-workers-abroad-103067/.
1. **Bangladesh-Gulf Region**

   The migration corridor from Bangladesh to the Gulf region has recently generated even higher migration flows than those coming from India. About 10 percent of Bangladeshi migrants have been sent home because of the global recession’s pinch on labor markets. Meanwhile, similar to the Philippines and Nepal, the government of Bangladesh has responded to the recession by looking for new overseas markets for the country’s workers and by providing them financial support in the receiving counties. Both are expected to slow returns.

   - The Bangladeshi government officially began to send rising numbers of workers abroad beginning in mid-1970s, with the total number of immigrant workers more than doubling from 382,000 to 832,000 between 2006 and 2007 alone:
     - 1976: 6,100 were deployed.
     - 1986: 68,000
     - 1996: 211,000
     - 2006: 382,000
     - 2007: 832,600 (118 percent more than in 2006)
     - 2008: 875,000 (5 percent more than in 2007)
   - Further, the number of Bangladeshi migrants who left for employment abroad increased between 2007 and 2008 from 832,600 to 875,000. Still, this 5 percent increase paled in comparison to the 118 percent rise in the outflow of workers from 2006 to 2007.
   - About 80 percent of Bangladeshi migrants go to Persian Gulf oil exporters: almost half to Saudi Arabia and 10 percent to Malaysia. Half are low-skilled.
   - Many of Bangladeshi workers on three-year labor contracts have not had their contracts renewed and are being asked to go home for a year or more. Almost
71,000 Bangladeshi migrants were sent home before the end of their contracts in 2008-2009.

- At the same time, the Bangladeshi government hopes to counteract the recession’s impact by sending at least 500,000 migrants abroad in 2009-2010, citing new destinations that include Romania, Australia, Canada, Russia, South Africa, Sudan, and Algeria. After visiting Bangladeshi migrants in Saudi Arabia last April, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina promised to establish an expatriate bank that would offer remittance transfers via mobile phones, introduce machine-readable passports, and modernize Bangladesh’s Biman Airlines. The Minister of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment, Khandker Mosharraf Hossain, said in May 2009 that the most important issue facing Bangladeshi migrants was the debt they assumed to go abroad. He said: “We are trying to make sure that overseas job seekers do not need to sell land or borrow money to go abroad for jobs. Expatriates Bank, which is to open soon, will help solve their credit problems.”

2. **Philippines-Gulf States**

*To sustain the high levels of overseas employment of its nationals in the face of the recession, the Philippine government has embraced “full-blast market development efforts” that are likely to promote sustained Philippine emigration and limit returns.*

- Almost 1.2 million Filipinos were deployed to overseas jobs in 2008, an average of 3,400 a day — up from 1.1 million in 2007. Half were deployed in the Middle East (most to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), with another 18 percent in Asia (most to Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan). About 22 percent were sea-based.

- Contract labor migration, an institution dating to the 1970s, has resulted in an estimated 9 million Filipinos — or one-fourth of the overall Philippine workforce — working in more than 190 countries.

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76 Philippines Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Employment Statistics, Annual Report 2008. Sea-based workers were deployed to ships and other naval vessels (in transportation, commercial fishing, and leisure).

• Of the 974,000 land-based hires in 2008, 39 percent were new hires, the same share as a year earlier.\textsuperscript{78} This is the most vulnerable population as these workers are more likely to be laid off first.

• While recent estimates show that the number of overseas Filipino workers increased between 2007 and 2008 overall, fewer Filipinos left the country for overseas employment in December 2008 (89,800) than in either November 2008 (106,600) or December 2007 (95,300).\textsuperscript{79}

• The sharp rise in migrant deployments in 2008 could be followed by return migration in 2009, as recently hired workers are laid off. Over 6,000 Filipino migrants, mostly women working in electronics factories in Taiwan and men working on Middle Eastern construction projects, returned home before the end of the contracts in the first three months of 2009.

• As the unemployment rate in the Philippines increased to 8 percent in January 2009, affecting almost 3 million people, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo directed the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to “execute a paradigm shift by refocusing its functions from regulation to full-blast market development efforts, the

\textsuperscript{78} Philippines Overseas Employment Administration, \textit{Overseas Employment Statistics, Annual Report 2008}.

exploration of frontier, fertile job markets for Filipino expatriate workers."80 POEA dispatched teams to Taiwan, Dubai, and South Korea to help Filipino migrants who had been laid off.

3. **Nepal-Gulf States**81

*Similar to the emigration of workers from other South Asian countries such as India and Bangladesh, Nepalese employment-related outflows reflect the differing strengths of the destination-countries’ economies as flows have declined to the countries with weaker economies (such as Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates) but have increased to Saudi Arabia.*

- The flow of Nepali migrant workers decreased by 13 percent during the last fiscal year due to the global recession. During fiscal 2008-2009, 217,164 individuals left the country for employment, compared to 249,051 in 2007-2008.
- A number of traditional destination countries for Nepalese workers accepted fewer migrants in 2008 and 2009 than in 2007 and 2008. Flows to the United Arab Emirates were down 31 percent (from 45,000 to 32,000); Qatar took 11 percent fewer Nepalese (falling from 85,000 to 76,000) and accepted 31 percent fewer migrants from Nepal (declining from 51,000 to 35,000).
- However, Nepali migrants leaving for Saudi Arabia, a country where public investments remain strong despite the drop in price for oil, increased 15 percent to 48,749 during the most recent fiscal year, up from 42,394 in 2007-2008.

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III. How the Recession Has Affected the Internal Movement of Economic Migrants: A Study of China

A. Background

“There is no future as a laborer in the city, but it is also futile to return to the village.” A popular saying in China describes the dilemma faced by migrant workers about where and how to make a living amid the after-effects of the global recession that hit China in the fourth quarter of 2008. China’s 140 million migrant workers have long moved between rural and urban areas inside China, both for annual holiday visits and eventual permanent returns to their hometowns. The recession affected the character of the 2009 flows and in some cases had a powerful impact on the lives of rural migrant workers, who are at the bottom of the global supply chain and find their lives intertwined with the global economy.

Rural migrant workers, who represented 11 percent of China’s population of 1.3 billion people as of the end of 2008, are concentrated in the eastern provinces (see Figure 1), where export-oriented, labor-intensive industries have been hurt by the economic crisis. According to the World Bank, China’s export performance has remained very weak, down an estimated 20 percent in April-May 2009 from a year earlier. Pre-recession, 42 percent of China’s rural migrant workers were employed in the manufacturing industry, 17 percent in wholesale and retail, and 12 percent in the construction industry.

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82 Rural migrant workers or migrant workers in this section refer to those workers who have rural hukou (household registration or residence permit) but work and live in urban areas.
84 Kam Wing Chan, Global Financial Crisis and Migrant Workers in China (unpublished 2009).
B. Employment Challenges Facing Rural Migrant Workers

Internal Migration Trends Before and Since the Recession

Tens of millions of rural migrant workers return to their provincial homes every year during Chinese New Year, at the end of January and beginning of February, to reunite with their families in a tradition that represents the world’s largest annual movement of people. The 2009 “spring movement” that occurred amid the global financial crisis provided a unique “natural experiment” that sheds light on the impacts of recession on China’s internal migration trends.88 (See Figure 2.)

During this year’s spring movement, more workers went back than in previous years, the annual ritual started earlier than usual, and more people did not return to the cities, at least initially.

88 The term “spring movement” refers to the annual trip home for migrant workers during lunar Chinese New Year, also known as “spring festival.”
An estimated 70 million — or half of the 140.1 million rural migrant workers in China in 2008 — returned to their home provinces during the 2009 spring movement. Some of the returnees still had jobs waiting for them in the cities, while others had lost or quit their jobs.

**Figure 2. The 2009 “Spring Movement” by Rural Migrant Workers**

- Of the 70 million migrant workers who returned to their rural homes, 62.4 percent were from the eastern provinces (particularly concentrated in Guangdong province, which accounted for 24.6 percent of rural returnees, and the Yangzi River delta, 17.2 percent).

- 83 percent of the migrant returnees had only a junior high school education or less, indicating the disproportional impact on the less educated.

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89 The rural migrant workers account for 62 percent of all 225 million workers in China who have rural hukou (household registration or residence permits). See National Bureau of Statistics of China, “2008 nianmo quanguo nongmingong zongliang 22.542 wan ren” [“2.25 billion rural labor as of the end of 2008”], March, 25, 2009, [http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_detail.jsp?searchword=%C5%A9%C3%F1%B9%A4&channelid=6697&record=70](http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_detail.jsp?searchword=%C5%A9%C3%F1%B9%A4&channelid=6697&record=70). The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics obtained these data based on its Monitoring Survey for Rural Migration Worker Statistics. In this survey, “rural migrant worker” refers to the civilian working-age (16 and older) population with rural hukou who have worked outside of their residence for six months or more. The survey is a sample survey held in 31 provinces, 857 counties, 7,100 villages, and 68,000 rural households. China standardized and initiated this survey beginning in January 2009. China’s Ministry of Agriculture has set up village monitoring stations to conduct the survey on a regular basis.

90 Ibid., 87.
91 Ibid., 87.
92 Ibid., 87.
73 percent of rural migrant workers in the construction industry returned home, as well as 46.2 percent of those in the manufacturing industry.93

After the Chinese New Year, 80 percent (56 million) of the workers went back to the cities. Some 45 million of them had found work, while 11 million went back to the cities jobless. 94

Meanwhile, 14 million migrant workers remained in the rural area; 12 million were unemployed with the remainder finding jobs in local towns or nearby cities. 95

In other words, as of March 2009, an estimated 126 million (about 90 percent) of rural migrant workers were in the cities, with or without a job. This number included the 70 million workers who did not return home during the Chinese New Year, and the 56 million workers who went home but have since returned to the cities.

There have been different estimates of how many migrant workers remain in the rural area. Wang Dewen from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimated that as of June 2009, 95 to 97 percent of rural migrant workers he surveyed in Anhui and Chongqing provinces had returned to the cities following the spring movement, as the economy improved during the second quarter of 2009.96

Some researchers argue that migrant workers are gradually absorbed and reallocated into the labor markets in the inland areas, both because the Chinese government’s US$586 billion stimulus package has invested heavily in public infrastructure and because the economies of many interior provinces might strengthen as they produce more consumer durables for the Chinese domestic (versus export) market.97

Rural migrant workers were already highly vulnerable before the recession, mainly because they do not have urban hukou to provide them with access to social services and worker protections in the urban areas where they live and work. Post-recession employment impacts on migrant workers and their well-being include:

**Higher Unemployment**

- The unemployment rate of rural migrant workers is much higher than that of urban workers. China's official unemployment rate was 4.3 percent in March 2009,

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93 Ibid., 87.
94 Ibid., 87.
according to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Protection. But this figure covered only the urban working population. Total unemployment for rural migrant workers in March 2009 was estimated to be 23 million, or about 16.4 percent. This closely mirrors the Chinese government’s own estimation. The Director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Rural Worker, Chen Xiwen, estimated that 20 million migrant workers, or 15.3 percent, have lost their jobs due to the global financial crisis.

- As of March 2009, almost all workers who returned during the spring movement and remained in the rural areas were unemployed.
- If the economy does not improve, 35 million rural workers face the risk of structural unemployment, according to a calculation by the Chinese Academy of Social Science. It is especially difficult for older, less-skilled, and less-educated migrant workers to regain jobs in the cities.
- When the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued its latest employment report during the first half of 2009, it stressed that the job situation was still “very grave,” although acknowledging the situation had stabilized since the recession.

Lower Wages, Poorer Working Conditions, and Less Job Protection

- Rural migrant workers in China, even if employed, suffer from lower wages, poorer working conditions, and less protection. For example Shenzhen city cut its average wage guideline earlier this year by 3.8 percent to 2,750 yuan ($402) a month, the first time in 11 years.
- According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 5.8 percent of rural migrant returnees were affected by wage arrears.

Higher Poverty Risks for Rural Families

- The larger size of the rural migrant returnee population and longer stay in rural hometowns also mean decreased migrant income. Decreases in migrant wages and unemployment have a huge negative impact on rural income and for provinces that rely on remittances.
- According to research that compared rural migrants from poor and non-poor counties during January to May 2009, rural migrant workers had worked on average 6.5 days less than during the same period in 2008, and their income had dropped 2.8

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99 Ibid., 83.  
100 Ibid., 93.  
101 Ibid., 86.  
104 Ibid., 87.
percent. For workers from poorer provinces, their income dropped 5 to 30 percent.105

C. Policy Measures to Alleviate the Unemployment Situation of Rural Migrant Workers

Overall Policy Structure

As of March 2009, an estimated 20 to 23 million rural migrant workers were unemployed. Rising unemployment and its potential to cause social unrest have been a deep concern for the Chinese government. As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao indicated, the return home of rural migrant workers is one of the most severe employment challenges associated with the economic downturn, alongside prospects for jobless college graduates.106

The government has issued new policies, including the “State Council Circular Regarding Handling Current Migrant Worker Affairs” on December 20, 2008; “PRC Central People’s Government Opinions Regarding Promoting Agricultural Development and Increasing Farmers’ Income” on December 31, 2008; and “Guiding Opinion Regarding Handling Current Economic Situation and Stabilizing Labor Relations” on January 23, 2009.107 These documents laid out policy guidelines for local governments to implement and all made reference to “maintaining social harmony and stability” during the financial crisis.108 The “State Council Circular Regarding Handling Current Migrant Worker Affairs” laid out major principles to mitigate employment problems associated with the economic downturn.109

The government’s policies have been designed to:

1. Promote rural labor employment (by encouraging both short- and longer-term training), provide financial support (through training vouchers and tuition for workers to return to school), and provide training in occupations that are less affected by the recession;
2. Strengthen training and vocational education for migrant workers;
3. Encourage migrant workers to start their own business or become entrepreneurs (by granting loans and providing tax credits);

107 Ibid., 32.
4. Channel rural migrant workers to employment on new rural development projects, especially projects funded by China’s fiscal stimulus package and those in the interior provinces;
5. Ensure workers get paid on time;
6. Provide social safety-net benefits and public services for rural migrant workers;
7. Help migrants secure land rights when they return; and
8. Reallocate rural migrant workers and export them abroad. It has been common for provinces with large rural worker surpluses to channel them to employment abroad — a practice that has grown in popularity with worsening unemployment.
IV. Policy Changes and Selected Impacts in Immigrant-Receiving Countries with Rising Unemployment

A. Policies Restricting Immigrants’ Access to the Labor Market

Countries have responded to the economic crisis in a variety of ways. Some have restricted access to their labor markets by halting or at least decreasing the overall number of work permits for foreigners and for declining industrial sectors. Others have tightened admission requirements. Some examples:

- In January 2009, Malaysian authorities stopped issuing work permits in the manufacturing and services sectors, reduced the duration of many short-term work permits from six months to three months, and introduced a policy for fast-track deportation that could affect an estimated 1 million unauthorized foreign workers residing in Malaysia.

- The Government of Thailand has announced that it will not issue new work permits or renew work permits for about 500,000 foreign workers.

- In Kazakhstan, authorities imposed a moratorium on the admission of less-skilled workers effective April 1, 2009.

Other countries have reduced if not stopped their admission of migrants for employment:

- In December 2008, Russia announced that it would reduce work permits for foreign workers by half in 2009, from 4 million to 2 million. Even some local governments have sought to save jobs for native workers. The Moscow Department of Transportation urged local employers to stop hiring foreign workers, citing their lack of Russian-language skills and poor knowledge of city transportation routes.

- The UK Home Office has strengthened the resident labor market test for immigrants in high-demand occupations such as civil engineers and nurses. Employers must advertise jobs to resident workers through the national employment

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112 The new requirement will affect immigrants who seek entry under the UK Points-Based System (PBS) Tier 2, i.e., non-EU immigrants with a confirmed job offer in a sector of labor market shortage. To read about the UK PBS, see Will Somerville, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, and Maria Latorre, “United Kingdom: A Reluctant Country of Immigration,” *Migration Information Source*, July 2009, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=736.
service (JobCentre Plus) before they can bring in a worker from outside Europe. There is a plan to use each shortage occupation list[113] to trigger skills reviews that focus on up-skilling resident workers for these occupations, which will make the United Kingdom less dependent on migration in the future. Finally, the United Kingdom tightened the criteria against which highly skilled migrants[114] seeking entry to the United Kingdom are judged, raising the minimum qualifications and salary required for highly skilled immigrants to a master's degree and a minimum £20,000 salary.

Countries have also responded to the economic crisis by making it harder for migrants to live and work illegally. Italy, for example, passed legislation criminalizing unlawful presence and preventing unauthorized migrants from accessing public services such as education and emergency medical care, while increasing the maximum period of detention and authorizing citizen patrols to assist police in combating crime and responding to immigration violations.[115] In early 2009, French police conducted a series of high-profile worksite raids as part of a redoubled effort to remove illegal immigrants but also to create additional jobs for unemployed legal workers.[116]

1. Taiwan
Like other export-dependent economies, Taiwan was hit hard by the fall in global trade. Taiwan's exports dropped over 40 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to a year earlier, and manufacturing employment fell as electronics factories laid off workers. As unemployment of all Taiwanese workers reached 5.3 percent (up from 4.1 percent in 2008), the government rushed to announce plans in January 2009 to cut the number of low-skilled foreign worker permits to create jobs for domestic workers amid the economic downturn. State Minister Tsai Tsun-hsiung said that 33,000 jobs could be released for Taiwanese under the plan, which could affect almost 9 percent of the estimated 370,000 foreign workers employed on the island. 117

- The number of low-skilled foreign workers peaked at 374,000 in July 2008 before falling to 344,000 in April 2009. Manufacturing experienced the biggest drop in foreign worker employment. In February 2009, the number of migrant caregivers (171,000) exceeded the number of migrant manufacturing workers (167,000) for the first time.[118]

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[114] The change will affect highly skilled immigrants who qualify under the UK Points-Based System (PBS) Tier 1.
[118] Migration News, China: Recession; Taiwan, Hong Kong profile.
- The number of foreign workers employed in construction and agriculture is significantly smaller than in manufacturing and in private households. Work permits for construction were cut by more than half between June 2007 and June 2009. In contrast, agriculture and the marine industry seem to have escaped the impact of recession as the number of permits continued its upward trends. (See Figure 1.) Migrant layoffs were concentrated in electronics and garment manufacturing, affecting primarily Filipina and Thai women, while the number of Indonesian caregivers rose slightly. (See Table 1.)

**Figure 1. New and Renewed Work Permits Issued to Foreign Workers in Taiwan, 2007-2009**

Source: Taiwan Council of Labor Affairs.
### Table 1. Work Permits Issued by Taiwan by Industry and Share of Four Main Countries of Origin of These Permits, 2007-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>November 2007</th>
<th>November 2008</th>
<th>June 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caregivers/Maids</td>
<td>162,472</td>
<td>168,113</td>
<td>172,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Workers</td>
<td>182,813</td>
<td>194,052</td>
<td>158,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Workers</td>
<td>8,696</td>
<td>6,388</td>
<td>4,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Taiwan Council of Labor Affairs.

- Taiwan’s government appeared less intent on cutting work permits for the highly skilled. The number of permits issued to highly skilled foreigners decreased only slightly, from 28,800 in June 2008 to 27,453 a year later.
- The Council of Labor Affairs, which regulates the employment of migrant workers, banned the recruitment of additional foreign workers in March 2009 for factories wishing to hire migrants for the overnight shift. The Council also limited migrants to a maximum 20 percent of a manufacturer’s workforce.\(^{119}\)

### 2. South Korea

The government took steps to reduce the employment of foreign workers by dramatically cutting the quota on foreign workers from 100,000 in 2008 to 34,000 in 2009. The policy change came amid slightly rising unemployment and against the backdrop of an increase in the number of immigrants in the workforce in recent years.

- The number of foreign residents in South Korea increased from 110,000 to 800,300 between 1995 and 2007, with the foreign-born share of the total population rising from 0.2 percent to 1.7 percent.\(^{120}\)
- Between March 2008 and March 2009, employment in South Korea fell by almost 200,000 and unemployment approached 4 percent. Some laid-off white-collar workers were reportedly seeking jobs that had been considered migrant jobs, including work in fisheries and in agriculture.\(^{121}\)

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\(^{119}\) *Migration News*, China: Recession; Taiwan, Hong Kong profile,


\(^{121}\) *Migration News*, China: Recession; Taiwan, Hong Kong profile
Table 2. South Korean Foreign Workforce 2009 Quota by Status and Industry (Persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sojourn status</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Agricultural and livestock</th>
<th>Fishery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign workers (E-9 visa)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities (H-2 visa)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- There were 480,000 foreign workers in South Korea in February 2009, including 317,000 men and 163,000 women. Some 45 percent of male migrant workers present legally had E-9 work visas for low-skilled work, while 88 percent of the female migrant workers present legally had H-2 work visit visas issued to ethnic Koreans in China. There were also 200,000 unauthorized workers in South Korea, including 67,000 women. Another 109,000 foreign women married Korean men; many of whom work on their husband’s farms.122

- Policies that seek to reduce immigration quotas can be a reflection of anti-immigrant sentiment that rises during a period of economic recession. On the face of it, this does not appear to be the case in South Korea. Director-General Lee Jae-Gap of the Ministry of Labor’s Employment Policy Bureau stated in March 2009, “In the first half of this year, the ministry will manage the scale of foreign workforce introduction more strictly, because of the increasing number of the Korean unemployed and in order to protect the foreign workers who are already in Korea.”123

3. Australia
In response to dwindling employment prospects available for Australian workers, the government made changes to both permanent and temporary admissions in spring of 2009.

Permanent Admissions
In early 2009 — for the first time in a decade — the Australian government decided to reduce the intake of skilled foreign workers who apply for permanent settlement visas, even though the country had not technically entered into recession.

- The Permanent Migration Program was set initially to be cut by 14 percent, from 133,550 to 115,000 people in 2009-2010.124 The decision to lower the ceiling came as pressure mounted on the Australian government amid rising unemployment, with the

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122 Migration News, China: Recession; Taiwan, Hong Kong profile
124 The Australian fiscal year starts on July 1 and ends on June 30.
The government further downsized the Australian permanent migration program in May 2009 so that only 108,100 employment visas will be available for foreigners wishing to apply for permanent settlement in Australia. Under the new policy, applicants who are employer- or government-sponsored will receive a priority in application processing to ensure that new arrivals have jobs upon arrival.

In a second major change to the Permanent Migration Program, a number of occupations (including bricklayers, plumbers, welders, carpenters, and metal fitters) were removed from the Critical Occupation Skills List. The list now comprises mainly health and medical, engineering, and IT professions.

Temporary Admissions
Reforms introduced by the Rudd government would compel employers to give priority to local workers and pay temporary or “457” visa holders the same wages and benefits as Australian workers. The government also increased English-language skill requirements for trades and chefs and lower-skilled occupations.

- Australia’s subclass 457 Temporary Business Visa is a temporary skilled worker visa program that admits foreigners with special skills for up to four years. The number of 457 visa applications dropped by 11 percent from 61,390 applications in 2007-2008 to 54,810 applications in 2008-2009.

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127 Ibid.


129 Ibid.

Table 3. Number of Primary Applications by Nominated Occupations, Fiscal Years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominated Occupation</th>
<th>2007-08 to 30/06/08</th>
<th>2008-09 to 30/06/09</th>
<th>% Change from 2007-08</th>
<th>2008-09 as % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Managers and Administrators</td>
<td>5 460</td>
<td>4 880</td>
<td>-10.6%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Professionals</td>
<td>34 110</td>
<td>29 880</td>
<td>-12.5%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Associate Professionals</td>
<td>8 270</td>
<td>7 670</td>
<td>-7.2%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Tradespersons and Related Workers</td>
<td>9 680</td>
<td>8 600</td>
<td>-12.1%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Advanced Clerical and Service Workers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-80.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Service Workers</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>-5.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Intermediate Production and Transport Workers</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Elementary Clerical, Sales and Service Workers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Labourers and Related Workers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>247.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Recorded</td>
<td>2 720</td>
<td>2 690</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>61 390</strong></td>
<td><strong>54 810</strong></td>
<td><strong>-10.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- The demand for temporary work visas was below that of the previous year as a result of the global economic crisis. The number of 457 visa applications in June 2009 was 45 percent lower than one year earlier and 38 percent lower than September 2008 (see Figure 2). Also, the share of 457 visa applicants already in Australia increased from 52 percent in June 2008 to 59 percent in June 2009, suggesting that fewer would-be workers apply from abroad.

Figure 2. 457 Visa Applications, July 2007-June 2009


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130 Ibid.,1.
4. **United States**
While many countries have responded to the economic crisis by lowering the number of work permits for low-skilled foreign workers, the US government placed its focus on high-skilled temporary work permits, making it more difficult for certain financial companies to apply for H-1B visas for more highly skilled workers. As part of the financial-sector bailout legislation signed into law by President Obama in mid-February 2009, the government limited banks and other financial institutions that receive taxpayer-funded bailout money from hiring H-1B workers unless the firms comply with certain requirements. One of these requirements is an attestation that they had offered positions to equally or better-qualified US workers first. The law also prevents banks from hiring H-1B workers in occupations in which they had laid off US workers.\(^{131}\)

- Meanwhile, H-1B applications filed by US companies dipped substantially in 2009 — a marked contrast from prior years. For fiscal year 2009, 163,000 H-1B applications were logged in the first few days of the filing period,\(^{132}\) more than enough to meet the congressionally mandated cap of 65,000 H-1B visas for the entire fiscal year. In contrast, four months into the fiscal 2010 filing period, only 45,000 cap-subject petitions had been received as of August 14, 2009.\(^{133}\) Experts attribute the decline both to lower demand for workers due to recession and the bailout-related restrictions. Following the passage of the new restrictions, Bank of America withdrew job offers made to foreign MBA students graduating from US business schools for summer 2009.\(^{134}\)

- Although there have been no policy changes to the US employment-sponsored permanent visa program, the number of applications for employment-based permanent visas fell by more than 50 percent between 2007 and 2008, and is projected to fall by another 50 percent in 2009.\(^{135}\)

5. **Canada: Going Against the Tide**
In early 2009, citing economic uncertainty and rising unemployment numbers, the Canadian government briefly considered reducing its permanent immigration targets for the year. But the possibility was shelved after Immigration Minister Jason Kenney met with his provincial and territorial counterparts to study the demand for immigration in regional labor markets.\(^{136}\)
Permanent immigration levels for 2009 were not reduced, maintaining a target of

\(^{131}\) Although the regular H-1B dependent employer rule includes an exemption from these attestations if an H-1B worker either possesses a master's degree or receives wages of $60,000 or higher, the bailout bill does not allow recipients to claim these exemptions.

\(^{132}\) April 1st is the first day when the applications can be submitted for next-year employment.

\(^{133}\) At the same time, US Citizenship and Immigration Services reported that by April 9 the agency has received enough advanced-degree petitions to fill the 20,000 visa cap.


approximately 250,000 new permanent residents. Permanent immigration to Canada dipped slightly however: 50,800 new immigrants came to Canada in the first quarter of 2009, compared to 53,147 during the first quarter of 2008.\textsuperscript{137}

- Canada also did not restrict flows of temporary workers. The stock of temporary workers increased by nearly 26 percent between 2007 and 2008, growing from 199,942 to 251,235.\textsuperscript{138} During the first quarter of 2009, the net number of non-permanent residents (foreign workers and international students) increased by nearly 23,800 (compared to a net increase of 15,600 in the same quarter of 2008). The fact that more temporary residents arrived than left Canada in early 2009 is consistent with the upward trend that began in 2007.

**B. The Advent of Pay-To-Go Schemes**

Since the start of the global economic crisis, a handful of countries have launched programs to encourage unemployed migrants to return home. Spain, the Czech Republic, and Japan have emulated France, which in 1977 pioneered a voluntary return program (VRP) for its guest workers. The idea behind the pay-to-go schemes is to offer economic incentives, such as paid one-way tickets home and a lump-sum payment for the migrant and/or family members, in return for giving up residence and work rights for some period of time or even indefinitely. To date, participation in the Spanish, Czech, and Japanese pay-to-go programs has been modest. Experts generally conclude that these programs do not take into account immigrants’ motivations to stay or leave (such as limited opportunities at home, substantial investments made to emigrate, and deepening social and family ties in the country of destination).\textsuperscript{139}

In addition to the recession-inspired voluntary return programs run by individual countries, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has provided pre-departure, transportation, and post-arrival assistance to migrants in countries around the world if they wish to return but cannot afford to do so or lack necessary documents. The IOM program provides failed asylum seekers, unauthorized migrants, and migrants and students stranded in transit with information, counseling, medical assistance, travel documents, funds, and some re-integration support.

The United Kingdom is experimenting with a variation on the pay-to-go concept: Offering assistance to migrants before they reach their destination. In July 2009, the British government announced it would participate in a program to encourage the return of migrants who are in camps in Calais, France, while they wait to attempt illegal entry into the United Kingdom via


ferry or train. Under the program, carried out in cooperation with the French government, migrants in Calais will be offered a plane ride home, 2,000 euros (£1,700) in cash, and some resettlement assistance and retraining when they arrive in their home country.  

1. Spain
Although unemployment rates for foreign workers have historically been higher than for native-born Spaniards, unemployment began to rise for both groups as early as the first quarter of 2008. By the third quarter of 2008, unemployment rates had risen substantially for both groups, to 10.2 percent for Spaniards and 17.4 percent for foreigners, compared to 7.4 percent and 11.8 percent in the same quarter in 2007. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3. Spanish Quarterly Unemployment Rates for Native, Foreign Workers, 2006-2009

As more foreign workers were losing jobs, they were becoming eligible for, and presumably tapping into, unemployment benefits. The number of eligible foreign unemployed workers grew by nearly a quarter between January and August 2008 (from 161,923 to 199,546) and nearly doubled between January and December (to 311,953). The share of foreign unemployed workers rose from 10 percent to 13 percent within 2008 (see Table 4). The availability of unemployment benefits may have contributed to patterns of slowed return

migration.

### Table 4. Foreign and Spanish Workers Entitled to Unemployment Benefits, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All workers</th>
<th>All foreign</th>
<th>Share of foreign workers (%)</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1,608,258</td>
<td>161,923</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>36,431</td>
<td>21,431</td>
<td>12,732</td>
<td>11,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1,621,589</td>
<td>169,680</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>37,582</td>
<td>23,166</td>
<td>13,187</td>
<td>13,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1,594,027</td>
<td>160,434</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>35,928</td>
<td>21,954</td>
<td>13,373</td>
<td>12,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1,624,644</td>
<td>165,217</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>37,801</td>
<td>22,192</td>
<td>15,110</td>
<td>12,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1,644,951</td>
<td>168,748</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>39,900</td>
<td>22,702</td>
<td>16,524</td>
<td>12,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1,687,377</td>
<td>178,230</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>43,833</td>
<td>23,579</td>
<td>18,898</td>
<td>12,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1,773,425</td>
<td>188,451</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>49,506</td>
<td>22,787</td>
<td>21,431</td>
<td>12,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>1,854,201</td>
<td>199,546</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>52,863</td>
<td>23,815</td>
<td>23,301</td>
<td>12,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1,851,308</td>
<td>209,101</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>54,918</td>
<td>25,026</td>
<td>23,797</td>
<td>13,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1,985,245</td>
<td>233,588</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>56,168</td>
<td>29,285</td>
<td>26,265</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>2,209,395</td>
<td>283,711</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>63,335</td>
<td>36,285</td>
<td>31,570</td>
<td>20,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2,318,355</td>
<td>311,953</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>66,696</td>
<td>41,140</td>
<td>35,618</td>
<td>22,446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Cited with permission of Piotr Plewa, “Voluntary Return Programmes: Could They Assuage the Effects of the Economic Crises?”*

In response to these patterns of unemployment, the government has developed a voluntary return program for unemployed foreign workers (see Table 5).

### Table 5. Key Features of the Spanish Voluntary Return Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligible migrants</th>
<th>Those who worked legally and were eligible for jobless benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of origin</td>
<td>Only those countries that had social security agreements with Spain so returnees could collect a bonus upon arrival home. These 20 countries included many Latin American countries (except Bolivia), Morocco (the only African country), the Philippines, Russia, Ukraine, Canada and the United States. The EU states were excluded to ensure that their nationals did not claim departure bonuses and then returned to Spain thanks to EU free-migration agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure bonus given to the jobless worker</td>
<td>The lump sum would depend on the amount of uncollected unemployment benefits. Once all unemployment benefits are collected the migrant is no longer eligible for the program. The worker would receive 40 percent before departure and the remainder in the home country. The average payment was about €9,035.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other incentives</td>
<td>One-way ticket + €50 per person as travel expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disincentives</td>
<td>Depart within 30 days after the first portion of the departure bonus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Give up work and residence permits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not return for at least 3 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need a job offer or other reasons to qualify to return.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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The Spanish voluntary return program began in November 2008. The government estimated that 140,000 unemployed workers would be eligible to participate. By March 13, 2009, a total of 3,699 immigrants had submitted applications, a number that rose to 5,088 as of June 8 and to 6,648 as of August 5. The overwhelming majority of beneficiaries as of early June (91 percent) were from Latin America. (See Table 6.) As of June 8, a total of 3,977 immigrants had returned home.

Table 6. Top Countries of Origin for Return Program Applicants as of June 8, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Accepted Offer</th>
<th>Number of Immigrants in Spain (as of 2008)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1,749</td>
<td>427,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>284,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>147,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>121,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>116,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>50,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>46,068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gador Manzano and Yolanda Vaccaro, “Take the Money and Run: Voluntary Return Programs” (cited with permission); National Statistics Institute, Table “Population by nationality and sex by year.”

In addition to its pay-to-go program, the Spanish government supports the return program run by IOM and implemented by NGOs. The IOM program, in place for the last six years, covers the cost of transportation and 450 euros for related expenses. IOM assists migrants who cannot sustain themselves in Spain but cannot afford travelling expenses to return home. In 2008, 1,592 migrants returned from Spain under this program. Bolivians were the top users (474), followed by Argentineans (216), and Brazilians (193). Between January and mid-July 2009, 684 people returned under the IOM program, including 141 Bolivians, 89 Argentineans, 78 Uruguayans, 71 Brazilians, and 71 Ecuadorians. The program has generally not been used by immigrants from Morocco and Romania: no Moroccans have participated and only a very few Romanians have done so (73 in 2008 and eight in 2009).

2. Japan

As part of a wider emergency strategy to combat rising unemployment, Japan in April 2009 implemented a repatriation program for Latin Americans of Japanese descent (Nikkeijin), offering money if they and their family members left the country. It is a voluntary pay-to-go program for the Latin American Nikkeijin to go home if they consider their job prospects in Japan to be dim and are willing to return to Latin America. As seen in Table 7, the majority of Nikkeijin from Latin America were from Brazil; others were from Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru.

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142 Private correspondence with IOM Madrid (August 24, 2009).
143 Private correspondence with Piotr Plewa of the University of Delaware (August 15, 2009).
### Table 7. Size of the Nikkeijin Population from Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>3,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>5,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>286,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>2,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>55,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Number of Nikkeijin in each country is based on Japan Foreign Affairs Ministry estimates. **Source:** Naoto Higuchu, “Brazilian Migration to Japan: Trends, Modalities, and Impact” (paper presented at the expert group meeting on international migration and development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, February 27, 2006), http://huwu.org/esa/population/meetings/lttMigLAC/P11_Higuchi.pdf

Since the economic recession, there has been rising unemployment, especially among Nikkeijin workers.

- Between November 2008 and January 2009, 9,296 foreigners were newly registered as searching for employment. This number is an eleven-fold increase from the same period the previous year.\(^{144}\)
- One of the reasons behind the higher unemployment among Nikkeijin is because many hold part-time or non-regular jobs affected by the recession.\(^{145}\) Non-regular employees include temporary workers, those on contracts, and part-time workers. Many Brazilian Nikkeijin work under temporary contracts in the automobile, heavy, and electronic industries. They are not employed directly, but sent to labor contractors in Japan and dispatched to the employers. As seen in Figure 4, non-regular employment declined by 420,000 jobs between Q4 in 2008 and Q2 in 2009.
- Another factor resulting in Nikkeijin unemployment is their concentration in manufacturing. Japan has 12 million manufacturing workers. The sector employs many foreigners, such as Chinese trainees (who are paid less than the minimum wage) and Nikkeijin (paid regular wages).\(^{146}\) The Japanese manufacturing sector has suffered from the decrease in global demand for advanced manufacturing products such as cars, information technology, and machinery.\(^{147}\)

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\(^{145}\) Ibid.


Japan’s Repatriation Program

From the start of the program on April 1, 2009 through July 9, 2009, 6,981 Nikkeijin applied for repatriation financial assistance.148

Table 8. Key Features of the Japanese Repatriation Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligible migrants</th>
<th>Only Nikkeijin from Latin American and their family members, who had entered Japan and started employment prior to April 1, 2009. The program is restricted to those with legal resident status.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of origin</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure bonus given to the jobless workers</td>
<td>The plan offers the applicant $3,000 for airfare and $2,000 for each dependent, and immigrants can keep the amount they do not use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Those who are receiving unemployment benefits will receive an additional set amount: If more than 30 days remain for unemployment benefits, the individual will receive $1,000 dollars; if more than 60 days remain, the individual will receive $2,000 dollars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other incentives</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disincentives</td>
<td>No reentry under the same residence permit/visa for three years. (They could, however, return as tourists or apply for a residence permit/visa other than the one possessed at the time of government repatriation assistance.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.149

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The Public Employment Security Office, better known as Hello Work, administers the repatriation program. Six hundred Hello Work facilities are located in major municipalities across Japan to offer job consultation and assistance to individuals, regardless of nationality.

Starting in July 2009, the Japanese government will also pay for foreign trainees and technical interns (mostly from China and South Korea) to return to their countries if their employers cannot do so because they have gone bankrupt.

Beyond the repatriation program, the Japanese government also announced that it will launch a number of immigrant integration measures to help jobless foreigners affected by the recession. These include offering free Japanese-language courses, enhancing the counseling and assistance capacities of agencies that serve foreign workers, and offering vocational training and job counseling to foreigners who wish to continue working in Japan.¹⁵⁰

All told, the Japanese government has created a $16 million Emergency Human Resources Development and Employment Support Fund to support the migrant-related employment measures taken in response to the economic crisis, including the repatriation program.¹⁵¹

**Controversies Surrounding the Repatriation Program**

After constitutional questions were raised about a permanent ban on reentry, the return program bars repatriated Nikkeijin from returning for three years.

Proponents of immigration reform in Japan argue that the repatriation program is short-sighted, especially given Japan's dropping birth rates and aging population.¹⁵² In fact, the former head of immigration in Japan has proposed that the government seek to increase immigrants' share of the population to 10 percent, or approximately 10 million people, by around 2060.¹⁵³

3. **Czech Republic**

As unemployment grew from 6.0 percent in January 2008 to 6.8 percent in December 2008, the government responded with a voluntary return program that targets legally present non-

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¹⁵² The Japanese population has been falling since 2005, and its working-age population could drop by a third by 2050.

EU workers who have lost their job due to the economic downturn and are willing to return home but unable to cover the costs. The rationale for the program was that temporary workers who lose their jobs are at a greater risk of falling into poverty, and thus might resort to forging documents and paying bribes to obtain work permits. The program, the first pay-to-go plan in Eastern Europe, started on February 16, 2009 and now is in its second phase (July 24, 2009 to December 15, 2009).

Since the fall of communism, the Czech Republic has experienced a transition from being mostly an immigrant-sending country to becoming a sending-receiving-transit country. The country’s total foreign population increased 2.5 times, from 158,600 in 1995 to 392,300 in 2007, and the size of the foreign labor force doubled (from 111,9000 to 240,200). In slightly more than a decade, the shares of the non-Czech population (1.5 percent in 1995 and 3.8 percent in 2007) and labor force (2.2 percent in 1995 and 4.6 percent in 2007) more than doubled as well.
While Czech citizens moved on to Western Europe in search of better working and living opportunities, migrants from the former Soviet Union and Asia moved to the Czech Republic to take jobs in automobile manufacturing, construction, and agriculture; or used the country as a stepping-stone on the way further west.

Statistics provided by the Czech Ministry of Labor and Piotr Plewa, author of *A False Start For Czech Foreign Worker Admissions?*, paint a picture of a rapidly changing immigrant labor market.

According to the Ministry of Labor, in January 2009 there were 272,335 foreigners employed in the Czech Republic, of whom 124,850 (or 45.8 percent) held work permits, 133,324 (or 48.9 percent) were exempt from work permits due to European Union/European Economic Area or Swiss citizenship, and another 14,181 (5 percent) were exempt under other regulations.

The arrival of temporary workers from Asia, in particular from Vietnam, challenged Ukraine's dominance as the Czech Republic's top source for non-EU foreign workers. Citizens of Vietnam moved from being the tenth largest (January 2007) to the second largest (March 2008) non-EU foreign worker community in the Czech Republic, after Ukrainians.

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155 Piotr Plewa, *A False Start For Czech Foreign Worker Admissions?*
156 The European Economic Area is comprised of the European Union plus Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein.
The immigration of Vietnamese to the Czech Republic has deep roots in international aid programs available to communist countries during the communist era. Under these programs, Vietnamese were invited to the Czech Republic as early as the 1970s and 1980s, their ranks expanding via social networks.157

- On the eve of the voluntary return program’s introduction in January 2009, the top three sending countries for the 124,590 contract workers employed in the Czech Republic were: Ukraine (58 percent), Vietnam (10 percent), and Mongolia (9 percent). By July 2009, the number of workers on valid permits dropped 22 percent to 97,665. The decline in work permits reflected a new Czech policy of not renewing expiring work permits and rejecting new permit applications from abroad.

- The Vietnamese saw the largest decline among work permits holders between January and July 2009, falling from 12,296 to 3,935 or by nearly 70 percent. Mongolians were much less likely to work as well (- 52 percent). At the same time the share of work permits granted to Ukrainians fell only 12 percent.

- The decline in work permits reflects curbs on renewals of expired permits, but also curbs on new workers. The data do not allow us to differentiate between these two factors, yet given the significant presence of Vietnamese workers in the country, it is likely that a large proportion lost their work permits while in the Czech Republic.

- The first phase of the voluntary return program began in February 2009 and was slated to continue until 2,000 return bonuses had been issued. Since then, the government has subsequently launched a second phase, which will continue until mid-December.

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157 Dušan Drbohlav, “The Czech Republic: From Liberal Policy to EU Membership.”
Table 9. Key Features of the Czech Voluntary Return Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligible migrants</th>
<th>Non-EU legal migrant workers who lost their jobs or did not get the renewal of their work permit. To be eligible, a worker must have a valid residence permit and cannot be subject to deportation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
<td>Children under age 15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of origin</td>
<td>Outside of the European Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure bonus given to the jobless worker</td>
<td>Phase I (began on February 16, 2009): €500 repatriation bonus per adult and €250 for child; Phase II (began on July 24, 2009): €300 repatriation bonus per adult and €150 for child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other incentives</td>
<td>Free transportation to the country of origin; Pre-departure and transit assistance; Temporary accommodations from the time of registration and the departure in Phase I and for pre-departure night in Phase II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disincentives</td>
<td>Give up their Czech documents, including the documents necessary to petition for permanent residence in the future. Have to apply at Aliens Police offices, bring a translator if the applicant does not speak Czech.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quota: Phase I: 2,000 successful applicants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- While Mongolians represent only 9 percent of Czech contract workers and Uzbeki workers only 3 percent, they dominate program participation. Of the 1,871 people who applied for the program during Phase 1, Mongolians accounted for two thirds (1,220), followed by Uzbekistan (287 or 15 percent).158 (See Table 10.)

---

158 Data from the Department of Asylum and Migration Policy, Ministry of the Interior Czech Republic
Table 10. Number of Registrations (Phase I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Registrations</th>
<th>Share of Total Registrations (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,871</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 percent</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Data from the Department of Asylum and Migration Policy, Ministry of the Interior Czech Republic.

In contrast, participation among the Vietnamese has been low relative to their share of temporary workers. Only 239 Vietnamese migrants (13 percent of total applicants) registered during the first phase, and 227 have left. Low turnout might be explained by a few factors: bleak opportunities in Vietnam; self-employment and employment in self-contained ethnic labor market niches (e.g., restaurants and beauty parlors); willingness to take jobs that were not attractive to Czech workers such as domestic help and agriculture; high debts incurred to obtain a work visa; and existing family and social networks in other EU countries.

Ukrainians, who are the largest group of foreign workers on permits, have been even less likely to participate in the program.

As Table 11 shows, more applications were made at the program’s start, perhaps in response to the 2,000 numerical cap. Experts suggest that earlier applicants were likely to be migrants who were planning to leave the Czech Republic anyway.159

159 Personal communication with Piotr Plewa.
Table 11. Number of Return Program Registrations by Week (Phase I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2009 Period</th>
<th>Applications Filed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 16-20</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 23-27</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2-6</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 9-13</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16-20</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23-27</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3-April 3</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6-10</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13-17</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20-24</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 27-30</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 4-7</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11-15</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 18-22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25-29</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1-5</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8-12</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 15-19</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22-26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29-July 3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6-10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13-17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20-24</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,871</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Data from the Department of Asylum and Migration Policy, Ministry of the Interior Czech Republic.

Of the 1,871 migrants who registered for the program, 1,844 have already left the country.

**IOM’s Role in Czech Return Programs**

The origin of the Czech voluntary return programs goes back to 1998 when the Czech Ministry of Interior authorized return assistance for rejected asylum seekers. A year later, IOM joined forces with the Ministry of Interior and began co-sponsoring another voluntary return program that assists unauthorized migrants other than failed asylum applicants. There now are three voluntary return programs operating in the Czech Republic for:

1. Rejected asylum seekers (administered by the Ministry of Interior);
2. Unauthorized migrants (administered by the Ministry of Interior and IOM); and,
3. Legal migrant workers (administered by the Ministry of Interior and IOM).

According to IOM Prague, IOM assisted 204 unauthorized migrants in 2007, 123 in 2008, and 189 in the first seven months of 2009, in addition to the 1,871 migrants who participated in the voluntary return program for legal migrant workers.\(^\text{160}\)

\(^\text{160}\) IOM Prague, private correspondence.
V. Remittances: Overlooked Trends

A. Background

Remittances sent by migrants have grown dramatically in recent years — the result of growing international migration, improving wages in the sectors where many migrants work, efforts to promote the use of formal remittance channels (i.e., banks and money transfer operators rather than cash couriers and hawala or similar networks), and better accounting of remittances. However, remittances are a lagging indicator of economic distress. As the economic crisis has spread beyond its origins — as a fairly localized construction and real estate bust in the United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain — and as migrants have faced rising unemployment, remittance flows have slowed more broadly. Just as the economic crisis has taken an uneven toll across regions and countries, shifts in remittances have also varied by region and country.


In some respects, the economic crisis caught many remittance analysts off-guard. Traditionally, remittances have increased when migrant-origin countries faced economic crisis. This was the case during the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. As the International Monetary Fund (IMF) observed during the peak of the most recent boom:

> “Remittances are argued to have a tendency to move countercyclically with the GDP in recipient countries, as migrant workers are expected to increase support to their family members during down cycles of economic activity back home so as to help them compensate for lost family income due to unemployment or other crisis-induced reasons. Wherever true, such a countercyclicality enables remittances to serve as a stabilizer that helps smooth out large fluctuations in the national income over different phases of the business cycle.”

Other studies have also noted the tendency of remittances to respond positively to political and humanitarian crises in developing countries. These observations led some analysts to predict that remittances would continue rising — if more modestly — during the economic crisis.


However, as recently as last fall, few analysts were aware how deep and synchronized across countries the economic crisis would eventually prove to be. In retrospect, the IMF study cited above includes an extraordinarily prescient warning:

“An often overlooked fact in the literature is that remittances should also respond to the state of economic activity in the host countries. Even if remittances move countercyclically with the output in the home countries of migrant workers, the cycles in home and host economies may move together in sync, thereby making it difficult for migrant workers employed in a crisis-struck economy to help out family members facing similar conditions back home. In fact, the remittance flows themselves may contribute to the transmission of the effects of a contraction in the host economy to the recipient economy through the reductions in the amounts remitted by migrant workers in a synchronized fashion or with a phase difference.”

This is, of course, what has occurred over the past year. The recession spread — with a lag — from developed countries to developing countries. Remittances, along with trade, foreign direct investment, and private-equity flows were among the principal transmission channels. However, as this report illustrates in a later section, remittances fell less dramatically than other financial flows, becoming an increasingly important infusion of foreign funding to immigrant-sending countries as public and private lending and other forms of foreign private investment declined more sharply.

B. Remittance Inflows

In 2008, remittances to developing countries continued to grow in line with annual growth rates recorded over the past decade. Between 2007 and 2008, remittances to developing countries increased 15 percent to a total of US$328 billion. The average annual growth rate between 1999 and 2007 was 18 percent and over the period, year-on-year growth ranged from 9 percent in 1999-2000 to 25 percent in both 2002-2003 and 2006-2007 (see Figure 1).

163 Sayan, “Business Cycles and Workers’ Remittances.”
164 Bilateral aid is often included among these flows as well; however, since official assistance is typically budgeted and governments are now entering their first new budget cycles since the start of the recession, it is not clear how official assistance will respond. Many developed country governments – notably the United States and United Kingdom – have implemented fiscal stimulus packages to counteract the effect of the recession. These expenditures rarely include assistance to other countries. On the other hand, developed-country governments have committed unprecedented resources to international financial institutions (especially the International Monetary Fund) to combat the crisis in developing countries. As government debt rises, the capacity to finance deficits will diminish in the coming years and some governments likely will cut official development assistance to poor countries. This occurred in Japan following its banking crisis in the late 1980s and Japan’s foreign-aid disbursements have not since recovered their pre-crisis levels. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, “DAC and Non-DAC OECD Donors Responding to Global Development Challenges at a Time of Crisis,” DAC High Level Meeting Action Plan, May 2009, http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_33721_42851542_1_1_1_1,00.html; and Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, and Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
Between 2000 and 2006, remittances grew at a similar pace across Latin America and the Caribbean (collectively referred to as the LAC region), East Asia, South Asia, Europe, and Central Asia. (Growth in the two other world regions: the Middle East and North Africa region, and Sub-Saharan Africa was much more modest). Differences emerged with slower growth in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2006 and 2007, largely reflecting the slowdown in the US construction industry; and growth was nearly flat between 2007 and 2008. In 2007-2008, growth also slowed in Europe and Central Asia as the recession spread to Western Europe and Russia.

On the other hand, remittances continue to grow rapidly to East and South Asia (about half of East Asia’s total goes to China; and about three-quarters of South Asia’s total goes to India). Notably, in almost every year between 2000 and 2006, the Latin America and Caribbean region was the leading remittance recipient (with the exception of 2002, reflecting the 2001-2002 US recession). Since 2006, however, the LAC region has been surpassed by both East and South Asia. In terms of remittance receipts, flows to Asia are rising as those to Latin America and Europe stagnate. Recent growth in remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa has also slowed noticeably.

When countries are classified by income level (see Figure 3), several important trends in remittances flows become evident:\textsuperscript{165}

1. Almost all of the growth in remittance flows in recent years has been toward middle-income countries;
2. Growth has not been very strong to low-income countries (although it is possible that this is simply an artifact of data quality or higher use of informal remittance channels);
3. Among middle-income countries, growth has been more dramatic to lower middle-income countries (e.g., remittances to India, China, and the Philippines) and remittance flows to these countries continued to grow in 2008;
4. Among middle-income countries, remittances have grown more modestly to upper middle-income countries (e.g., United States to Mexico or Germany to Turkey) and increases in flows to these countries slowed dramatically in 2008.

\textsuperscript{165} According to World Bank income classifications, low-income countries had a gross national income per capita (GNI, Atlas method) of $975 or less (Haiti, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Myanmar, for instance); lower middle-income countries had a GNI per capita of $976 to $3,855 (China, India, Pakistan, Morocco, Jordan, and Paraguay, for instance); upper middle-income countries had a GNI per capita of $3,856 to $11,905 (Mexico, Turkey, Lebanon, Algeria, Colombia, and Malaysia, for instance); and high-income countries had a GNI per capita of $11,906 or more.
Figure 3. Remittance Flows by Country Income, 2000 to 2008

At the country level, the top remittance-receiving developing countries in 2008 were (in descending order): India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Nigeria, Egypt, Romania, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. These are largely the same countries that received the most remittances in 2007 (India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Nigeria, Romania, Egypt, Morocco, and Bangladesh); however, in 2008, Bangladesh surpassed Morocco as the ninth largest remittance recipient and Vietnam jumped ahead of Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Serbia from 15th to tenth place. Morocco fell from ninth place in 2007 to 13th (behind Pakistan and Indonesia).

C. Remittance Outflows

Although data on remittance outflows are incomplete, several clear trends emerge from the data that are available. The principal source countries of remittances have also changed. In 2000, the United States was the source of nearly one-quarter of all remittances, but its share has fallen dramatically, to about 10 percent in 2008. By contrast, the Russian Federation was the origin of less than 1 percent of remittances sent in 2000, compared to 6 percent of remittances sent in 2008. While improvements in accounting and tracking remittance flows may explain some of these changing trends, they certainly reflect real phenomena: Growing global migration and the increasingly diverse destinations of migration — including Russia.

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166 This list excludes developed countries. If developed countries were included, France, Spain, Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom would be on this list. (In 2008, France, Spain, and Germany combined received more remittances than China, for instance.)
The next tier of remittance-sending countries each now accounts for about 4 percent of the world total. Saudi Arabia’s share has declined from about 12 percent, while Switzerland and Germany declined more modestly from around 6 percent (see Figure 5). By contrast, Spain's share has risen from about 2 percent, although it declined somewhat in 2008.

Overall, the story is one of increasingly diverse origin countries of remittance flows. In 2000, five traditional countries of immigration — the United States, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Switzerland, and France — accounted for about half of all remittances sent worldwide. By 2008, the number of countries that accounted for half of all remittances sent worldwide had grown to 18. And the list included a diverse group of countries (in descending order of volume of remittance outflows): the United States, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Malaysia, China, Oman, the United Kingdom, Norway, Japan, France, the Czech Republic, and Kuwait.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ Several major countries of immigration do not report data on remittance outflows, notably Canada, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.
Figure 5. Share of Global Remittances from Select Countries, 2000-2008

Source: World Bank, Remittances data, 2009

D. Remittances are Declining to Some Countries, Not to Others

The recession has had an uneven impact on remittance sending across countries. Some countries that attracted large numbers of migrant workers in recent years have been severely affected by the economic downturn, including the United States, Spain, Ireland, Russia, and the United Kingdom. As migrants in these countries lose their jobs and deplete their savings, remittances have begun to slow. Developing countries with diasporas concentrated in these countries are most at risk. As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean countries have seen remittances slow or even decline.

A look at a sample of top remittance recipients (both in terms of total value and as a share of GDP) where preliminary 2009 data are available from Central Banks shows how trends have evolved in the first few months of 2009. Figure 6 shows how remittances have evolved over recent years; for each country, Figure 7 shows the change in remittance flows to date in 2009 (compared to a similar period in 2008) and the major destination countries of emigrants.

According to Ratha (2003) remittances are composed of three items in a country’s balance of payments: compensation of employees, workers remittances, and migrants transfers. “Workers remittances” are current private transfers from migrant workers who are considered residents of the host country to recipients in their country of origin. “Compensation of employees” includes wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by individuals in economies other than those in which they are resident. Employees, in this context, include seasonal or other short-term workers who are in the host country for less than a year. “Migrants’ transfers” are the net worth of migrants that are transferred from one country to another at the time of migration (for a period of at least one year).

Figure 6. Remittances to Many Developing Countries Have Slowed (annual growth, 2005 to 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annual change in remittance flows, 2005 to 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 2008-09 data compare January to June totals for Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, and Turkey. January to July totals for El Salvador, Honduras, and Pakistan; first quarter totals for Poland, Moldova, and Jordan; and first semester totals for Ecuador. 

Source: Migration Policy Institute tabulations of Central Bank data. 

---

Table 1. Change in Remittance Flows to Major Recipient Countries and Main Destinations of Emigrants, 2008-2009 (year to date)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008-09 YTD percent change in remittances</th>
<th>Main destination countries of emigrants from the country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>+23%</td>
<td>India, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>+16%</td>
<td>India, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>+3%</td>
<td>United States, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>United States, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>United States, Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>United States, Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>United States, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>France, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>Spain, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>United Kingdom, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>-37%</td>
<td>Russia, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-43%</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 2008-09 data compare January to June totals for Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, and Turkey. January to July totals for El Salvador, Honduras, and Pakistan; first quarter totals for Poland, Moldova, and Jordan; and first semester totals for Ecuador.


This sample shows that countries have experienced differing remittance “shocks.” Below, we examine some of the stories behind these shocks in greater detail, grouping countries by world region.

**South and East Asia**

As the aggregate data arrayed earlier suggest, South and East Asia have been spared the worst of the crisis and — although remittances are expected to slow somewhat in 2009 — they continue growing. Compared to the same period last year, remittances are growing at a rate of 23 percent to Pakistan (faster than during the past three years), 16 percent to Bangladesh (still down substantially from 2008), and 3 percent to the Philippines (also down substantially from last year).

These trends are probably explained by the destination countries to which many Pakistani, Filipino, and Bangladeshi expatriates migrate — notably the Persian Gulf states — as well as the occupations where they are concentrated (i.e., health and elder care for Filipinos) and the diversity of their destinations. For Bangladesh and Pakistan, Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal (2009) note that since the crisis began these two countries have become more reliant on
remittances from the Gulf relative to remittances from the United States (see Figure 7).\textsuperscript{170} It is unlikely, however, that this shift represents a long-term trend. Once the US and European economies recover, remittances from the West to South and East Asia will likely pick up again — the large majority of Bangladeshi and Pakistani migrants in the West have legal residence and are better skilled than other immigrant groups. Their earnings potential exceeds that of their lesser-skilled counterparts in the Gulf. However, the experience may leave a lasting impression on countries such as Bangladesh and the Philippines that maintain complex labor-export programs. The Philippines has long been a leader in diversifying the destinations where Filipino contract labor is sent — other countries in the region (and perhaps elsewhere in the world) will likely follow suit.

\textbf{Figure 7. Rate of Remittance Increase from Gulf Countries to Bangladesh and Pakistan, 2008-2009}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.png}
\caption{Rate of Remittance Increase from Gulf Countries to Bangladesh and Pakistan, 2008-2009}
\end{figure}

\textit{Sources:} Central banks of the respective countries in Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal (2009).

\textbf{Sub-Saharan Africa}

The data in Figure 8 and Table 1 paint a mixed — and admittedly incomplete — portrait of the impact of the economic crisis on remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa. Data on the region are notoriously deficient — and for remittances more so: Banking systems are underdeveloped, public access to banks is low, and the incidence of informal transfer mechanisms is high.

Analysis of the presumed remitting behavior of the African diaspora also yields inconsistent conclusions. African expatriates (most reside within Africa) are concentrated at both extremes of the skill spectrum. Many highly skilled Africans have legal permanent residence in Europe and North America. At the same time, many (especially West) African countries have a growing less-educated and often illegally resident diaspora in Europe; many were attracted to Spain’s booming construction and agricultural industries in recent years and these migrants are now extremely vulnerable. Finally, the African diaspora community in the West that arrived as refugees is also likely to be vulnerable to the downturn.

Data from the Central Bank of Kenya show that remittances have declined by 11 percent in the first six months of 2009 relative to the same period last year. (The spike in remittances recorded in 2007 may be related to Kenya’s general election held in December 2007.) A recent analysis by the Director of Research at Kenya’s Central Bank concludes that remittances to the country are highly cyclical and may actually aggravate the impact of business-cycle fluctuations.  

Cape Verde is a small archipelago off the West African coast whose past and present are intrinsically linked to international migration. Dr. Jørgen Carling of the Norwegian Peace Research Institute estimates that there are 460,000 Cape Verdeans on the islands and 500,000 overseas — including 265,000 in the United States. About one-tenth of the country’s income (9.7 percent) comes from remittances from the diaspora.

Data from Cape Verde’s Central Bank on the evolution of remittance flows to the islands initially appear to contrast with global trends: they declined for two consecutive years between 2005 and 2007 before registering annual increases in 2008 and to date in 2009. Through June 2009, remittances were up 6 percent compared to the first half of 2008. On closer examination, it is clear that exchange-rate fluctuations are behind this trend.

Cape Verde’s currency, the escudo, is pegged to the euro. However, since about half of the country’s diaspora resides in the United States remittances are responsive to changes in the dollar-euro exchange rate. According to the Central Bank of Cape Verde, “the evolution of remittances in 2008 essentially reflects the significant decline in remittances from the United States (-11.8 percent in 2008) due to the depreciation of the dollar in the first semester of 2008. As a result, remittances from the United States slowed 27.9 percent while in the second semester of the year, as the dollar appreciated, remittances increased by 7.3 percent. On the other hand, remittances from the euro zone grew 4.1 percent in 2008 and displayed a regular trend throughout the year.”

Moreover, although remittances from the United States appear to have picked up in 2009, this is misleading because of the strengthening of the dollar relative to the euro compared to the same time last year. As Figure 8 illustrates, whereas remittances jumped roughly in line with the exchange rate in 2005-2006, the increase in remittances from the United States in 2009 has been much modest relative to the appreciation of the dollar. This suggests that Cape Verdeans in the United States are not behaving like they have in the past — perhaps because of the recession they cannot take advantage of dollar-euro exchange-rate fluctuations and repatriate earnings.

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Europe and Central Asia
Remittances to the sampled countries in the Europe and Central Asia region — Moldova, Poland, and Turkey — have fallen off sharply in 2009. Remittances were down 43 percent to Turkey in the first six months of 2009, 37 percent to Moldova in the first quarter of 2009, and down 33 percent to Poland also in the first quarter.

The main countries where Moldovans work — Russia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey — have all been hit hard by the recession, so the drop is not particularly surprising. Similarly, job losses among Polish immigrants in the United Kingdom, along with modest outmigration from the United Kingdom, explain the drop in remittances to Poland. However, the surprisingly large drop in remittances to Turkey is unexpected given that France and Germany — two economies that have weathered the recession fairly well — are main destinations for Turkish emigrants and host large Turkish diasporas.

Latin America and the Caribbean
As a result of its close ties to the United States and Spain — two economies that have arguably been among the worst hit by the recession — the global economic crisis spread quickly and early to the Latin America and the Caribbean region. Two of the most vulnerable countries, Mexico and Ecuador, have experienced two consecutive years of declining remittances.

Mexico and Central America began observing slowing remittance flows as early as 2007 when US residential construction collapsed. (Upward of 95 percent of Mexicans residing outside of Mexico are in the United States.) Remittances to Mexico declined 4 percent in 2008 and to date in 2009 they have declined an additional 12 percent. In total, remittance

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flows to Mexico are about 18 percent below their 2006 peak. The average amount of remittance sent to Mexico has also declined from about $343 per transaction in January to June 2007 and 2008 to about $329 in January to June 2009.

El Salvador and Honduras — two small Central American countries that are highly dependent on remittances (which account for 18.2 percent and 21.5 percent respectively of their GDPs) have both registered declines on the order of 11 percent to date in 2009.

Remittances to Honduras have declined, but the most recent data, for July 2009, show a surprising upswing — up 18 percent from June 2009. By contrast, remittances to El Salvador — a country whose diaspora in the United States has a similar demographic and labor force profile to the Honduran diaspora — continued to decline (see Figure 9). July 2009 is the first month in at least two years when remittances to El Salvador and Honduras have moved in opposite directions. Presumably this modest upswing in remittances to Honduras is, at least in part, a result of Hondurans in the United States sending extra support home to their families following that country’s political crisis which began in late June 2009 and the subsequent instability. (About 95 percent of Hondurans abroad and 88 percent of Salvadorans reside in the United States.)

**Figure 9. Year-on-Year Growth of Remittances to Honduras and El Salvador, January 2005 to July 2009**

Compared to migration from Mexico and Central America — which is overwhelmingly oriented toward the United States or, in the latter case, within the region as well — migrants from Ecuador are divided between the United States, Spain, and several other European

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countries in smaller numbers (notably Italy and the United Kingdom). While under normal circumstances, this greater degree of diversity in expatriate destinations would reduce Ecuador's exposure to crises in any single host country of Ecuadorean expatriates, it just so happens that both of the major destinations of Ecuadorean emigrants have been severely hit by the economic crisis.

Beyond Ecuador's high degree of exposure to the US and Spanish economies via its migrant workers, Ecuador's economy is officially dollarized. The US dollar is the country's official currency, allowing the country little room for currency devaluation or fiscal loosening to provide incentives for remittance sending. As in Cape Verde, dollar-euro exchange-rate fluctuations have adverse impacts on the value of flows: When the dollar gains value, remittances from Europe lose value.

As of the second quarter of 2009, remittances to Ecuador from the euro zone (of which 80 to 90 percent are from Spain) fell much more dramatically than remittances from the United States — an understandable finding given that unemployment among Latin American immigrants in Spain (26.6 percent in the first quarter of 2009) is more than twice as high as among Hispanics in the United States (10.7 percent in the first quarter of 2009). However, when we take into account the euro-dollar exchange rate a somewhat more nuanced story emerges (see Figure 11). First, the apparent collapse in remittance flows from the euro zone that occurred between the first and fourth quarters of 2008 coincided with the dramatic weakening of the euro relative to the dollar. As a result, euro-denominated

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176 Spain, Encuesta de Población Activa, data provided to MPI by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística; United States, US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
remittances over the period converted into progressively fewer dollars. This exchange rate effect makes the fall in remittances from the euro zone appear more dramatic than we would have observed were Ecuador a euro economy. Second, the apparent recovery of remittance flows from the euro zone reflects the strengthening of the euro to the dollar in the second quarter of 2009. The pre-conversion amount sent by Ecuadoreans in Europe recovered less than the dollar-denominated remittance flow data suggest.

**Figure 11. Year-on-Year Percent Change in Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate**

![Graph showing the year-on-year percent change in Euro-Dollar exchange rate from 1/1/2008 to 7/1/2009.]


**Middle East and North Africa**

The evolution of remittances from our sample of countries in the Middle East and North Africa region illustrates many of the underlying dynamics behind global trends. Remittances are extremely important to the economies of Jordan and Morocco — accounting for 21.9 percent of Jordan’s GDP and 9.0 percent of Morocco’s. Remittances to Jordan declined in the first quarter of 2009 — although by just 1 percent. By contrast, Morocco has experienced two consecutive years of declining remittance flows (-4 percent in 2008 and -12 percent during the first six months of 2009). Presumably, the destinations of emigrants from these two countries explain much of the difference. Jordanians abroad reside in such diverse countries as the West Bank and Gaza, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Germany, Oman, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, and Sweden, while Moroccans abroad are concentrated in Western Europe — notably France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium.

Non-Resident Deposits

Beyond remittances, another important financial flow to some developing countries from migrants abroad takes the form of non-resident deposits. Non-resident deposits are the domestic currency savings of foreign residents. In most cases, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish the nationality or national origin of the account holder. However, we assume that in most developing countries foreign residents with no ties to the country have few motivations to hold domestic currency. Expatriates, by contrast, incur substantial liabilities in the domestic currency (i.e., support to family members, cash for periodic visits home, savings for retirement or investment in the home country, etc.). As a result, analysts commonly assume that most non-resident deposits are held by the diaspora. (In some cases, such as in India, there are special accounts available only to Non-Resident Indians [NRIs] that are reported separately.178)

Similar to remittances, non-resident deposits improve a country’s balance of payments position (i.e., its net of assets and liabilities with the rest of the world) and often respond to both currency fluctuations and political or economic crises in the home country. When the domestic currency loses value relative to the destination-country currency, expatriates often choose to take advantage of the favorable exchange rate to convert more of their income or savings into the country of origin currency.

But non-resident deposits are distinct from remittances in other respects. Remittances are allocated between consumption on the one hand, and savings and investment on the other hand. (Typically, with a larger share geared toward consumption.) But non-resident deposits are savings. As a result, they represent future investment or consumption — which in turn reflects an individual’s longer-term plans (as well as immediate consumption needs of the migrant in the destination country). So, while remittances tend to respond to immediate needs of family members, non-resident deposits reflect expectations. An increase in non-resident deposits would reflect expatriates’ expectations of future investment or consumption in the origin country (i.e., an increase in confidence regarding that country’s future).

According to recent World Bank analysis, non-resident deposits fell in 2008, but have since recovered slightly in India and the Dominican Republic (see Figure 11). However, non-resident deposits in Mexico do not appear to have recovered to date.

E. The Importance of Remittances Relative to Other Financial Flows

Although remittances are declining in some places, they are still increasing in importance relative to other financial flows. Because of the nature of remittances — being intra-family obligations more than business decisions — they have fallen less than other capital flows. For example, World Bank analysts expect remittances to developing countries to contract by about 7 percent in 2009 compared to foreign direct investment, which fell 57 percent according to preliminary data. This surprising resilience of remittance flows has been reported. However, the decline in remittance flows is in line with the expected drop in world trade — which the World Trade Organization (WTO) predicts will range between 9 and 10 percent (see Figure 12).

179 According to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, foreign direct investment (FDI) is any financial investment by which a person or entity acquires a lasting interest in, and a degree of influence over the management of, a business enterprise in a foreign country. In addition to applying additional resources to productive use, FDI is an important source of foreign currency for many developing countries (along with remittances, exports, and official development assistance). Foreign currency allows countries to pay for imports from abroad which, presumably, improve their quality of life.


**Family and Household Level**

On the family level, some families and communities are becoming more dependent on remittances than ever before. However, household income and consumption data are available only through household surveys so there is very little data illustrating this phenomenon for 2009. A recent survey conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank of immigrants in the United States from Latin America and the Caribbean who had sent remittances is the only resource that we identified describing the impacts of the financial crisis on remittances at the household level. The data and analysis in this section draws exclusively on the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) report.  


The survey estimates that Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic will be most adversely affected by remittance declines and that in each of these three countries, between 50,000 and 100,000 households will be affected by slowing remittance flows.

In response to the economic crisis, the survey finds migrants have had to change their behaviors — most often by restricting expenditures or tapping savings (see Table 1). Lowering day-to-day expenses has been the main mechanism for coping with the crisis (35 percent). Many migrants have looked for alternative solutions, such as taking a second job (21 percent), or seeking a second job (11 percent). Migrants with higher incomes (US$20,000 and above) were the most likely to have had to limit their expenses, while migrants with lower incomes have been more focused on looking for a second job or a new job to increase their earnings.  

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182 In September 2009, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) will release preliminary national-level data on foreign direct investment flows in the first two quarters of 2009 enabling this line of analysis on the national level.


184 Ibid.
### Table 2. How Migrant Remitters Are Coping with the Economic Downturn

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies Remitters Are Using to Cope with Recession</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower spending</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look for a second job</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to a cheaper house</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look for a new job</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refinance mortgage</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depend on savings</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to sell some possessions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give house to the bank</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declare bankruptcy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unemployment in major destination countries is having a measurable impact on the sending of remittances. Among migrants in the labor force, 40 percent are sending less money than in 2008 and among the unemployed, only 25 percent continue to remit.\(^{185}\) However, a small group of people continue to send money, despite having lost their jobs. When the authors compared data from the 2009 survey to survey data from 2008, they find that as the crisis continues and unemployment increases, the percentage of people unable to remit also increases: in October 2008, 40 percent of those unemployed were remitting, by June 2009 the percentage drops to 25 percent.

### Table 3. Differences in Remittance Sending, 2008 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sending less than previous year</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending more than previous year</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending the same as previous year</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**National Level**

Migration Policy Institute analysis of the year-to-date change in remittance flows and exports for a number of developing countries show that exports have declined more dramatically than remittances for most (see Figure 14). Moldova and Turkey appear to be exceptions in this respect, but this divergence is likely a result of the extraordinarily high share of remittances in Moldova’s GDP and their relatively low share in Turkey’s total output. In other words, Moldova is highly dependent on remittances whereas remittances are much less important to Turkey’s economy.

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\(^{185}\) Ibid.
In Pakistan, Cape Verde, and the Philippines, remittances and exports have moved in opposite directions, and in all three cases remittances continue to grow while exports have declined. In Bangladesh alone both remittances and exports continue to grow.

Finally, for two major countries of emigration and where data are available — Mexico and Philippines — we compare how remittances, exports and foreign direct investment have evolved during 2009 relative to the same period in 2008. The data present a more nuanced view of the conventional wisdom that remittances are a more stable source of external finance than the other two capital flows (see Figure 15). Migration and remittances are certainly less volatile (i.e., fluctuate less), but they are also a lagging indicator of economic distress. As a result, when compared to other capital flows — such as the flow of goods (exports) and investment (FDI) — migration and remittances respond relatively slowly to

**Source:** Remittances, Migration Policy Institute analysis of Central Bank data; share of remittances in GDP, World Bank; Exports, International Monetary Fund, Directorate of Trade Statistics.
the changing economy. So while foreign direct investment appears to have begun recovering from its precipitous declines in 2008, the recovery in remittances will take much longer. The apparent decline in exports to Mexico is, in part, due to the decline in oil prices over the past year; still, the small decline in foreign direct investment to Mexico — just 5 percent lower than last year — is surprising given that Mexico has suffered directly from the US economic crisis, a deteriorating security climate as the government confronts drug cartels, and was the focus of a global health pandemic earlier this year. The Philippine Central Bank claims that the increase in foreign direct investment reflects confidence in the Philippines’ improving economy and early signs of a global stabilization. It may also reflect bargain hunting on the part of foreign investors.

Figure 15. Annual Change, to Date, of Remittances, Exports, and Foreign Direct Investment to Mexico and the Philippines, 2009

![Figure 15](image)

Source: Remittances, Migration Policy Institute analysis of Central Bank Data; exports, International Monetary Fund, Directorate of Trade Statistics; FDI, Secretaría de Economía de México and Bangko Sentral ng Philipinas.

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VI. The Recession and Immigrants’ Financial Well-Being

Economist Arnold Kling recently contemplated the long-term meaning of the economic crisis that began in earnest with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 but in fact dates further back. “In the last 18 months,” he writes, “an unusually high number of people have had their plans go awry. They wish they had made different choices in terms of their education and occupations. Digging out from these mistakes is going to take a long time.” Dr. Kling makes this observation with respect to the general population, but it is particularly relevant for the world’s estimated 195 million migrants. In the years leading up to the global economic crisis, millions of people made the often-difficult decision to leave their homes for abroad with the aim of improving their lives. But their plans have since been interrupted by global events.

Even pre-dating the global recession, migrants were among the more vulnerable populations in most major destination countries, concentrated at the lower socioeconomic rungs of society, often unable to access the same social safety-net benefits as the native born, and experiencing higher unemployment rates. There are, of course, important differences by world region and country. Broadly, in Anglo-Saxon countries (the United States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, Ireland), in Japan, and in the Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries, unemployment among migrants was low — often below natives; however, so were wages. As a result, poverty was typically higher in most immigrant communities — even among more skilled immigrants. By contrast, in continental Europe, unemployment and poverty among immigrants was typically well above natives (although many immigrants had access to limited social protections unavailable elsewhere).

The sacrifices endured by the world’s migrants enabled millions of people in their countries of origin to improve their financial and material well-being. The Mexican government estimates that absent remittances, food poverty in rural areas would have been 2.1 percentage points higher in 2006. Stated otherwise, remittances lifted 2.3 million rural Mexicans out of food poverty. (Research shows that remittances contribute more to

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189 For instance, in Spain in the fourth quarter of 2008, the unemployment rate among immigrants with a primary education was 27.0 percent compared to 18.6 percent among the Spanish born; among those with a lower secondary education, the unemployment rate was 23.5 percent for immigrants, and 17.3 percent for natives; among those with an upper secondary education, the unemployment rate was 19.6 for immigrants and 11.2 percent for natives; and among those with a post-secondary education, the unemployment rate was 14.9 percent for immigrants versus 6.5 percent for natives. Encuesta de Población Activa, Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Miguel Pajares, Inmigración y mercado de trabajo: Informe 2009 (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, 2009). For the United States, Batalova and Fix (2008) recently analyzed unemployment and underemployment among skilled immigrants. See Jeanne Batalova and Michael Fix with Peter A. Creticos, Uneven Progress: The Employment Pathways of Skilled Immigrants in the United States (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2008).

reducing the depth of poverty rather than reducing the poverty headcount, so these numbers understate the true importance of remittances in reducing poverty.\textsuperscript{191}

The storyline that emerges is that even in the boom years of the past decade, migrants have occupied marginalized positions in many developed countries — but even this was a step up compared to the opportunities in their countries of origin. Their incomes have helped family members move out of poverty back home. As policymakers increasingly move to protect domestic labor markets — and with the prospect of a long, painful jobless recovery — the situation for migrants is unlikely to improve in the near term.

A. Unemployment

Conventional wisdom suggests that immigrants are the “last hired and first fired” in the workplace. Available data confirm this notion — especially in the countries that have been worst hit by the recession. Immigrants disproportionately possess the demographic characteristics of workers who are most vulnerable during recessions. They tend to be less skilled and less formally educated, relatively young, and recent labor-market entrants.\textsuperscript{192} Many immigrants work in economic sectors like construction and lower-value-added manufacturing that have been the hardest hit by the downturn.\textsuperscript{193} It is not surprising, then, that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that unemployment rates for immigrants are rising faster than, and exceed, those of native-born workers in many developed nations.\textsuperscript{194} But migrants have been laid off at high rates throughout the world, including construction workers from India in Dubai and in other Gulf States, and Indonesians in Malaysia.\textsuperscript{195} Growing unemployment in Europe could likewise lead to large job losses for sub-Saharan Africans working in the construction and tourism industries.\textsuperscript{196}

United States

In the United States, unemployment among the overall immigrant population has remained in line with the unemployment rate for the native population, but when Mexican and Central American immigrants are disaggregated, the unemployment rate shows greater seasonality and a greater increase since the recession began (see Figure 1). Mexican and Central


\textsuperscript{192} Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Aaron Terrazas, Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis, (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009), 14, \url{http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/lmi_recessionJan09.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{193} Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Keep doors open to migrant workers to meet long-term labour needs, says OECD,” June 30, 2009, \url{http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3343,en_2649_201185_43195111_1_1_1_1,00.html}.


\textsuperscript{195} Khalid Koser, “The Global Financial Crisis and International Migration: Policy Implications for Australia” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, July 2009), 7, \url{http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1077}.

Americans are the most likely group to be unauthorized and have comparatively low skill levels. Notably, for a brief period during winter 2009, the unemployment rate among Mexican and Central American immigrants approached the historically high unemployment rate among African-Americans. It has since begun to decline, but this may be due to seasonal fluctuations.

**Figure 1. Unemployment Rate by Nativity or Ethnic Group, January 2000 to June 2009**

Notes: Unemployment rates are not seasonally adjusted, which means that comparisons should be made only for the same quarters of different years and not for successive quarter of the same year.

Refugees to the United States have also been hard hit by the recession. The US refugee resettlement process long has prided itself on promoting the early employment and self-sufficiency of refugees. Yet since the recession began, few refugees have been able to find jobs, undermining the very basis of the program and the well-being of refugees and their families.197

**European Union**

In most European countries, unemployment is typically higher among immigrants in normal times. Table 1 shows unemployment rates for natives and foreign nationals in the first quarter of 2007-Q1 (or as close as possible) and in the first quarter of 2009 (or as close as

possible) where data are available. Based on these data, we identify five groups of countries based on how unemployment has evolved among natives and foreign nationals over the past four years.

- Stable unemployment for both natives and foreign nationals (+/- 1.5 percentage points up or down): Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and Switzerland.
- Stable unemployment among natives, declining unemployment among foreign nationals (greater than 1.5 percentage point decline): Germany, Finland, Netherlands.
- Rising unemployment among foreign nationals (greater than 1.5 percentage point increase), stable unemployment among natives: Cyprus, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Sweden.
- Rising unemployment among natives, stable unemployment among foreign nationals: United Kingdom.
- Rising unemployment among both natives and foreign nationals: Estonia, Spain.

### Table 1. Unemployment Rates among Natives and Foreign Nationals, 2007-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007 Q1</th>
<th>2009 Q1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland*</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain**</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg***</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal**</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Source:** Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.

Within the European Union, Spain stands out for the severity of the crisis in that country. As has been described in this report, Spain attracted unprecedented numbers of migrants over the past decade to fuel its construction- and service-based boom. But those sectors have since retreated and migrants have been among the worst hit (although, admittedly, native-born Spaniards have not fared much better.) The unemployment rate among the Spanish born grew from 8.5 percent in Q4 2005 to 17.4 percent in Q1 2009, and from 10.2
to 28.4 percent over the same period among the foreign born. Spain had recorded the highest unemployment rate in the European Union already by July 2008 and half of the jobs lost in the European Union during the first six months of the recession were in Spain — an average of 8,600 jobs a day. (The various EU countries officially entered the recession at different times — mostly in the second half of 2008. Spain officially entered recession in the fourth quarter of 2008 while other countries such as Denmark entered recession as early as June 2008.) As Table 2 illustrates, the number of unemployed increased broadly across all nationality groups in Spain in 2008 (with the exception of Cubans who tend to be older, more highly skilled, and better integrated immigrants).

**Table 2. Yearly Increase in Unemployed Foreigners in Spain by Country of Birth, 2007-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign Jobless Increase in 2007</th>
<th>Foreign Jobless Increase in 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>13,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>19,653</td>
<td>53,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>4,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-892</td>
<td>2,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>20,177</td>
<td>68,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>-4,420</td>
<td>10,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>-1,015</td>
<td>22,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>37,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>7,370</td>
<td>-1,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>-1,059</td>
<td>59,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3,735</td>
<td>2,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>4,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>-486</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,338</strong></td>
<td><strong>371,734</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: A negative number indicates an increase in employment for a given population.*


Figure 2 shows that unemployment among construction and service workers increased most dramatically. By contrast, the number of unemployed foreigners in the agricultural industry actually declined in 2008. The distinction is notable for one reason in particular: In Spain, the agricultural industry relies on foreign workers with temporary visas (who must return home after the growing season) to a greater extent than the construction and services industries, which tend to hire illegally resident or longer-term resident immigrants.

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198 First quarter 2009 data: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Población Activa, data requested by the Migration Policy Institute.
Along with Spain, Ireland has perhaps been the worst hit by the global recession in the European Union. And like Spain, Ireland attracted record numbers of immigrants in recent years to fuel its booming economy. Ireland does not report unemployment rates for the foreign-born population, but we can get a sense of the human impact of the crisis on immigrants from the Live Register. (The Live Register is an administrative count of people registering for unemployment assistance, benefits, or other statutory entitlements at local offices of the Irish Department of Social and Family Affairs.)

Since the recession began in late 2007, the number of foreigners on the Live Register has increased dramatically — mostly due to increases in the number of A-10 nationals (see Figure 3). This was widely reported by OECD, among others, as of March 2009. However, more recent data analyzed by the Migration Policy Institute, through July 2009, show that while the number of foreign nationals on the Live Register continues to increase for almost all groups, the number of A-10 nationals has gradually declined since peaking in April 2009 (see Table 3).
Table 3. Nationality of Persons on the Live Register, December 2008 to July 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Persons</th>
<th>Irish nationals</th>
<th>Non-Irish nationals</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>EU 15 excl. Irl. &amp; UK</th>
<th>Accession states EU-15 to EU-27</th>
<th>Other nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td>291,363</td>
<td>236,908</td>
<td>54,455</td>
<td>13,279</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>28,950</td>
<td>9,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>327,861</td>
<td>263,527</td>
<td>64,334</td>
<td>14,807</td>
<td>3,651</td>
<td>35,826</td>
<td>10,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2009</td>
<td>354,437</td>
<td>282,721</td>
<td>71,716</td>
<td>15,707</td>
<td>4,052</td>
<td>41,057</td>
<td>10,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>371,271</td>
<td>295,658</td>
<td>75,613</td>
<td>16,299</td>
<td>4,245</td>
<td>43,559</td>
<td>11,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>384,448</td>
<td>306,598</td>
<td>77,850</td>
<td>16,819</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>44,727</td>
<td>11,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>396,871</td>
<td>317,794</td>
<td>79,077</td>
<td>17,315</td>
<td>4,389</td>
<td>44,640</td>
<td>12,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>418,592</td>
<td>337,647</td>
<td>80,945</td>
<td>18,033</td>
<td>4,528</td>
<td>44,566</td>
<td>13,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>435,735</td>
<td>354,949</td>
<td>80,786</td>
<td>18,594</td>
<td>4,499</td>
<td>43,548</td>
<td>14,145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Poverty

1. Poverty and Vulnerability Are Expected to Increase Globally

Evidence from past recessions provides some indicators as to the potential human toll of the economic crisis. Following the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, poverty rates rose by 10 percentage points in South Korea and in Indonesia they increased from 15 to 33 percent. Moreover, the World Bank notes that following the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, it took almost a decade for poverty headcounts to recover to their pre-crisis levels (which were, in any case, not particularly admirable). And this long recovery occurred in the context of an extremely favorable external economic climate with strong demand for exports from the worst-affected countries such as Thailand, Taiwan, and Indonesia.

Similarly, poverty rates in Mexico jumped 4 percentage points between 1994 and 1996 in the wake of the 1994 peso crisis. Food poverty rates nearly doubled between 1994 and 1996 and did not return to their pre-crisis levels until roughly 2002. More recent data suggest that rural food poverty rates in Mexico jumped from 13.8 percent in 2006 to 18.2 percent in 2008 — the first biennial increase in rural food poverty since 1994-96. The slowdown in remittances described earlier in this report will only accentuate this trend. Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies (CONEVAL) estimates that between 1992 and 2006, remittances grew 405.5 percent to rural families living in food poverty — much faster than for the general population. As a result, in 2006, with remittances food poverty in rural areas of Mexico would have affected 15.9 rather than 13.8 percent of the population; stated otherwise, remittances lifted 2.3 million rural Mexicans out of food poverty in 2006. However, these figures understate the effects of remittances in reducing poverty since most studies show that remittances tend to reduce the depth of poverty more than they reduce poverty headcounts.

Forecasts for the current economic crisis are dire: the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that in 2009, global unemployment will rise between 18 and 30 million workers relative to 2007; an estimated 210 to 239 million people will be unemployed by

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205 Ibid.
year’s end. Early estimates suggest that 53 million fewer people will escape poverty in the developing world (at the $1.25 per day level); in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (except India), the slowdown essentially eliminates all progress in poverty reduction between 2008 and 2009.

As is often the case, however, these aggregate figures hide significant regional variation. Reports on private-sector investment plans from the World Bank and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reveal some of these different trends. For instance, French building materials conglomerate Lafarge is advancing with plans to open a new cement factory in Saudi Arabia. A new Samsung plant in Malaysia could create as many as 2,000 jobs, according to UNCTAD, and personal care and household goods manufacturer Proctor and Gamble is continuing with investment in a shampoo factor in Slovakia. On the other hand, Ana Revenga, Director of the Poverty Reduction and Development Effectiveness Group at the World Bank reports that mine and smelter closures have led to mass layoffs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (100,000), South Africa (40,000, nearly 10 percent of the workforce), Zambia (3,000), Chile (2,000), and Mongolia (1,700), and to shorter working hours in Armenia; in the garment industry, 30,000 workers have been laid off in Cambodia (10 percent of the workforce).

In the second quarter of 2009, the Mexican unemployment rate rose 1.7 percent points relative to the second quarter of 2008; the underemployment rate rose 3.9 percentage points, and the discouraged worker rate rose 2.6 percentage points compared to a year earlier (see Figure 4). Underemployed rather than unemployed Mexicans typically have the greatest propensity to migrate to the United States. (Discouraged workers are individuals who have given up looking for a job because they do not believe that any are available; underemployed workers are defined as employed workers who need and are available for more hours of work than their current employer permits.)

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208 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ana Revenga, Financial Crisis and the Developing Countries.
214 Migration Policy Institute analysis of data from Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo, 2007 to 2009.
Similarly, Figure 5 presents data on unemployment rates among the total population in the ten Eastern European countries that joined the European Union between 2004 and 2007 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia). These countries send substantial numbers of migrants to Western Europe and so domestic unemployment has implications for the number of potential “migrants in waiting.”

Overall, the story of unemployment in Eastern Europe over the past five years is optimistic: As countries have joined the European Union, unemployment has declined substantially — with the exception of Hungary where unemployment has risen. However, in the three Baltic countries, the recession has effectively erased all employment gains since EU accession: unemployment in the first quarter of 2009 was at or above its 2004 levels. In the major Eastern European migrant-sending countries — Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania — the increase in unemployment has been much more modest. But the return of migrants from Western Europe will likely change this.
Figure 5. Unemployment Rates in A-10 Countries, 2004 to 2009
Note: Pink bars are prior to accession.
2. **Pre-Recession Migrants Were Already Highly Vulnerable**

Most official surveys that report poverty levels ask individual households about their income in a previous reference period — in the United States’ Current Population Survey, the reference period is the previous year. In the European Union, surveys that include questions on income are rare. As a result, available data address only the very early stages of the recession — before much of the turmoil of the past year. Still, poverty data on the foreign born in the United States show a marked uptick in 2007 (from the 2008 survey) — particularly among Mexican immigrants (see Figure 6). Of course, the construction sector in which many Mexican immigrants in the United States work was among the early victims of the crisis.

**Figure 6. Poverty Rates among Native-, Foreign-, and Mexican-Born in the United States, 1993 to 2007**

![Figure 6. Poverty Rates among Native-, Foreign-, and Mexican-Born in the United States, 1993 to 2007](image)


Across Europe, poverty rates among immigrants and their children were much higher than natives in most major destination countries in the most recent data available prior to the recession. Given the trends in unemployment in most countries described above poverty will likely increase.

- In Great Britain, about 40 percent of people from ethnic minorities are in income poverty, twice the rate for white people. Among white British, the poverty rate was 20 percent. The income poverty rates were highest for Bangladeshis (65 percent), Pakistanis (55 percent), and black Africans (45 percent); they were lowest for black Caribbeans (30 percent), Indians (25 percent), and other whites (including Arabs) (25

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216 The data for Great Britain (United Kingdom without Northern Ireland) are disaggregated by ethnicity rather than nativity. Accordingly, data reported for ethnic groups include both immigrants and their descendants.

percent). In London, about half of Bangladeshi workers are paid less than £7.50 per hour compared to about 10 percent of white British workers.\textsuperscript{218}

- In 2004, poverty rates among long-term immigrants to Canada were practically identical to poverty rates among the native born, but were about half of the poverty rate among recent immigrants (i.e., those in Canada for five years or less).\textsuperscript{219} Human Resources and Social Development Canada concluded in 2007 that “a significant proportion of recent immigrants of working age avoid poverty, not because of their labor-market income, but because of support they receive from family members and government. This finding is particularly true for working-age female immigrants.”\textsuperscript{220} Corak (2008) reports that the fraction of recent immigrants to Canada who live on low incomes has increased steadily since the 1980s and by 2000, more than one in three were living on low incomes.\textsuperscript{221}

- According to Ireland’s Office of Statistics, only one in five non-Irish nationals from the ten countries that joined the European Union in May 2007 (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Malta, and Cyprus) belong to the three highest-ranking occupational groups (professionals, managerial and technical workers, and non-manual workers) compared to nearly two-thirds of Irish nationals.\textsuperscript{222}

- The rate of poverty among non-EU immigrant households in the Paris region (Ile-de-France) was 37.3 percent in 2001 compared to 6.5 percent among EU-immigrant households and 8.9 percent among French households.\textsuperscript{223}

- In Spain as of 2006, 21 percent of the children of Spaniards are at risk of moderate poverty (households with 60 percent of median income), but among the children of parents born outside the European Union, 52 percent are at risk of moderate poverty. The differential in rates of extreme poverty (households with 25 percent of the median income) is even greater: among the children of Spaniards, 8.4 percent are at risk of extreme poverty compared to 32 percent of the children of immigrants.\textsuperscript{224}

- In early 2005, about 8.5 percent of Spain’s population was foreign born, but according to a survey by the Caixa Catalunya Foundation, 48.2 percent of homeless people in Spain were foreign born (including both people who sleep in streets and

\textsuperscript{218} Tom MacInnes and Peter Kenway, \textit{London’s Poverty Profile} (London: New Policy Institute, 2009).
\textsuperscript{219} Dominique Fleury, \textit{A Study of Poverty and Working Poverty among Recent Immigrants to Canada} (Ottawa: Human Resources and Social Development Canada, July 2007).
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{221} Miles Corak, \textit{Immigration in the Long Run: The Education and Earnings Mobility of Second-Generation Canadians} (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2008).
public spaces as well as people who sleep in public shelters). And among homeless immigrants in Spain, 59.0 percent had been in the country less than three years.

- In Belgium in 2001, 10.2 percent of the Belgian population lived in households with incomes below 60 percent of the median income compared to 15.0 percent of European immigrant households, 29.9 percent of non-European immigrant households, 58.9 percent of Turkish-origin households, and 55.6 percent of Moroccan-origin households. Unemployment among immigrants was also notably higher: In 2002-2003, 7 percent of natural-born Belgians were unemployed compared to 15 percent of naturalized citizens, 10 percent of European Union immigrants, 36 percent of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (combined), and 26 percent of other non-EU immigrants.

- Even in the relatively generous welfare states of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, poverty rates among children in immigrant families from developing countries are about four to six times those for native-born children; and they are about half as likely to exit from poverty.

**Taiwan**

As factory production shrinks, foreign workers risk loss of overtime and layoffs. Most migrants live in company-provided dorms, for which many employers deduct NT$4,000 (US$120) a month for room and board, which represents 23 percent of the minimum wage. In addition, Taiwan allows the labor brokers who match most migrants with jobs to charge up to NT$1,800 (US$55) a month for their first year in Taiwan, NT$1,700 (US$50) a month during the second year, and NT$1,500 (US$45) a month during the third year, or about 10 percent of the Taiwanese minimum wage. However, many brokers charge migrants an additional NT$200,000 (US$6,000) as a placement fee, which is allowed if the migrant signs a side agreement.

Foreign workers are not obtaining the overtime work they expected, making it difficult to repay the loans they took to get jobs in Taiwan. Migrants are entitled to the minimum wage even if their hours are reduced (unless they agree to fewer hours). Some factories have asked migrants to adopt 4-3 work schedules, four days of work followed by three days off.

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226 Ibid.


228 Ibid.


230 This section draws on “China: Recession; Taiwan, Hong Kong,” Migration News, vol. 15, no. 3 (July 2009), http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3534_0_3_0.

231 Approximate exchange rate in August 2009, 1 US$ = 33 NT$.

C. Other Forms of Vulnerability

1. Increased Reliance on the Informal Economy

Unemployment, underemployment, and economic insecurity — all features of the current crisis — are strongly associated with growth in the informal, or underground, economy. Informal work serves as an economic buffer to unemployed persons and allows low-wage workers to cobble together sufficient income to subsist. Although data are hard to come by, the combination of hard-pressed employers and even harder-pressed workers increases the likelihood that the informal economy in the United States has grown during the recession.

2. Greater Vulnerability to Trafficking

The US Department of State cautions that the recession also has increased the vulnerability of migrants to human trafficking and to exploitation in the workplace, including involuntary servitude. There are two principal reasons for this concern. First, dramatically reduced opportunities at home may force persons to migrate and to take greater risks in doing so. Second, the economic crisis increases demand for “forced, cheap, and child labor.” Furthermore, cuts in social safety nets will likely reduce programs and services for trafficked persons.

3. Increased Hostility toward Migrants

The crisis has led to increased hostility and violence against migrants. As the Migration Policy Institute cautioned in January 2009:

[I]n the face of growing economic insecurity, immigrants become likely scapegoats. This may be particularly problematic in countries that already face integration difficulties, such as Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, and France.

The Centre of Migration Policy and Society has echoed this concern in the context of increased civil unrest in many countries. It has also reported on rising hostility against Polish immigrants in the United Kingdom, particularly in “small towns, places without much

236 Ibid.
237 Ibid., 37.
238 Ibid., 40.
history of immigration and where the resources for coping with migrants are insufficient. Similarly, Amnesty International has reported on rising xenophobia as a result of diminished resources and competition for jobs, housing, and social services.

In some countries, the economic downturn is reported to have been a contributing factor in anti-immigrant violence. In May 2008, mobs in South Africa killed 60 people, injured 600, and displaced thousands of immigrants, most of them from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Somalia, and Ethiopia. In Russia, hate crimes against immigrants increased significantly in 2008, as did officially sanctioned anti-immigrant demonstrations by the youth group of the ruling United Russia party and by the nationalist Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DNPI). In the United States, the number of active hate groups has increased and these groups increasingly use animus toward immigrants as a recruitment tool.

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VII. Conclusion

Viewed from a high altitude, the story of the effects of the deepest economic contraction since the Great Depression on migration has been that the human flows most closely tied to withering labor markets — the unauthorized and, to a lesser degree, temporary migrant workers — have slowed. Less pronounced declines can be seen among migrants who move for permanent settlement through the family and even employment systems. But inflows are only half of the story we tell here. A second central story is that even now — nearly two years into the recession — return migration remains the exception and not the rule. Where it has been the exception (the United Kingdom and the A8 countries for example) it may well offer a lesson about the salutary self-regulating character of free, if regulated, movement of people.

Further, it is interesting to note that the traditional immigrant-receiving countries of the United States, Canada, and Australia, have essentially retained their comparatively liberal pre-recession admissions policies. They may have trimmed a few temporary worker slots here and a few permanent employment slots there but they have essentially stayed their historical immigration course.

At the same time, a large number of countries with struggling economies, some of which have hosted large numbers of migrant-worker populations in recent years have closed, or at least partially shut their migration doors. And some of the most provocative experiments intended to reduce the number of now unwanted foreign workers — paid voluntary return programs — appear to have had modest success at best, unable to surmount the force of immigrant networks, human investments, and unpromising home economies.

This general pattern of slowed movement may, in many ways, be seen as a testament to the often noted resilience of migrants worldwide. Though they have been particularly hard hit by recession-driven unemployment, growing poverty, and in some cases discrimination — they have, by and large, stayed put to weather the storm.

Finally, we are struck by the persistence of these trends — trends that we first observed and documented in the fall of 2008. But one year out from the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, changing economic forecasts raise the question whether the world is at a another hinge point of history that will set in motion an accelerated flow and return migration patterns akin to those of the earliest years of the 21st century.
**VIII. Data Sources**

1. **Multilateral Organizations**

   **Eurostat**


   **Frontex**


   **Inter-American Development Bank**


   **International Labor Organization**


International Monetary Fund


International Organization for Migration


Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development


**United Nations**


[www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html](http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html).

**World Bank**


**World Trade Organization**


2. **Country Sources**

**Australia**


**Bangladesh**

Canada


Cape Verde


China


www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_detail.jsp?searchword=%C5%A9%C3%F1%B9%A4 &channelid=6697&record=70.


Czech Republic

http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=325.

Ministry of the Interior, Department of Asylum and Migration Policy. 

Ministry of Labor. Table “Employment of Foreigners.”


Ecuador

El Salvador


Honduras


India


Ireland


Japan


www.mhlw.go.jp/za/0729/a54/a54-02.pdf.


Kenya

Central Bank of Kenya. 


Korea

Ministry of Labor. 2009. This Year Foreign Workforce Quota Reduced to 1/3 of last year- To protect Korean Job-Seekers and Foreign Workers in Korea. News release, March 31, 2009. 

Malaysia


Mexico


Moldova


Morocco


Pakistan

Philippines


Poland


Spain


Taiwan


Turkey


United States


United Kingdom


http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=736.


UK Border Agency. Accession Monitoring Reports.

3. Other Sources for Global and Regional Topics


Acknowledgments

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About the Authors

Michael Fix

Michael Fix is Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), as well as Co-Director of MPI's National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy. His work focuses on immigrant integration, citizenship policy, immigrant children and families, the education of immigrant students, the effect of welfare reform on immigrants, and the impact of immigrants on the US labor force.

Mr. Fix, who is an attorney, previously was at the Urban Institute, where he directed the Immigration Studies Program from 1998 through 2004. His research at the Urban Institute focused on immigrants and integration, regulatory reform, federalism, race, and the measurement of discrimination.

Mr. Fix is a Research Fellow with IZA in Bonn, Germany. He served on the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on the Redesign of US Naturalization Tests and is a member of the Advisory Panel to the Foundation for Child Development's Young Scholars Program. In November 2005, Mr. Fix was a New Millennium Distinguished Visiting Scholar at Columbia University's School of Social Work.

Mr. Fix received a JD from the University of Virginia and bachelor's degree from Princeton University. He did additional graduate work at the London School of Economics.

Demetrios G. Papademetriou

Demetrios G. Papademetriou is President and Co-Founder of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), a Washington-based think tank dedicated exclusively to the study of international migration. He is also the convener of the Transatlantic Council on Migration and its predecessor, the Transatlantic Task Force on Immigration and Integration (co-convened with the Bertelsmann Stiftung). The Council is composed of senior public figures, business leaders, and public intellectuals from Europe, the United States, and Canada. Dr. Papademetriou is also Co-Founder and International Chair Emeritus of Metropolis: An International Forum for Research and Policy on Migration and Cities. He is Chair of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Migration.

Dr. Papademetriou holds a PhD in Comparative Public Policy and International Relations (1976) and has taught at the universities of Maryland, Duke, American, and New School for Social Research. He
has held a wide range of senior positions that include: Chair of the Migration Committee of the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Director for Immigration Policy and Research at the US Department of Labor and Chair of the Secretary of Labor’s Immigration Policy Task Force; and Executive Editor of the International Migration Review.

Dr. Papademetriou has published more than 250 books, articles, monographs, and research reports on migration topics and advises senior government and political party officials in more than 20 countries, including numerous European Union Member States while they hold the rotating EU presidency.

Jeanne Batalova

Jeanne Batalova is a Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute. Her areas of expertise include impacts of immigrants on society and labor markets; integration of immigrant children and elderly immigrants; and the policies and practices regulating immigration of highly skilled workers and foreign students. She is also Manager of MPI’s Data Hub, a one-stop, Web-based resource that provides instant access to the latest facts, stats, and maps covering US and global data on immigration and immigrant integration.

She earned her PhD in Sociology, with a specialization in demography, from University of California-Irvine, MBA from Roosevelt University, and BA in Economics from Academy of Economic Studies, Chisinau, Moldova.

Aaron Terrazas

Aaron Terrazas is an Associate Policy Analyst at MPI, where he focuses on immigrant integration and education, migration and development, and the role of immigrants in the workforce.

Mr. Terrazas holds a bachelor’s degree with honors from the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he majored in International Affairs and earned a certificate in Latin American Studies. He was awarded the William Manger Latin American Studies Award for his senior thesis, The Mexican Connection: Remittances, Diaspora Engagement, Economic Development, and the Role of the State. He also studied at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris and has completed post-graduate coursework in statistics and econometrics.
Serena Yi-Ying Lin

Serena Yi-Ying Lin is a Data/Statistical Analyst at MPI, providing quantitative research and project management support across MPI's programs and for MPI's National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy.

Before coming to MPI, Ms. Lin worked as an economist for the Division of International Labor Comparisons at the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.

She has a master's degree in Public Policy from Georgetown University, and earned her undergraduate degree from the National Taiwan University. She has also studied at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

Michelle Mittelstadt

Michelle Mittelstadt is Director of Communications and is responsible for developing and implementing MPI’s strategic communications, managing the Web site and publications, and coordinating the Institute’s media outreach and events.

A veteran journalist, she joined MPI after covering immigration policy, Congress, and border-related issues since the early 1990s in the Washington bureaus of The Associated Press, The Dallas Morning News, and The Houston Chronicle. She has written hundreds of articles examining US immigration policy, border and interior enforcement, and the post-9/11 legislative and executive branch changes that have altered the immigration landscape. She also covered the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security.

Prior to coming to Washington, Ms. Mittelstadt was an editor with The Associated Press in Dallas and Managing Editor of The Courier Herald in Dublin, Ga.

She holds a bachelor's degree in Journalism with a concentration in Global Studies from the University of Georgia.